














NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I01020-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDACID: 103
ITEM: HE ISOL A & B VLVS




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA NOW RECOMMENDS THAT THE B SCREEN BE FAILED AND THAT THIS ITEM
AND FAILURE MODE BE PLACED ON THE CIL. A FAILURE OF THE REDUNDANT
SECONDARY REG IS NOT DETECTABLE IN FLIGHT. IOA RECOMMENDS THE
ADDITION OF A STATEMENT TO THE EFFECTS (FAILS OPEN) REGARDING
POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF ORBITER ENTRY MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS.
F_NAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDRAWS ISSUE BASED ON NSTS 22206
GROUNDRULE (8/21/87, P. 2-13, 2.3.4.c) . A FAILED OPEN ISOL VALVE
IS DETECTABLE DURING FLIGHT VIA TALKBACK DISPLAY. THE REDUNDANCY
SCREEN B TEST SHOULD BE APPLIED ONLY TO THE ISOL VALVE SINCE THE
UNLIKE REDUNDANT REGULATOR IS IDENTIFIED SEPARATELY IN THE
FMEA/CIL. THAT IS, AN UNDETECTABLE REG FAILURE SHOULD NOT CAUSE A
B SCREEN FAILURE FOR THE DETECTABLE ISOL VALVE FAILURE. HOWEVER,
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THE B SCREEN BE FAILED SINCE ONE LEVEL OF
REDUNDANCY (REG) CAN BE LOST WITHOUT BEING DETECTED. ALSO, THE
NASA RCS FMEA/CIL ANALYSIS CONSIDERED THE DETECTABILITY OF ALL
REDUNDANT ITEMS IN DETERMINING B SCREEN PASSAGE OR FAILURE. IOA
AGREES WITH THIS PRACTICE. FOR CONSISTENCY WITHIN THE RCS
FMEA/CIL, THIS B SCREEN SHOULD BE FAILED.














HE ISOL A & B VLVS




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA/RI DO NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE (INTERNAL LEAKAGE).
FINAL RESOLUTION: G. GRUSH (RCS SSM) ON 5/19/88 AGREED TO ADD
"INTERNAL LEAKAGE" TO THE FAILURE MODES ON 03-2F-I01020-3 (3/IR
PPP, FAILS OPEN) DURING THE NEXT FMEA UPDATE ACTIVITY. IOA
WITHDRAWS B SCREEN ISSUE. WITH ONE HELIUM ISOL VALVE OPEN,
INTERNAL LEAKAGE OF THE CLOSED PARALLEL VALVE IS UNDETECTABLE, BUT
HAS NO EFFECT. IF BOTH VALVES ARE CLOSED AND ONE VALVE IS LEAKING
INTERNALLY, THE EFFECTS ARE DETECTABLE VIA PRESSURE SENSORS IN THE
HELIUM TANK AND/OR THE PROPELLANT TANK.





NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I01020-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 104
ITEM: HE ISOL A & B VLVS




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)




IOA RECOMMENDS THIS FAILURE MODE BE UPGRADED TO A 2/IR AND PLACED
ON THE CIL. INABILITY TO REPRESS FRCS PROP TANK AND SUBSEQUENT
INABILITY TO DEPLETE PROP COULD RESULT IN VIOLATION OF X CG LIMIT.
FINAL RESODUTION: IOA HELD MTG ON 6/2/88 WITH RCS SSM, & MOD,
BOEING, & RSOC PERSONNEL TO DISCUSS IOA IR/2 ISSUE AND
INCONSISTENCY BETWEEN RCS HDW CRIT (IR/3) AND GN&C FMEA 05-1-
FC6242-I (IR/2). SSM STATED THAT USE OF A FRCS DUMP FOR ENTRY X
CG MANAGEMENT WAS NOT CONSIDERED IN RCS CRIT ASSIGNMENT AS WAS
DONE IN IOA AND GN&C CRITS. A POST-DEORBIT FRCS DUMP IS USED TO
MEET THE FWD X CG LIMIT (1076.7 IN). THEREFORE, IF A PLANNED DUMP
ISN'T COMPLETED BECAUSE OF TWO FAILED CLOSED HE ISOL VLVS, THE X
CG LIMIT MAY BE VIOLATED CAUSING LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE. THE CRIT
ASSIGNED TO THIS FAILURE SHOULD REFLECT THE POTENTIAL ENTRY X CG
LIMIT VIOLATION. IOA RELUCTANTLY WITHDRAWS ISSUE BASED ON THE
NARROW TIME SPAN IN WHICH BOTH FAILURES MUST OCCUR, PARTIAL ULLAGE
CAPABILITY, THE "CONTINGENCY CG ENVELOPE", AND THE SSM'S JUDGMENT.
HOWEVER, IOA STRONGLY RECOMMENDS EITHER A IR/2 FOR THIS FAILURE,
OR A FLIGHT RULE WHICH PROHIBITS RELIANCE ON A FRCS DUMP TO MEET
THE ENTRY X CG LIMIT. ALSO, THE INCONSISTENCY BETWEEN THE RCS
CRIT AND ABOVE GN&C FMEA SHOULD BE CORRECTED.





NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I01091-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HIGH PRESSURE HELIUM TEST PORT COUPLINGS A & B




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH NASA/RI FAILURE OF A AND B SCREENS. IOA
RECOMMENDS THAT "POPPET FAILS OPEN" BE ADDED AS A FAILURE MODE ON
THIS FMEA/CIL. THIS IS A CREDIBLE FAILURE MODE AND IS ADDRESSED
ON OTHER QD FMEAS. THE QUANTITY ON THIS FMEA/CIL SHOULD BE 12.
IOA RECOMMENDS ADDING A STATEMENT TO THE EFFECTS REGARDING
POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF ORBITER ENTRY MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS.
F_NAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDRAWS ISSUE. IOA MAINTAINS
RECOMMENDATION THE "POPPET FAILS OPEN" BE ADDED AS A FAILURE MODE
ON THIS CIL FOR COMPLETENESS, HOWEVER CIL IS ADEQUATE WITHOUT THIS
ADDITION.





NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I01030-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HE PRESS REGULATOR ASSEMBLY




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
] IN]
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA RECOMMENDS THIS FAILURE MODE BE UPGRADED TO A 2/IR AND PLACED
ON THE CIL. INABILITY TO REPRESS FRCS PROP TANK AND SUBSEQUENT
INABILITY TO DEPLETE PROP COULD RESULT IN VIOLATION OF X CG LIMIT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA HELD MTG ON 6/2/88 WITH RCS SSM, & MOD,
BOEING, & RSOC PERSONNEL TO DISCUSS IOA IR/2 ISSUE AND
INCONSISTENCY BETWEEN RCS HDW CRIT (IR/3) AND GN&C FMEA 05-1-
FC6242-I (IR/2). SSM STATED THAT USE OF A FRCS DUMP FOR ENTRY X
CG MANAGEMENT WAS NOT CONSIDERED IN RCS CRIT ASSIGNMENT AS WAS
DONE IN IOA AND GN&C CRITS. A POST-DEORBIT FRCS DUMP IS USED TO
MEET THE FWD X CG LIMIT (1076.7 IN). THEREFORE, IF A PLANNED DUMP
IS NOT COMPLETED BECAUSE OF TWO FAILED CLOSED HELIUM REGS, THE X
CG LIMIT MAY BE VIOLATED RESULTING IN LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE. THE
CRITICALITY ASSIGNED TO THIS FAILURE MODE SHOULD REFLECT THE
POTENTIAL ENTRY X CG LIMIT VIOLATION. IOA RELUCTANTLY WITHDRAWS
ISSUE BASED ON THE NARROW TIME SPAN IN WHICH BOTH FAILURES MUST BE
PRESENT, PARTIAL ULLAGE CAPABILITY, THE "CONTINGENCY CG ENVELOPE",
AND THE SSM'S JUDGMENT. HOWEVER, IOA STRONGLY RECOMMENDS EITHER A
IR/2 FOR THIS FAILURE MODE, OR A NEW FLIGHT RULE WHICH PROHIBITS
RELIANCE ON A FRCS DUMP TO MEET THE ENTRY X CG LIMIT. ALSO, THE
INCONSISTENCY BETWEEN THE RCS CRIT AND ABOVE GN&C FMEA SHOULD BE
CORRECTED. IOA ACCEPTS B SCREEN FAILURE. SEE ASSESSMENT SHEET
RCS-212 FOR RATIONALE.














HE PRESS REGULATOR ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA/RI DO NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE (RESTRICTED FLOW).
FINAL RESOLUTION: G. GRUSH (RCS SSM) ON 5/19/88 AGREED TO ADD
"RESTRICTED FLOW" TO THE FAILURE MODES ON 03-2F-I01030-2 (3/IR
PPP, FAILS CLOSED) DURING THE NEXT FMEA UPDATE ACTIVITY. IOA
WITHDRAWS 2/IR ISSUE (SEE ASSESSMENT SHEET RCS-II2 FOR RATIONALE).
IOA ALSO WITHDRAWS B SCREEN ISSUE. THIS FAILURE WOULD BE
DETECTABLE BEFORE LAUNCH AND AT SOME POINT ON-ORBIT SINCE ONLY ONE
FLOW PATH IS OPEN AT A TIME DURING PAD PRE-PRESS AND ON-ORBIT.
HOWEVER, IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THE B SCREEN BE FAILED FOR PHASES
WHEN BOTH FLOW PATHS ARE USED SIMULTANEOUSLY (ASCENT AND ENTRY),
WHEN THIS FAILURE WOULD NOT BE DETECTABLE.














HE PRESS REGULATOR ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA/RI DO NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE (STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
RUPTURE, EXTERNAL LEAKAGE). IOA ORIGINALLY CONSIDERED THE
PARALLEL HELIUM PATHS TO BE REDUNDANT FOR THIS FAILURE (2/IR), BUT
NOW CLASSIFIES THIS FAILURE AS A i/i.
FINAL RESOLUTION: G. GRUSH (RCS SSM) ON 12/15/87 AGREED TO ADD
THIS VALVE BODY TO THE HELIUM LINE EXTERNAL LEAKAGE FMEA (03-2F-
101013-1, I/I) WITH CORRESPONDING RETENTION RATIONALE. THIS WAS
ALSO AN ACTION ITEM FROM THE RCS PRCB ON 12/23/87.














HE PRESS REGULATOR PRIMARY SENSING PORT
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA/RI DO NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE (EXTERNAL LEAKAGE THROUGH
SENSING PORT). HOWEVER, THIS FAILURE MODE IS COVERED BY NASA/RI
IN THE OMS SUBSYSTEM ON FMEA 03-3-1004-3 (3/2R PFP). IOA
RECOMMENDS THAT THIS FAILURE MODE ALSO BE COVERED FOR THE RCS
REGULATOR WITH THE SAME RATIONALE USED IN OMS. IOA WITHDRAWS 2/IR
PPP CRIT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDRAWS ISSUE. THE WORST CASE REGULATOR
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE IS COVERED ON 03-2F-I01013-I (i/i). THE PROPOSED
IOA FAILURE MODE IS A LESS SEVERE CASE OF THE FAILURE MODE COVERED
ON 03-2F-I01013-I AND, THEREFORE, NEED NOT BE ADDED TO THE RCS
FMEA/CIL. HOWEVER, FOR CONSISTENCY BETWEEN RCS AND OMS IDENTICAL
ITEMS, IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THIS FAILURE MODE SHOULD ALSO BE
ADDRESSED IN THE RCS FMEA/CIL.





NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I01091-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HE PRESS REGULATOR OUTLET TEST PORT COUPLING




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH NASA/RI 3/1R FFP ASSIGNMENT. IOA ORIGINALLY
IDENTIFIED THIS AS A TWO-SEAL COUPLING RATHER THAN A MULTIPLE SEAL
0032 COUPLING. IOA RECOMMENDS THAT "POPPET FAILS OPEN" BE ADDED
AS A FAILURE MODE ON THIS FMEA/CIL. THIS IS A CREDIBLE FAILURE
MODE AND IS ADDRESSED ON OTHER QD FMEAS. THE QUANTITY ON THIS
FMEA SHOULD BE 12. IOA ALSO RECOMMENDS ADDING A STATEMENT TO THE
EFFECTS REGARDING POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF ORBITER ENTRY MASS
PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDRAWS ISSUE. IOA MAINTAINS
RECOMMENDATION THE "POPPET FAILS OPEN" BE ADDED AS A FAILURE MODE
ON THIS CIL FOR COMPLETENESS, HOWEVER CIL IS ADEQUATE WITHOUT THIS
ADDITION.





NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I01095-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






QUAD CHECK VALVE ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THIS ITEM AND FAILURE MODE BE UPGRADED TO A
2/IR AND PLACED ON THE CIL. WITH SERIES POPPETS FAILED OPEN, THE
CONTAMINATION OF REGULATORS BY PROP OR PROP VAPORS COULD RESULT IN
LOSS OF PROP TANK REPRESS CAPABILITY AND INABILITY TO USE OR
DEPLETE FRCS PROP. THIS COULD LEAD TO VIOLATIONS OF ENTRY MASS
PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS AND LOSS OF LIFE OF VEHICLE DURING ENTRY.
FAILURE OF ONE POPPET UNDETECTABLE DURING FLIGHT (FAIL B SCREEN).
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA ACCEPTS 3/3 BASED ON INPUTS FROM OMS AND
RCS SSMs: THE REGS ARE DESIGNED TO BE COMPATIBLE WITH PROP AND
HAVE PASSED 90 DAY PROP EXPOSURE TEST. ALSO, ENOUGH TIME DOES NOT
EXIST DURING A MISSION FOR PROP EXPOSURE TO CAUSE A REG FAILURE.
ANY PROBLEM RESULTING FROM PROP EXPOSURE ON THE GROUND WOULD BE
DETECTED DURING PRELAUNCH OPS. THE SSMs AGREED THAT THE IOA
CONCERNS WERE NOT IMPOSSIBLE, BUT CONSIDER THE PROBABILITY OF SUCH
OCCURRENCES TO BE "INFINITESIMALLY SMALL". IOA STILL RECOMMENDS
2/IR BASED ON ULTIMATE WORST-CASE POSSIBLE EFFECTS, BUT ACCEPTS
JUDGMENT OF SSMs. SINCE THESE FAILURE MODES CAN CAUSE IR
REGULATOR FAILURES (SEE CAUSES ON 03-2F-I01030-I, 03-2A-201030-I,
& 03-2A-201030-2), THEY SHOULD BE CLASSIFIED AS IR's.





NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I01095-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






QUAD CHECK VALVE ASSEMBLY




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
] [ ]
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)




IOA RECOMMENDS THIS FAILURE MODE BE UPGRADED TO A 2/IR. INABILITY
TO REPRESS FRCS PROP TANK AND SUBSEQUENT INABILITY TO DEPLETE PROP
COULD RESULT IN VIOLATION OF THE ENTRY X CG LIMIT.
F_NAL RESOLUTION: IOA HELD MTG ON 6/2/88 WITH RCS SSM, AND MOD,
BOEING, & RSOC PERSONNEL TO DISCUSS IOA IR/2 ISSUE AND
INCONSISTENCY BETWEEN RCS HDW CRIT (IR/3) AND GN&C FMEA 05-1-
FC6242-I (IR/2). SSM STATED THAT USE OF A FRCS DUMP FOR ENTRY X
CG MANAGEMENT WAS NOT CONSIDERED IN RCS CRIT ASSIGNMENT AS WAS
DONE IN IOA AND GN&C CRITS. A POST-DEORBIT FRCS DUMP IS USED TO
MEET THE FWD X CG LIMIT (1076.7 IN). THEREFORE, IF A PLANNED DUMP
IS NOT COMPLETED BECAUSE OF TWO FAILED CLOSED CHECK VLV POPPETS,
THE X CG LIMIT MAY BE VIOLATED RESULTING IN LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
THE CRITICALITY ASSIGNED TO THIS FAILURE MODE SHOULD REFLECT THE
POTENTIAL ENTRY X CG LIMIT VIOLATION. IOA RELUCTANTLY WITHDRAWS
ISSUE BASED ON THE NARROW TIME SPAN IN WHICH BOTH FAILURES MUST BE
PRESENT, PARTIAL ULLAGE CAPABILITY, THE "CONTINGENCY CG ENVELOPE",
AND THE SSM'S JUDGMENT. HOWEVER, IOA STRONGLY RECOMMENDS EITHER A
IR/2 FOR THIS FAILURE MODE, OR A NEW FLIGHT RULE WHICH PROHIBITS
RELIANCE ON A FRCS DUMP TO MEET THE ENTRY X CG LIMIT. ALSO, THE
INCONSISTENCY BETWEEN THE RCS CRIT AND ABOVE GN&C FMEA SHOULD BE
CORRECTED.















NEW [ X ]
FRCS
121
QUADCHECK VALVE TEST PORT COUPLINGS A & B
C.D. PRUST
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH NASA/RI 3/IR FFP ASSIGNMENT. IOA ORIGINALLY
IDENTIFIED THIS AS A TWO-SEAL COUPLING RATHER THAN A MULTIPLE SEAL
0032 COUPLING. IOA RECOMMENDS THAT "POPPET FAILS OPEN" BE ADDED
AS A FAILURE MODE ON THIS FMEA/CIL. THIS IS A CREDIBLE FAILURE
MODE AND IS ADDRESSED ON OTHER QD FMEAS. THE QUANTITY ON THIS
FMEA SHOULD BE 12. IOA ALSO RECOMMENDS ADDING A STATEMENT TO THE
EFFECTS REGARDING POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF ORBITER ENTRY MASS
PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDRAWS ISSUE. IOA MAINTAINS
RECOMMENDATION THE "POPPET FAILS OPEN" BE ADDED AS A FAILURE MODE
ON THIS CIL FOR COMPLETENESS, HOWEVER CIL IS ADEQUATE WITHOUT THIS
ADDITION.





NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-111110-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THE P.A.D. COMPONENTS BE ITEMIZED IN THE ITEM
LIST OR FUNCTIONAL DESCRIPTION SECTIONS TO SHOW SPECIFICALLY WHAT
IS COVERED BY THIS FMEA/CIL. IOA ALSO RECOMMENDS THAT THE "HIGH
G" DISCUSSION BE REMOVED FROM THE FUNCTIONAL DESCRIPTION.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDRAWS ISSUE. IOA RECOMMENDS EDITORIAL
REVISIONS AS STATED, HOWEVER NO LONGER CONSIDERS THIS
RECOMMENDATION TO BE AN "ISSUE". THE CRITICALITY IS CORRECT FOR
THIS FAILURE MODE.





NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I01090-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







PROP TK UPPER COMPARTMENT CHANNEL CHECK-OUT




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH NASA/RI 3/IR FFP ASSIGNMENT. IOA ORIGINALLY
IDENTIFIED THIS AS A TWO-SEAL COUPLING RATHER THAN A MULTIPLE-SEAL
0032 COUPLING. IOA RECOMMENDS THAT "POPPET FAILS OPEN" BE ADDED
AS A FAILURE MODE ON THIS FMEA/CIL. THIS IS A CREDIBLE FAILURE
MODE AND IS ADDRESSED ON OTHER QD FMEAS. IOA ALSO RECOMMENDS
ADDING STATEMENTS TO THE EFFECTS REGARDING POSSIBLE FIRE HAZARD,
HAZARD TO GROUND CREW, AND POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF ENTRY MASS
PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDRAWS ISSUE. IOA MAINTAINS
RECOMMENDATION THE "POPPET FAILS OPEN" BE ADDED AS A FAILURE MODE
ON THIS CIL FOR COMPLETENESS, HOWEVER CIL IS ADEQUATE WITHOUT THIS
ADDITION.















LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA/RI DO NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE (BURST DISK INTERNAL
LEAKAGE). IOA CONSIDERS THIS FAILURE MODE TO BE CREDIBLE AND
RECOMMENDS IT BE ADDED TO 03-2F-I01060-5. THE FAILURE HISTORY OF
THE BURST DISK INCLUDES THIS FAILURE.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDRAWS ISSUE. THE WORST-CASE BURST DISK
LEAKAGE IS COVERED ON 03-2F-I01060-5 (BURST DISK RUPTURES
PREMATURELY, 2/1R PFP). THE IOA FAILURE MODE IS A LESS SEVERE
CASE OF THE FAILURE MODE COVERED ON 03-2F-I01060-5 AND, THEREFORE,
NEED NOT BE ADDED TO THE RCS FMEA/CIL. THE FMEA/CIL NEED ONLY
ADDRESS THE WORST-CASE FAILURE MODE.





NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-101091-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RELIEF VALVE TEST PORT COUPLING




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH NASA/RI FAILURE OF A AND B SCREENS. IOA
RECOMMENDS THAT "POPPET FAILS OPEN" BE ADDED AS A FAILURE MODE ON
THIS FMEA/CIL. THIS IS A CREDIBLE FAILURE MODE AND IS ADDRESSED
ON OTHER QD FMEAS. THE QUANTITY ON THIS FMEA/CIL SHOULD BE 12.
IOA RECOMMENDS ADDING A STATEMENT TO THE EFFECTS REGARDING
POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF ORBITER ENTRY MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDRAWS ISSUE. IOA MAINTAINS
RECOMMENDATION THE "POPPET FAILS OPEN" BE ADDED AS A FAILURE MODE
ON THIS CIL FOR COMPLETENESS, HOWEVER CIL IS ADEQUATE WITHOUT THIS
ADDITION.



















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]





COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA/RI DO NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE (STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
RUPTURE, EXTERNAL LEAKAGE).
FINAL RESOLUTION: G. GRUSH (RCS SSM) ON 12/15/87 AGREED TO ADD
THIS VALVE BODY TO THE HELIUM LINE EXTERNAL LEAKAGE FMEA (03-2F-
101013-1, I/I) WITH CORRESPONDING RETENTION RATIONALE. THIS WAS
ALSO AN ACTION ITEM FROM THE RCS PRCB ON 12/23/87. IOA ALSO
RECOMMENDS THAT THIS FMEA INCLUDE PROP LEAKAGE EFFECTS (CORROSION,
FIRE, EXPLOSION, EXPOSURE OF EVA AND GROUND CREWS).





NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I02112-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PROP TK ISOL VLVS 1/2 & 3/4/5




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS FMEA COVERS ONLY THE BELLOWS LEAKAGE FAILURE MODE FOR THE
PROP TANK ISOL VALVES. IOA HAS NO ISSUE WITH THIS FAILURE MODE,
HOWEVER DOES RECOMMEND THAT THE EFFECTS INCLUDE THE POSSIBLE
EXPOSURE OF EVA AND GROUND CREWS TO PROP OR PROP VAPORS.
NASA/RI DO NOT COVER STRUCTURAL FAILURE, RUPTURE, OR EXTERNAL
LEAKAGE OF THE VALVE HOUSING ON THIS FMEA OR ELSEWHERE.
FINAL RESOLUTION: G. GRUSH (RCS SSM) ON 12/15/87 AGREED TO ADD
THIS VALVE BODY TO THE PROP LINE EXTERNAL LEAKAGE FMEA (03-2F-
102108-1, i/i) WITH CORRESPONDING RETENTION RATIONALE. THIS WAS
ALSO AN ACTION ITEM FROM THE RCS PRCB ON 12/23/87.





NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-i02120-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PROP TK ISOL VLVS 1/2 & 3/4/5




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ N ]
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ F ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA WITHDRAWS I/1 CRIT, BUT MAINTAINS CONCERN THAT RESTRICTED FLOW
TO A THRUSTER COULD RESULT IN BURN-THROUGH. IOA ALSO WITHDRAWS
I/I ABORT ISSUE DUE TO LACK OF CURRENT FRCS DUMP CAPABILITY DURING
RTLS & TAL, HOWEVER RECOMMENDS A i/i ABORT CRIT (BASED ON A
POSSIBLE INCOMPLETE DUMP) IF SUCH CAPABILITY EXISTS IN THE FUTURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THE RESTRICTED FLOW MODE BE UPGRADED TO A 2/IR
AND PLACED ON THE CIL. INABILITY TO USE OR DEPLETE FRCS PROP
COULD RESULT IN INABILITY TO PERFORM ET SEP, OR VIOLATION OF THE
ENTRY X CG LIMIT. ANY UPSTREAM CONTAMINATION CAN AFFECT ALL
REDUNDANCY.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA MET WITH G. GRUSH (RCS SSM) ON 5/19/88 TO
DISCUSS IR/2 ISSUE. IOA ACCEPTS SSM'S JUDGMENT AND RELUCTANTLY
WITHDRAWS ISSUE BASED ON THE NARROW TIME SPAN IN WHICH BOTH VLVS
MUST FAIL, AND THE "CONTINGENCY CG ENVELOPE". HOWEVER, IOA
STRONGLY RECOMMENDS A IR/2 PPF FOR THIS FAILURE MODE BASED ON THE
ABOVE RATIONALE. IOA CONTENDS THAT RESTRICTED FLOW OF THE TWO
PROP TANK ISOL VLVS COULD RESULT IN LOSS ET SEP CAPABILITY OR
VIOLATION OF THE ENTRY X CG LIMIT DUE TO INABILITY TO DUMP FRCS
PROP AFTER THE DEORBIT BURN. ALSO, THE INCONSISTENCY BETWEEN THIS
RCS HDW CRIT (IR/3) AND GN&C FMEA 05-I-FC6242-I (IR/2) SHOULD BE
CORRECTED.











PROP TK ISOL VLV 1/2




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)




IOA WITHDRAWS i/1 ABORT ISSUE DUE TO LACK OF CURRENT FRCS DUMP
CAPABILITY DURING RTLS & TAL, HOWEVER RECOMMENDS A i/i ABORT CRIT
(BASED ON POSSIBLE INADEQUATE DUMP) IF SUCH A CAPABILITY EXISTS IN
THE FUTURE. IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THE FAILED CLOSED AND FAILS TO
REMAIN OPEN FAILURE MODES BE UPGRADED TO 2/IR AND PLACED ON THE
CIL. INABILITY TO USE OR DEPLETE FRCS PROP COULD RESULT IN
INABILITY TO PERFORM ET SEP, OR VIOLATION OF THE ENTRY X CG LIMIT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA MET WITH G. GRUSH (RCS SSM) ON 5/19/88 TO
DISCUSS IR/2 ISSUE. IOA ACCEPTS SSM'S JUDGMENT AND RELUCTANTLY
WITHDRAWS ISSUE BASED ON THE NARROW TIME SPAN IN WHICH BOTH VALVES
MUST FAIL, AND THE "CONTINGENCY CG ENVELOPE". HOWEVER, IOA
STRONGLY RECOMMENDS A IR/2 FOR THIS FAILURE MODE BASED ON THE
ABOVE RATIONALE. IOA CONTENDS THAT TWO FAILED CLOSED PROP TANK
ISOL VLVS COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF FRCS ET SEP CAPABILITY AND
POSSIBLE VIOLATION OF THE ENTRY X CG LIMIT DUE TO INABILITY TO
DUMP FRCS PROP AFTER THE DEORBIT BURN. THESE VALVES ARE ALWAYS
OPEN DURING FLIGHT, HOWEVER A SWITCH FAILURE COULD CAUSE A VALVE
TO GO FROM OPEN TO FAILED CLOSED. THE INCONSISTENCY BETWEEN THIS
RCS HDW CRIT (IR/3) AND GN&C FMEA 05-I-FC6242-1 (IR/2) SHOULD BE
CORRECTED.





NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I02120-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PROP TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA WITHDRAWS i/i ABORT ISSUE DUE TO LACK OF CURRENT FRCS DUMP
CAPABILITY DURING RTLS & TAL, HOWEVER RECOMMENDS A I/i ABORT CRIT
(BASED ON POSSIBLE INADEQUATE DUMP) IF SUCH A CAPABILITY EXISTS IN
THE FUTURE. IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THE FAILED CLOSED AND FAILS TO
REMAIN OPEN FAILURE MODES BE UPGRADED TO 2/IR AND PLACED ON THE
CIL. INABILITY TO USE OR DEPLETE FRCS PROP COULD RESULT IN
INABILITY TO PERFORM ET SEP, OR VIOLATION OF THE ENTRY X CG LIMIT.
F_NAL RESO_UTION: IOA MET WITH G. GRUSH (RCS SSM) ON 5/19/88 TO
DISCUSS IR/2 ISSUE. IOA ACCEPTS SSM'S JUDGMENT AND RELUCTANTLY
WITHDRAWS ISSUE BASED ON THE NARROW TIME SPAN IN WHICH BOTH VALVES
MUST FAIL, AND THE "CONTINGENCY CG ENVELOPE". HOWEVER, IOA
STRONGLY RECOMMENDS A IR/2 FOR THIS FAILURE MODE BASED ON THE
ABOVE RATIONALE. IOA CONTENDS THAT TWO FAILED CLOSED PROP TANK
ISOL VLVS COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF FRCS ET SEP CAPABILITY AND
POSSIBLE VIOLATION OF THE ENTRY X CG LIMIT DUE TO INABILITY TO
DUMP FRCS PROP AFTER THE DEORBIT BURN. THESE VALVES ARE ALWAYS
OPEN DURING FLIGHT, HOWEVER A SWITCH FAILURE COULD CAUSE A VALVE
TO GO FROM OPEN TO FAILED CLOSED. THE INCONSISTENCY BETWEEN THIS
RCS HDW CRIT (IR/3) AND GN&C FMEA 05-I-FC6242-I (IR/2) SHOULD BE
CORRECTED.





NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I02110-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






MANIFOLD i, ISOL VLV




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
] IN]
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DE_TE)




IOA WITHDRAWS i/i ABORT ISSUE. IOA RECOMMENDS THESE FAILURE MODES
BE UPGRADED TO IR/2. CERTAIN COMBINATIONS OF TWO FAILURES COULD
RESULT IN INABILITY TO DUMP FRCS PROP AND VIOLATION OF ENTRY X CG
LIMIT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA HELD MTG ON 6/2/88 WITH RCS SSM, MOD,
BOEING, & RSOC PERSONNEL TO DISCUSS IOA IR/2 ISSUE AND
INCONSISTENCY BETWEEN RCS CRIT (IR/3) AND GN&C FMEA 05-I-FC6242-I
(IR/2). SSM STATED THAT USE OF A FRCS DUMP FOR ENTRY X CG
MANAGEMENT WASN'T CONSIDERED IN RCS CRIT ASSIGNMENT AS WAS DONE IN
IOA AND GNC CRITS. A POST-DEORBIT FRCS DUMP IS USED TO MEET THE
FWD X CG LIMIT (1076.7 IN). THEREFORE, IF A PLANNED DUMP ISN'T
COMPLETED BECAUSE OF TWO FAILED CLOSED MANIFOLD VLVS, THE X CG
LIMIT MAY BE VIOLATED CAUSING LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE. THE CRIT
ASSIGNED TO THIS FAILURE SHOULD REFLECT THE POTENTIAL ENTRY X CG
LIMIT VIOLATION. IOA RELUCTANTLY WITHDRAWS ISSUE BASED ON THE
NARROW TIME SPAN IN WHICH TWO FAILURES MUST OCCUR, PARTIAL ULLAGE
CAPABILITY, THE "CONTINGENCY CG ENVELOPE", AND THE SSM'S JUDGMENT.
HOWEVER, IOA STRONGLY RECOMMENDS EITHER A IR/2 FOR THIS FAILURE,
OR A FLIGHT RULE WHICH PROHIBITS RELIANCE ON A FRCS DUMP TO MEET
THE ENTRY X CG LIMIT. ALSO, THE INCONSISTENCY BETWEEN THE RCS
CRIT AND ABOVE GN&C FMEA SHOULD BE CORRECTED.





NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I01080-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH NASA/RI RATIONALE FOR FAILURE OF A AND B SCREENS.
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT "POPPET FAILS OPEN" BE ADDED AS A FAILURE MODE
ON THIS FMEA/CIL. THIS IS A CREDIBLE FAILURE MODE AND IS
ADDRESSED ON OTHER QD FMEAS. IOA ALSO RECOMMENDS ADDING A
STATEMENT TO THE EFFECTS ABOUT PROP LEAKAGE EFFECTS (CORROSION,
FIRE, EXPLOSION, EXPOSURE OF EVA AND GROUND CREWS).
F_NAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDRAWS ISSUE. IOA MAINTAINS
RECOMMENDATION THE "POPPET FAILS OPEN" BE ADDED AS A FAILURE MODE
ON THIS CIL FOR COMPLETENESS, HOWEVER CIL IS ADEQUATE WITHOUT THIS
ADDITION.





NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I02110-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






MANIFOLD 2, ISOL VLV




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
] [N]
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA WITHDRAWS i/I ABORT ISSUE. IOA RECOMMENDS THESE FAILURE MODES
BE UPGRADED TO IR/2. CERTAIN COMBINATIONS OF TWO FAILURES COULD
RESULT IN INABILITY TO DUMP FRCS PROP AND VIOLATION OF ENTRY X CG
LIMIT.
F_NAL RESOLUTION: IOA HELD MTG ON 6/2/88 WITH RCS SSM, MOD,
BOEING, & RSOC PERSONNEL TO DISCUSS IOA IR/2 ISSUE AND
INCONSISTENCY BETWEEN RCS CRIT (IR/3) AND GN&C FMEA 05-I-FC6242-I
(IR/2). SSM STATED THAT USE OF A FRCS DUMP FOR ENTRY X CG
MANAGEMENT WASN'T CONSIDERED IN RCS CRIT ASSIGNMENT AS WAS DONE IN
IOA AND GNC CRITS. A POST-DEORBIT FRCS DUMP IS USED TO MEET THE
FWD X CG LIMIT (1076.7 IN). THEREFORE, IF A PLANNED DUMP ISN'T
COMPLETED BECAUSE OF TWO FAILED CLOSED MANIFOLD VLVS, THE X CG
LIMIT MAY BE VIOLATED CAUSING LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE. THE CRIT
ASSIGNED TO THIS FAILURE SHOULD REFLECT THE POTENTIAL ENTRY X CG
LIMIT VIOLATION. IOA RELUCTANTLY WITHDRAWS ISSUE BASED ON THE
NARROW TIME SPAN IN WHICH TWO FAILURES MUST OCCUR, PARTIAL ULLAGE
CAPABILITY, THE "CONTINGENCY CG ENVELOPE", AND THE SSM'S JUDGMENT.
HOWEVER, IOA STRONGLY RECOMMENDS EITHER A IR/2 FOR THIS FAILURE,
OR A FLIGHT RULE WHICH PROHIBITS RELIANCE ON A FRCS DUMP TO MEET
THE ENTRY X CG LIMIT. ALSO, THE INCONSISTENCY BETWEEN THE RCS
CRIT AND ABOVE GN&C FMEA SHOULD BE CORRECTED.





NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I01080-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






MANIFOLD 2, GROUND PURGE/DRAIN COUPLING




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH NASA/RI RATIONALE FOR FAILURE OF A AND B SCREENS.
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT "POPPET FAILS OPEN" BE ADDED AS A FAILURE MODE
ON THIS FMEA/CIL. THIS IS A CREDIBLE FAILURE MODE AND IS
ADDRESSED ON OTHER QD FMEAS. IOA ALSO RECOMMENDS ADDING A
STATEMENT TO THE EFFECTS ABOUT PROP LEAKAGE EFFECTS (CORROSION,
FIRE, EXPLOSION, EXPOSURE OF EVA AND GROUND CREWS).
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDRAWS ISSUE. IOA MAINTAINS
RECOMMENDATION THE "POPPET FAILS OPEN" BE ADDED AS A FAILURE MODE
ON THIS CIL FOR COMPLETENESS, HOWEVER CIL IS ADEQUATE WITHOUT THIS
ADDITION.





NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I02110-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






MANIFOLD 3, ISOL VLV




HDW/FUNC A B C
ClL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
] [N]
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)




IOA WITHDRAWS i/I ABORT ISSUE. IOA RECOMMENDS THESE FAILURE MODES
BE UPGRADED TO IR/2. CERTAIN COMBINATIONS OF TWO FAILURES COULD
RESULT IN INABILITY TO DUMP FRCS PROP AND VIOLATION OF ENTRY X CG
LIMIT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA HELD MTG ON 6/2/88 WITH RCS SSM, MOD,
BOEING, & RSOC PERSONNEL TO DISCUSS IOA IR/2 ISSUE AND
INCONSISTENCY BETWEEN RCS CRIT (IR/3) AND GN&C FMEA 05-I-FC6242-I
(IR/2). SSM STATED THAT USE OF A FRCS DUMP FOR ENTRY X CG
MANAGEMENT WASN'T CONSIDERED IN RCS CRIT ASSIGNMENT AS WAS DONE IN
IOA AND GNC CRITS. A POST-DEORBIT FRCS DUMP IS USED TO MEET THE
FWD X CG LIMIT (1076.7 IN). THEREFORE, IF A PLANNED DUMP ISN'T
COMPLETED BECAUSE OF TWO FAILED CLOSED MANIFOLD VLVS, THE X CG
LIMIT MAY BE VIOLATED CAUSING LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE. THE CRIT
ASSIGNED TO THIS FAILURE SHOULD REFLECT THE POTENTIAL ENTRY X CG
LIMIT VIOLATION. IOA RELUCTANTLY WITHDRAWS ISSUE BASED ON THE
NARROW TIME SPAN IN WHICH TWO FAILURES MUST OCCUR, PARTIAL ULLAGE
CAPABILITY, THE "CONTINGENCY CG ENVELOPE", AND THE SSM'S JUDGMENT.
HOWEVER, IOA STRONGLY RECOMMENDS EITHER A IR/2 FOR THIS FAILURE,
OR A FLIGHT RULE WHICH PROHIBITS RELIANCE ON A FRCS DUMP TO MEET
THE ENTRY X CG LIMIT. ALSO, THE INCONSISTENCY BETWEEN THE RCS
CRIT AND ABOVE GN&C FMEA SHOULD BE CORRECTED.





NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I01080-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






MANIFOLD 3, GROUND PURGE/DRAIN COUPLING




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH NASA/RI RATIONALE FOR FAILURE OF A AND B SCREENS.
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT "POPPET FAILS OPEN" BE ADDED AS A FAILURE MODE
ON THIS FMEA/CIL. THIS IS A CREDIBLE FAILURE MODE AND IS
ADDRESSED ON OTHER QD FMEAS. IOA ALSO RECOMMENDS ADDING A
STATEMENT TO THE EFFECTS ABOUT PROP LEAKAGE EFFECTS (CORROSION,
FIRE, EXPLOSION, EXPOSURE OF EVA AND GROUND CREWS).
_INAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDRAWS ISSUE. IOA MAINTAINS
RECOMMENDATION THE "POPPET FAILS OPEN" BE ADDED AS A FAILURE MODE
ON THIS CIL FOR COMPLETENESS, HOWEVER CIL IS ADEQUATE WITHOUT THIS
ADDITION.





NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I02110-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






MANIFOLD 4, ISOL VLV




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
] [ N ]
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA WITHDRAWS i/I ABORT ISSUE. IOA RECOMMENDS THESE FAILURE MODES
BE UPGRADED TO IR/2. CERTAIN COMBINATIONS OF TWO FAILURES COULD
RESULT IN INABILITY TO DUMP FRCS PROP AND VIOLATION OF ENTRY X CG
LIMIT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA HELD MTG ON 6/2/88 WITH RCS SSM, MOD,
BOEING, & RSOC PERSONNEL TO DISCUSS IOA IR/2 ISSUE AND
INCONSISTENCY BETWEEN RCS CRIT (IR/3) AND GN&C FMEA 05-I-FC6242-I
(IR/2). SSM STATED THAT USE OF A FRCS DUMP FOR ENTRY X CG
MANAGEMENT WASN'T CONSIDERED IN RCS CRIT ASSIGNMENT AS WAS DONE IN
IOA AND GNC CRITS. A POST-DEORBIT FRCS DUMP IS USED TO MEET THE
FWD X CG LIMIT (1076.7 IN). THEREFORE, IF A PLANNED DUMP ISN'T
COMPLETED BECAUSE OF TWO FAILED CLOSED MANIFOLD VLVS, THE X CG
LIMIT MAY BE VIOLATED CAUSING LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE. THE CRIT
ASSIGNED TO THIS FAILURE SHOULD REFLECT THE POTENTIAL ENTRY X CG
LIMIT VIOLATION. IOA RELUCTANTLY WITHDRAWS ISSUE BASED ON THE
NARROW TIME SPAN IN WHICH TWO FAILURES MUST OCCUR, PARTIAL ULLAGE
CAPABILITY, THE "CONTINGENCY CG ENVELOPE", AND THE SSM'S JUDGMENT.
HOWEVER, IOA STRONGLY RECOMMENDS EITHER A IR/2 FOR THIS FAILURE,
OR A FLIGHT RULE WHICH PROHIBITS RELIANCE ON A FRCS DUMP TO MEET
THE ENTRY X CG LIMIT. ALSO, THE INCONSISTENCY BETWEEN THE RCS
CRIT AND ABOVE GN&C FMEA SHOULD BE CORRECTED.















NEW [ X ]
FRCS
171
MANIFOLD 4, GROUND PURGE/DRAIN COUPLING
C.D. PRUST
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOa [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH NASA/RI RATIONALE FOR FAILURE OF A AND B SCREENS.
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT "POPPET FAILS OPEN" BE ADDED AS A FAILURE MODE
ON THIS FMEA/CIL. THIS IS A CREDIBLE FAILURE MODE AND IS
ADDRESSED ON OTHER QD FMEAS. IOA ALSO RECOMMENDS ADDING A
STATEMENT TO THE EFFECTS ABOUT PROP LEAKAGE EFFECTS (CORROSION,
FIRE, EXPLOSION, EXPOSURE OF EVA AND GROUND CREWS).
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDRAWS ISSUE. IOA MAINTAINS
RECOMMENDATION THE "POPPET FAILS OPEN" BE ADDED AS A FAILURE MODE
ON THIS CIL FOR COMPLETENESS, HOWEVER CIL IS ADEQUATE WITHOUT THIS
ADDITION.





NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I01080-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






MANIFOLD 5, GROUND PURGE/DRAIN COUPLING




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH NASA/RI RATIONALE FOR FAILURE OF A AND B SCREENS.
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT "POPPET FAILS OPEN" BE ADDED AS A FAILURE MODE
ON THIS FMEA/CIL. THIS IS A CREDIBLE FAILURE MODE AND IS
ADDRESSED ON OTHER QD FMEAS. IOA ALSO RECOMMENDS ADDING A
STATEMENT TO THE EFFECTS ABOUT PROP LEAKAGE EFFECTS (CORROSION,
FIRE, EXPLOSION, EXPOSURE OF EVA AND GROUND CREWS).
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDRAWS ISSUE. IOA MAINTAINS
RECOMMENDATION THE "POPPET FAILS OPEN" BE ADDED AS A FAILURE MODE
ON THIS CIL FOR COMPLETENESS, HOWEVER CIL IS ADEQUATE WITHOUT THIS
ADDITION.





NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I02112-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 177
ITEM: MANIFOLD ISOL VLVS




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE )




THIS FMEA/CIL COVERS ONLY THE BELLOWS LEAKAGE FAILURE MODE FOR THE
PRIMARY MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE. IOA HAS NO ISSUE WITH THIS
FAILURE MODE, HOWEVER DOES RECOMMEND THAT THE EFFECTS DISCUSS THE
POSSIBLE EXPOSURE OF EVA AND GROUND CREWS TO PROP OR PROP VAPORS.
NASA/RI DO NOT COVER STRUCTURAL FAILURE, RUPTURE, OR EXTERNAL
LEAKAGE OF THE VALVE HOUSING ON THIS FMEA OR ELSEWHERE.
FINAL RESOLUTION: G. GRUSH (RCS SSM) ON 12/15/87 AGREED TO ADD
THIS VALVE BODY TO THE PROP LINE EXTERNAL LEAKAGE FMEA (03-2F-
102108-1, i/I) WITH CORRESPONDING RETENTION RATIONALE. THIS WAS
ALSO AN ACTION ITEM FROM THE RCS PRCB ON 12/23/87.





NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-102170-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 177
ITEM: MANIFOLD ISOL VLVS




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE )




THIS FMEA/CIL COVERS ONLY THE BELLOWS LEAKAGE FAILURE MODE FOR THE
VERNIER MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE. IOA HAS NO ISSUE WITH THIS
FAILURE MODE, HOWEVER DOES RECOMMEND THAT THE EFFECTS DISCUSS THE
POSSIBLE EXPOSURE OF EVA AND GROUND CREWS TO PROP OR PROP VAPORS.
NASA/RI DO NOT COVER STRUCTURAL FAILURE, RUPTURE, OR EXTERNAL
LEAKAGE OF THE VALVE HOUSING ON THIS FMEA OR ELSEWHERE.
FINAL RESOLUTION: G. GRUSH (RCS SSM) ON 12/15/87 AGREED TO ADD
THIS VALVE BODY TO THE PROP LINE EXTERNAL LEAKAGE FMEA (03-2F-
102108-1, i/i) WITH CORRESPONDING RETENTION RATIONALE. THIS WAS
ALSO AN ACTION ITEM FROM THE RCS PRCB ON 12/23/87.



















HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE )




NASA/RI DO NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE (RESTRICTED FLOW). IOA
WITHDRAWS I/i CRIT, BUT MAINTAINS CONCERN THAT RESTRICTED FLOW TO
A THRUSTER COULD CAUSE BURN-THROUGH. IOA ALSO WITHDRAWS i/i ABORT
ISSUE DUE TO LACK OF CURRENT FRCS DUMP CAPABILITY DURING RTLS &
TAL, HOWEVER RECOMMENDS A i/i ABORT CRIT (BASED ON A POSSIBLE
INCOMPLETE DUMP) IF SUCH A CAPABILITY EXISTS IN THE FUTURE. IOA
RECOMMENDS THAT THE RESTRICTED FLOW FAILURE MODE BE ADDRESSED ON
THE FMEA/CIL.
FINAL RESOLUTION: G. GRUSH (RCS SSM) ON 5/19/88 AGREED TO ADD
"RESTRICTED FLOW" TO THE FAILURE MODES ON 03-2F-I02110-I (3/IR
PPP, PRIMARY VALVES) AND 03-2F-I02170-I (2/2, VERNIER VALVES).
IOA WITHDRAWS 2/IR ISSUE ON PRIMARY VALVES (SEE ASSESSMENT
SHEETS RCS-158, 162, 166, & 170 FOR RATIONALE).





NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-121308-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






JET ALIGNMENTBELLOWS, PRIMARY, ALL AXES




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THE "D" EFFECTS BE REVISED. IOA CONSIDERS
LEAKAGE OF PROP TO BE CRITICAL AFTER ET SEP ALSO, AS WELL AS A
HAZARD TO EVA AND GROUND CREWS. IOA ALSO RECOMMENDS THAT "ISOL
VALVE RELIEF DEVICE FAILURE TO RELIEVE" AND "FAILURE OF LINE
BELLOWS TO DEFLECT" BE ADDED AS CAUSES ON THIS FMEA.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA NO LONGER CLASSIFIES THIS AS AN "ISSUE"
SINCE THE CRITICALITY IS CORRECT. HOWEVER, IOA DOES RECOMMEND
THAT THE "D" EFFECTS BE REVISED AS DESCRIBED ABOVE.





NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-121310-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VLV, PRIMARY, ALL AXES
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1/1 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[I/i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [A]
(AD_DELETE)




IOA FAILURE MODES ON ANALYSIS SHEET SHOULD NOT INCLUDE "FAILS ON".
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THE FAILED OPEN MODE BE UPGRADED TO A i/i
BECAUSE IT RESULTS IN LEAKAGE OF PROP. PER NSTS 22206, ANY SINGLE
FAILURE RESULTING IN PROP LEAKAGE SHOULD BE CI_ASSIFIED AS A i/i.
PROP LEAKAGE PRESENTS A HAZARD TO THE GROUND CREW.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDRAWS I/i ISSUE AFTER DISCUSSION WITH
RCS SSM ON 5/19/88. SSM BELIEVES THAT THE CRIT ASSIGNED TO THIS
FAILURE MODE SHOULD REFLECT ONLY THE EFFECTS ON THE MISSION, CREW,
AND VEHICLE DURING FLIGHT, AND NOT THE POTENTIAL EFFECTS TO THE
GROUND CREW DURING NON-FLIGHT PHASES. IOA ACCEPTS THIS
PHILOSOPHY, BUT RECOMMENDS THAT THE CRIT BE UPGRADED TO A i/i PER
NSTS 22206 GROUNDRULES AND BECAUSE THIS FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS
OF LIFE DURING THE PRE-LAUNCH AND LANDING/SAFING PHASES. FROM A
LOSS OF THRUSTER STANDPOINT, IOA RECOMMENDS A IR/2 FPP
CRITICALITY. SEE ASSESSMENT SHEET RCS-186. THE SSM STATES THAT
THE WORST-CASE EFFECT OF ZOTS RESULTING FROM THIS FAILURE WOULD BE
THRUSTER INTERNAL LEAKAGE. ZOTS WOULD NOT RUPTURE THE THRUSTER
HOUSING.














THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VLV, PRIMARY, ALL AXES




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA/RI DO NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE (STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
RUPTURE, EXTERNAL LEAKAGE) FOR THE THRUSTER SOLENOID VALVE.
_NAD RESOLUTION: G. GRUSH (RCS SSM) ON 12/15/87 AGREED TO ADD
THIS VALVE BODY TO THE PROP LINE EXTERNAL LEAKAGE FMEA (03-2F-
102108-1, i/I) WITH CORRESPONDING RETENTION RATIONALE. THIS WAS
ALSO AN ACTION ITEM FROM THE RCS PRCB ON 12/23/87.














THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VLV, PRIMARY, ALL AXES




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA/RI DO NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE (RESTRICTED FLOW). IOA
WITHDRAWS i/I CRIT, BUT MAINTAINS CONCERN THAT RESTRICTED FLOW TO
A THRUSTER COULD RESULT IN BURN-THROUGH. IOA ALSO WITHDRAWS i/i
ABORT ISSUE DUE TO LACK OF CURRENT FRCS DUMP CAPABILITY DURING
RTLS & TAL, HOWEVER RECOMMENDS A I/i ABORT CRIT (BASED ON A
POSSIBLE INCOMPLETE DUMP) IF SUCH A CAPABILITY EXISTS IN THE
FUTURE. IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THE RESTRICTED FLOW FAILURE MODE BE
ADDRESSED ON THE FMEA/CIL.
FINAL RESOLUTION: G. GRUSH (RCS SSM) ON 5/19/88 AGREED TO ADD
"RESTRICTED FLOW" TO THE FAILURE MODES ON 03-2F-121310-3 (3/IR
FPP, FAILS CLOSED) DURING THE NEXT FMEA UPDATE ACTIVITY. IOA
WITHDRAWS 2/IR ISSUE FOR YAW THRUSTERS (SEE ASSESSMENT SHEET RCS-
186 FOR RATIONALE).





NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-121310-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VLV, PRIMARY, -X AXIS
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE )




IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THE INTERNAL LEAKAGE FAILURE MODE BE UPGRADED
TO A i/I BECAUSE IT RESULTS IN LEAKAGE OF PROP. PER NSTS-22206,
ANY SINGLE FAILURE RESULTING IN PROP LEAKAGE SHOULD BE CLASSIFIED
AS A i/1. PROP LEAKAGE PRESENTS A HAZARD TO THE GROUND CREW.
FINAL R_SOLUTION: IOA WITHDRAWS i/i ISSUE AFTER DISCUSSION WITH
RCS SSM ON 5/19/88. SSM BELIEVES THAT THE CRIT ASSIGNED TO THIS
FAILURE MODE SHOULD REFLECT ONLY THE EFFECTS ON THE MISSION, CREW,
AND VEHICLE DURING FLIGHT, AND NOT THE POTENTIAL EFFECTS TO THE
GROUND CREW DURING NON-FLIGHT PHASES. IOA ACCEPTS THIS
PHILOSOPHY, BUT RECOMMENDS THAT THE CRIT BE UPGRADED TO A i/i PER
NSTS 22206 GROUNDRULES AND BECAUSE THIS FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS
OF LIFE DURING THE PRE-LAUNCH AND LANDING/SAFING PHASES. PER THE
SSM'S PHILOSOPHY, THE NASA CRITICALITY IS CORRECT. THE SSM STATES
THAT THE WORST-CASE EFFECT OF ZOTS RESULTING FROM THIS FAILURE
WOULD BE THRUSTER INTERNAL LEAKAGE. ZOTS WOULD NOT RUPTURE THE
THRUSTER HOUSING.





NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-121310-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VLV, PRIMARY, Y AXIS




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA WITHDRAWS i/I ABORT CRIT. IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THE FAILED
CLOSED MODE FOR PRIMARY +/-Y JETS BE UPGRADED TO IR/2. LOSS OF
BOTH +Y OR -Y JETS MAY CAUSE INABILITY TO DUMP FRCS PROP AND
VIOLATION OF THE ENTRY X CG LIMIT.
FINA_ RESOLUTION: IOA HELD MTG ON 6/2/88 WITH SSM, MOD, BOEING, &
RSOC PERSONNEL TO DISCUSS IR/2 ISSUE AND INCONSISTENCY BETWEEN RCS
CRIT (IR/3) AND GNC FMEA 05-I-FC6242-I (IR/2). SSM STATED THAT USE
OF A FRCS DUMP FOR ENTRY X CG MANAGEMENT WAS NOT CONSIDERED IN RCS
CRIT ASSIGNMENT AS WAS DONE IN IOA AND GN&C CRITS. A POST-DEORBIT
FRCS DUMP IS USED TO MEET THE FWD X CG LIMIT. THEREFORE, IF A
PLANNED DUMP ISN'T COMPLETED BECAUSE TWO YAW JETS ON SAME SIDE ARE
FAILED, THE X CG LIMIT MAY BE VIOLATED CAUSING LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE. THE CRIT ASSIGNED TO THIS FAILURE SHOULD REFLECT
THE POTENTIAL ENTRY X CG LIMIT VIOLATION. IOA RELUCTANTLY
WITHDRAWS ISSUE BASED ON THE NARROW TIME SPAN IN WHICH TWO JETS
MUST FAIL, THE "CONTINGENCY CG ENVELOPE", AND THE SSM'S JUDGMENT.
HOWEVER, IOA STRONGLY RECOMMENDS EITHER A IR/2 FOR THIS FAILURE,
OR A FLIGHT RULE WHICH PROHIBITS RELIANCE ON A FRCS DUMP TO MEET
THE ENTRY X CG LIMIT. ALSO, THE INCONSISTENCY BETWEEN THE RCS
CRIT AND ABOVE GN&C FMEA SHOULD BE CORRECTED.











NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]





NEW [ X ]
FRCS
187
THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VLV, PRIMARY, Y AXIS
C.D. PRUST
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
IF] [P] [P]
[ ] [ ] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ i/1 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THE INTERNAL LEAKAGE FAILURE MODE BE UPGRADED
TO A i/i BECAUSE IT RESULTS IN LEAKAGE OF PROP. PER NSTS-22206,
ANY SINGLE FAILURE RESULTING IN PROP LEAKAGE SHOULD BE CLASSIFIED
AS A i/I. PROP LEAKAGE PRESENTS A HAZARD TO THE GROUND CREW.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDRAWS i/i ISSUE AFTER DISCUSSION WITH
RCS SSM ON 5/19/88. SSM BELIEVES THAT THE CRIT ASSIGNED TO THIS
FAILURE MODE SHOULD REFLECT ONLY THE EFFECTS ON THE MISSION, CREW,
AND VEHICLE DURING FLIGHT, AND NOT THE POTENTIAL EFFECTS TO THE
GROUND CREW DURING NON-FLIGHT PHASES. IOA ACCEPTS THIS
PHILOSOPHY, BUT RECOMMENDS THAT THE CRIT BE UPGRADED TO A I/i PER
NSTS 22206 GROUNDRULES AND BECAUSE THIS FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS
OF LIFE DURING THE PRE-LAUNCH AND LANDING/SAFING PHASES. FROM A
LOSS OF THRUSTER STANDPOINT, IOA RECOMMENDS A IR/2 FPP
CRITICALITY. SEE ASSESSMENT SHEET RCS-186. THE SSM STATES THAT
THE WORST-CASE EFFECT OF ZOTS RESULTING FROM THIS FAILURE WOULD BE
THRUSTER INTERNAL LEAKAGE. ZOTS WOULD NOT RUPTURE THE THRUSTER
HOUSING.





NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-121310-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VLV, PRIMARY, Z AXIS




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
[ F ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1/1 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THE INTERNAL LEAKAGE FAILURE MODE BE UPGRADED
TO A I/i BECAUSE IT RESULTS IN LEAKAGE OF PROP. PER NSTS-22206,
ANY SINGLE FAILURE RESULTING IN PROP LEAKAGE SHOULD BE CLASSIFIED
AS A i/I. PROP LEAKAGE PRESENTS A HAZARD TO THE GROUND CREW.
FINAL RESODUTION: IOA WITHDRAWS i/I ISSUE AFTER DISCUSSION WITH
RCS SSM ON 5/19/88. SSM BELIEVES THAT THE CRIT ASSIGNED TO THIS
FAILURE MODE SHOULD REFLECT ONLY THE EFFECTS ON THE MISSION, CREW,
AND VEHICLE DURING FLIGHT, AND NOT THE POTENTIAL EFFECTS TO THE
GROUND CREW DURING NON-FLIGHT PHASES. IOA ACCEPTS THIS
PHILOSOPHY, BUT RECOMMENDS THAT THE CRIT BE UPGRADED TO A I/i PER
NSTS 22206 GROUNDRULES AND BECAUSE THIS FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS
OF LIFE DURING THE PRE-LAUNCH AND LANDING/SAFING PHASES. PER THE
SSM'S PHILOSOPHY, THE NASA CRITICALITY IS CORRECT. THE SSM STATES
THAT THE WORST-CASE EFFECT OF ZOTS RESULTING FROM THIS FAILURE
WOULD BE THRUSTER INTERNAL LEAKAGE. ZOTS WOULD NOT RUPTURE THE
THRUSTER HOUSING.





NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-131310-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VLV, VERNIERS, ALL AXES




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1/1 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA FAILURE MODES ON ANALYSIS SHEET SHOULD NOT INCLUDE "FAILS ON".
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THE FAILED OPEN MODE BE UPGRADED TO A i/I
BECAUSE IT RESULTS IN LEAKAGE OF PROP. PER NSTS 22206, ANY SINGLE
FAILURE RESULTING IN PROP LEAKAGE SHOULD BE CLASSIFIED AS A I/I.
PROP LEAKAGE PRESENTS A HAZARD TO THE GROUND CREW. IOA ALSO
RECOMMENDS THAT THE SUBASSEMBLY ITEMS INCLUDED ON THIS FMEA BE
SEPARATED ONTO INDIVIDUAL FMEAS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDRAWS i/I ISSUE AFTER DISCUSSION WITH
RCS SSM ON 5/19/88. SSM BELIEVES THAT THE CRIT ASSIGNED TO THIS
FAILURE MODE SHOULD REFLECT ONLY THE EFFECTS ON THE MISSION, CREW,
AND VEHICLE DURING FLIGHT, AND NOT THE POTENTIAL EFFECTS TO THE
GROUND CREW DURING NON-FLIGHT PHASES. IOA ACCEPTS THIS
PHILOSOPHY, BUT RECOMMENDS THAT THE CRIT BE UPGRADED TO A I/i PER
NSTS 22206 GROUNDRULES AND BECAUSE THIS FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS
OF LIFE DURING THE PRE-LAUNCH AND LANDING/SAFING PHASES. PER THE
SSM'S PHILOSOPHY, THE NASA CRITICALITY IS CORRECT.














THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VLV, VERNIERS, ALL AXES




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ I /i ] [ ] [ ] [
] [ ] •
] ix]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[I/i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [A]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA/RI DO NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE (STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
RUPTURE, EXTERNAL LEAKAGE).
FINAL RESOLUTION: G. GRUSH (RCS SSM) ON 12/15/87 AGREED TO ADD
THIS VALVE BODY TO THE PROP LINE EXTERNAL LEAKAGE FMEA (03-2F-
102108-1, I/i) WITH CORRESPONDING RETENTION RATIONALE. THIS WAS
ALSO AN ACTION ITEM FROM THE RCS PRCB ON 12/23/87.





NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-131310-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VLV, VERNIERS, ALL AXES




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THE INTERNAL LEAKAGE FAILURE MODE BE UPGRADED
TO A i/i BECAUSE IT RESULTS IN LEAKAGE OF PROP. PER NSTS 22206,
ANY SINGLE FAILURE WHICH RESULTS IN PROP LEAKAGE SHOULD BE
CLASSIFIED AS A i/i. PROP LEAKAGE PRESENTS A HAZARD TO THE GROUND
CREW. IOA ALSO RECOMMENDS THAT THE SUBASSEMBLY COMPONENTS
INCLUDED ON THIS FMEA BE SEPARATED ONTO INDIVIDUAL FMEAS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDRAWS i/i ISSUE AFTER DISCUSSION WITH
RCS SSM ON 5/19/88. SSM BELIEVES THAT THE CRIT ASSIGNED TO THIS
FAILURE MODE SHOULD REFLECT ONLY THE EFFECTS ON THE MISSION, CREW,
AND VEHICLE DURING FLIGHT, AND NOT THE POTENTIAL EFFECTS TO THE
GROUND CREW DURING NON-FLIGHT PHASES. IOA ACCEPTS THIS
PHILOSOPHY, BUT RECOMMENDS THAT THE CRIT BE UPGRADED TO A i/i PER
NSTS 22206 GROUNDRULES AND BECAUSE THIS FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS
OF LIFE DURING THE PRE-LAUNCH AND LANDING/SAFING PHASES. PER THE
SSM'S PHILOSOPHY, THE NASA CRITICALITY IS CORRECT.





NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-201070-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH NASA/RI FAILURE OF A AND B SCREENS. IOA
RECOMMENDS THAT "POPPET FAILS OPEN" BE ADDED AS A FAILURE MODE ON
THIS FMEA. THIS IS A CREDIBLE FAILURE MODE AND IS ADDRESSED ON
OTHER QD FMEAS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDRAWS ISSUE. IOA MAINTAINS
RECOMMENDATION THE "POPPET FAILS OPEN" BE ADDED TO THE FAILURE
MODES ON THIS CIL FOR COMPLETENESS, HOWEVER CIL IS ADEQUATE
WITHOUT THIS ADDITION.





NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-201020-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 202
ITEM: HE ISOL A & B VLVS




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA NOW RECOMMENDS THAT THE B SCREEN BE FAILED AND THAT THIS ITEM
AND FAILURE MODE BE ADDED TO THE CIL. A FAILURE OF THE REDUNDANT
SECONDARY REG IS NOT DETECTABLE DURING FLIGHT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDRAWS ISSUE BASED ON NSTS 22206
GROUNDRULE (8/21/87, P. 2-13, 2.3.4.c). A FAILED OPEN ISOL VALVE
IS DETECTABLE DURING FLIGHT VIA TALKBACK DISPLAY. THE REDUNDANCY
SCREEN B TEST SHOULD BE APPLIED ONLY TO THE ISOL VALVE SINCE THE
UNLIKE REDUNDANT REGULATOR IS IDENTIFIED SEPARATELY IN THE
FMEA/CIL. THAT IS, AN UNDETECTABLE REG FAILURE SHOULD NOT CAUSE A
B SCREEN FAILURE FOR THE DETECTABLE ISOL VALVE FAILURE. HOWEVER,
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THE B SCREEN BE FAILED SINCE ONE LEVEL OF
REDUNDANCY (REG) CAN BE LOST WITHOUT BEING DETECTED. ALSO, THE
NASA RCS FMEA/CIL ANALYSIS CONSIDERED THE DETECTABILITY OF ALL
REDUNDANT ITEMS IN DETERMINING B SCREEN PASSAGE OR FAILURE. IOA
AGREES WITH THIS PRACTICE. FOR CONSISTENCY WITHIN THE RCS
FMEA/CIL, THIS B SCREEN SHOULD BE FAILED.





NASA FMEA #: NONE
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 202
ITEM: HE ISOL A & B VLVS





CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA/RI DO NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE (INTERNAL LEAKAGE).
FINAL RESOLUTION: G. GRUSH (RCS SSM) ON 5/19/88 AGREED TO ADD
"INTERNAL LEAKAGE" TO THE FAILURE MODES ON 03-2A-201020-2 (3/IR
PPP, FAILS OPEN) DURING THE NEXT FMEA UPDATE ACTIVITY. IOA
WITHDRAWS B SCREEN ISSUE. WITH ONE HELIUM ISOL VALVE OPEN,
INTERNAL LEAKAGE OF THE CLOSED PARALLEL VALVE IS UNDETECTABLE, BUT
HAS NO EFFECT. IF BOTH VALVES ARE CLOSED AND ONE VALVE IS LEAKING
INTERNALLY, THE EFFECTS ARE DETECTABLE VIA PRESSURE SENSORS IN THE
HELIUM TANK AND/OR THE PROPELLANT TANK.





NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-201091-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HIGH PRESSURE HELIUM TEST PORT COUPLINGS A & B




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH NASA/RI RATIONALE FOR FAILURE OF A AND B SCREENS.
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT "POPPET FAILS OPEN" BE ADDED AS A FAILURE MODE
ON THIS FMEA. THIS IS A CREDIBLE FAILURE MODE AND IS ADDRESSED ON
03-2F-I01070-I. IOA ALSO RECOMMENDS ADDING A STATEMENT TO THE
EFFECTS REGARDING POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF ORBITER ENTRY MASS
PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS AND PROP TANK LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS.
THE QUANTITY ON THIS FMEA IS INCORRECT.
_INAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDRAWS ISSUE. IOA MAINTAINS
RECOMMENDATION THE "POPPET FAILS OPEN" BE ADDED AS A FAILURE MODE
ON THIS CIL FOR COMPLETENESS, HOWEVER CIL IS ADEQUATE WITHOUT THIS
ADDITION.





NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-201030-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HELIUM PRESSURE REGULATOR ASSEMBLY




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ F ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH NASA/RI FAILURE OF C SCREEN. HOWEVER, IOA
RECOMMENDS THAT THE B SCREEN BE FAILED. A FAILED CLOSED REG WOULD
NOT BE DETECTABLE DURING DUAL LEG OPERATION (ASCENT). IOA ALSO
RECOMMENDS ADDING A STATEMENT TO THE EFFECTS ABOUT POSSIBLE
VIOLATIONS OF ORBITER ENTRY MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS.
F_AL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDRAWS ISSUE. LOSS OF FLOW THROUGH ONE
REGULATOR WOULD NOT BE DETECTABLE WHEN BOTH FLOW PATHS ARE OPEN
(AS DURING ASCENT AND ENTRY). HOWEVER, ONLY ONE OF THE PARALLEL
FLOW PATHS IS USED AT A TIME FOR PAD PRE-PRESS AND ON-ORBIT.
THEREFORE, THESE FAILURES WOULD BE DETECTABLE BEFORE LAUNCH OR AT
SOME POINT DURING THE MISSION ON-ORBIT. HOWEVER, IOA RECOMMENDS
THAT THE B SCREEN BE FAILED FOR PHASES WHEN BOTH PATHS ARE USED
S IMULTANEOUS LY.





NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-201030-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HELIUM PRESSURE REGULATOR ASSEMBLY




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ F ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH NASA/RI FAILURE OF C SCREEN. HOWEVER, IOA
RECOMMENDS THAT THE B SCREEN BE FAILED. A FAILED CLOSED REG WOULD
NOT BE DETECTABLE DURING DUAL LEG OPERATION (ASCENT). IOA ALSO
RECOMMENDS ADDING A STATEMENT TO THE EFFECTS ABOUT POSSIBLE
VIOLATIONS OF ORBITER ENTRY MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDRAWS ISSUE. LOSS OF FLOW THROUGH ONE
REGULATOR WOULD NOT BE DETECTABLE WHEN BOTH FLOW PATHS ARE OPEN
(AS DURING ASCENT AND ENTRY). HOWEVER, ONLY ONE OF THE PARALLEL
FLOW PATHS IS USED AT A TIME FOR PAD PRE-PRESS AND ON-ORBIT.
THEREFORE, THESE FAILURES WOULD BE DETECTABLE BEFORE LAUNCH OR AT
SOME POINT DURING THE MISSION ON-ORBIT. HOWEVER, IOA RECOMMENDS
THAT THE B SCREEN BE FAILED FOR PHASES WHEN BOTH PATHS ARE USED
SIMULTANEOUSLY.














HELIUM PRESSURE REGULATOR ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA/RI DO NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE (EXTERNAL LEAKAGE).
IOA ORIGINALLY CONSIDERED THE PARALLEL HELIUM FLOW PATHS TO BE
REDUNDANT FOR THIS FAILURE (2/IR), BUT NOW CLASSIFIES THIS FAILURE
AS A I/i.
FINAL RESOLUTION: G. GRUSH (RCS SSM) ON 12/15/87 AGREED TO ADD
THIS VALVE BODY TO THE HELIUM LINE EXTERNAL LEAKAGE FMEA (03-2A-
201013-1, i/i) WITH CORRESPONDING RETENTION RATIONALE. THIS WAS
ALSO AN ACTION ITEM FROM THE RCS PRCB ON 12/23/87.














HELIUM PRESSURE REGULATOR PRIMARY SENSING PORT




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)




NASA/RI DO NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE (EXTERNAL LEAKAGE THROUGH
SENSING PORT). HOWEVER, THIS FAILURE MODE IS COVERED BY NASA/RI
IN THE OMS SUBSYSTEM ON FMEA 03-3-1004-3 (3/2R PFP). IOA
RECOMMENDS THAT THIS FAILURE MODE ALSO BE COVERED FOR THE RCS
REGULATOR WITH THE SAME RATIONALE USED IN OMS. IOA WITHDRAWS 2/IR
PPP CRIT.
F_NAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDRAWS ISSUE. THE WORST CASE REGULATOR
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE IS COVERED ON 03-2F-I01013-I (i/I). THE PROPOSED
IOA FAILURE MODE IS A LESS SEVERE CASE OF THE FAILURE MODE COVERED
ON 03-2F-I01013-I AND, THEREFORE, NEED NOT BE ADDED TO THE RCS
FMEA/CIL. HOWEVER, FOR CONSISTENCY BETWEEN RCS AND OMS IDENTICAL
ITEMS, IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THIS FAILURE MODE SHOULD ALSO BE
ADDRESSED IN THE RCS FMEA/CIL.












NEW [ X ]
ARCS
216
HELIUM PRESSURE REGULATOR OUTLET TEST PORT




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH NASA/RI 3/IR FFP ASSIGNMENT. IOA ORIGINALLY
IDENTIFIED THIS -0032 COUPLING AS A -0018 COUPLING. IOA
RECOMMENDS THAT "POPPET FAILS OPEN" BE ADDED AS A FAILURE MODE ON
THIS FMEA. THIS IS A CREDIBLE FAILURE MODE AND IS ADDRESSED ON
03-2F-I01070-I. IOA ALSO RECOMMENDS ADDING A STATEMENT TO THE
EFFECTS REGARDING POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF ORBITER ENTRY MASS
PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS AND PROP TANK LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS.
THE QUANTITY ON THIS FMEA IS INCORRECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDRAWS ISSUE. IOA MAINTAINS
RECOMMENDATION THE "POPPET FAILS OPEN" BE ADDED AS A FAILURE MODE
ON THIS CIL FOR COMPLETENESS, HOWEVER CIL IS ADEQUATE WITHOUT THIS
ADDITION.





NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-201095-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






QUAD CHECK VALVE ASSEMBLY




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[N]
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THIS ITEM AND FAILURE MODE BE UPGRADED TO A
2/IR PFP AND PLACED ON THE CIL. WITH SERIES POPPETS FAILED OPEN,
THE CONTAMINATION OF REGULATORS BY PROP OR PROP VAPORS COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF PROP TANK REPRESS CAPABILITY AND INABILITY TO
USE OR DEPLETE ARCS PROP. THIS COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF ET SEP
CONTROL, LOSS OF ENTRY CONTROL, AND POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF ENTRY
MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS AND PROP TANK LANDING WEIGHT
CONSTRAINTS. FAILURE OF ONE POPPET IS UNDETECTABLE DURING
FLIGHT (FAIL B SCREEN).
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA ACCEPTS 3/3 BASED ON INPUTS FROM OMS & RCS
SSMs: THE REGS ARE DESIGNED TO BE PROP COMPATIBLE AND HAVE PASSED
90 DAY PROP EXPOSURE TEST. ALSO, ENOUGH TIME DOESN'T EXIST DURING
A MISSION FOR PROP EXPOSURE TO CAUSE A REG FAILURE. ANY PROBLEM
RESULTING FROM PROP EXPOSURE ON THE GROUND WOULD BE DETECTED
DURING PRELAUNCH OPS. THE SSMs AGREED THAT THE IOA CONCERNS WERE
NOT IMPOSSIBLE, BUT CONSIDER THE PROBABILITY OF SUCH OCCURRENCES
TO BE "INFINITESIMALLY SMALL". IOA STILL RECOMMENDS 2/IR BASED ON
ULTIMATE WORST CASE EFFECTS, BUT ACCEPTS THE JUDGMENT OF THE SSMs.
SINCE THESE FAILURE MODES CAN CAUSE IR REG FAILURES (SEE CAUSES ON
03-2F-I01030-I, 03-2A-201030-I, & 03-2A-201030-2), THEY SHOULD BE
CLASSIFIED AS iR's.





NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-201091-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






QUAD CHECK VALVE TEST PORT COUPLINGS A & B




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH NASA/RI RATIONALE FOR FAILURE OF A AND B SCREENS.
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT "POPPET FAILS OPEN" BE ADDED AS A FAILURE MODE
ON THIS FMEA. THIS IS A CREDIBLE FAILURE MODE AND IS ADDRESSED ON
03-2F-I01070-I. IOA ALSO RECOMMENDS ADDING A STATEMENT TO THE
EFFECTS REGARDING POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF ORBITER ENTRY MASS
PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS AND PROP TANK LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS.
THE QUANTITY ON THIS FMEA IS INCORRECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDRAWS ISSUE. IOA MAINTAINS
RECOMMENDATION THE "POPPET FAILS OPEN" BE ADDED AS A FAILURE MODE
ON THIS CIL FOR COMPLETENESS, HOWEVER CIL IS ADEQUATE WITHOUT THIS
ADDITION.





NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-211110-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THE P.A.D. COMPONENTS INCLUDED ON THIS FMEA BE
ITEMIZED IN THE ITEM LIST OR FUNCTIONAL DESCRIPTIONS SECTIONS TO
SHOW SPECIFICALLY WHAT IS COVERED ON THIS FMEA.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDRAWS ISSUE. IOA RECOMMENDS EDITORIAL
REVISIONS TO THE EFFECTS AS SHOWN, HOWEVER NO LONGER CONSIDERS
THESE RECOMMENDATIONS TO BE AN "ISSUE". THE CRITICALITY ASSIGNED
IS CORRECT FOR THIS FAILURE MODE.





NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-201090-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







PROP TK UPPER COMPARTMENT CHANNEL CHECK-OUT




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH NASA/RI RATIONALE FOR FAILURE OF A AND B SCREENS.
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT "POPPET FAILS OPEN" BE ADDED AS A FAILURE MODE
ON THIS FMEA. THIS IS A CREDIBLE MODE AND IS ADDRESSED ON OTHER
QD FMEAS. IOA ALSO RECOMMENDS ADDING A STATEMENT TO THE EFFECTS
REGARDING POSSIBLE FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD AND HAZARD TO GROUND AND
EVA CREWS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDRAWS ISSUE. IOA MAINTAINS
RECOMMENDATION THE "POPPET FAILS OPEN" BE ADDED AS A FAILURE MODE
ON THIS CIL FOR COMPLETENESS, HOWEVER CIL IS ADEQUATE WITHOUT THIS
ADDITION.





NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-201090-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PROP TK LOWER COMPARTMENT CHECK-OUT COUPLING




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DE_TE)




IOA AGREES WITH NASA/RI RATIONALE FOR FAILURE OF A AND B SCREENS.
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT "POPPET FAILS OPEN" BE ADDED AS A FAILURE MODE
ON THIS FMEA. THIS IS A CREDIBLE MODE AND IS ADDRESSED ON OTHER
QD FMEAS. IOA ALSO RECOMMENDS ADDING A STATEMENT TO THE EFFECTS
REGARDING POSSIBLE FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD AND HAZARD TO GROUND AND
EVA CREWS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDRAWS ISSUE. IOA MAINTAINS
RECOMMENDATION THE "POPPET FAILS OPEN" BE ADDED AS A FAILURE MODE
ON THIS CIL FOR COMPLETENESS, HOWEVER CIL IS ADEQUATE WITHOUT THIS
ADDITION.





NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-201090-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PROP TK PLENUM SCREEN CHECK-OUT COUPLING




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH NASA/RI RATIONALE FOR FAILURE OF A AND B SCREENS.
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT "POPPET FAILS OPEN" BE ADDED AS A FAILURE MODE
ON THIS FMEA. THIS IS A CREDIBLE MODE AND IS ADDRESSED ON OTHER
QD FMEAS. IOA ALSO RECOMMENDS ADDING A STATEMENT TO THE EFFECTS
REGARDING POSSIBLE FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD AND HAZARD TO GROUND AND
EVA CREWS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDRAWS ISSUE. IOA MAINTAINS
RECOMMENDATION THE "POPPET FAILS OPEN" BE ADDED AS A FAILURE MODE
ON THIS CIL FOR COMPLETENESS, HOWEVER CIL IS ADEQUATE WITHOUT THIS
ADDITION.



















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]





COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA/RI DO NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE (BURST DISK INTERNAL
LEAKAGE). IOA CONSIDERS THIS FAILURE MODE TO BE CREDIBLE AND
RECOMMENDS IT BE ADDED TO 03-2F-I01060-5. THE FAILURE HISTORY OF
THE BURST DISK INCLUDES THIS FAILURE.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDRAWS ISSUE. THE WORST-CASE BURST DISK
LEAKAGE IS COVERED ON 03-2F-I01060-5 (BURST DISK RUPTURES
PREMATURELY, 2/IR PFP). THE IOA FAILURE MODE IS A LESS SEVERE
CASE OF THE FAILURE MODE COVERED ON 03-2F-I01060-5 AND, THEREFORE,
NEED NOT BE ADDED TO THE RCS FMEA/CIL. THE FMEA/CIL NEED ONLY
ADDRESS THE WORST-CASE FAILURE MODE.





NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-201091-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RELIEF VALVE TEST PORT COUPLING




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH NASA/RI RATIONALE FOR FAILURE OF A AND B SCREENS.
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT "POPPET FAILS OPEN" BE ADDED AS A FAILURE MODE
ON THIS FMEA. THIS IS A CREDIBLE FAILURE MODE AND IS ADDRESSED ON
03-2F-I01070-I. IOA ALSO RECOMMENDS ADDING A STATEMENT TO THE
EFFECTS REGARDING POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS OF ORBITER ENTRY MASS
PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS AND PROP TANK LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS.
THE QUANTITY ON THIS FMEA IS INCORRECT.
F_NAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDRAWS ISSUE. IOA MAINTAINS
RECOMMENDATION THE "POPPET FAILS OPEN" BE ADDED AS A FAILURE MODE
ON THIS CIL FOR COMPLETENESS, HOWEVER CIL IS ADEQUATE WITHOUT THIS
ADDITION.














GROUND MANUAL ISOLATION VALVE




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]





COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ i/I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA/RI DO NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE (EXTERNAL LEAKAGE).
FINAL RESOLUTION: G. GRUSH (RCS SSM) ON 12/15/87 AGREED TO ADD
THIS VALVE BODY TO THE HELIUM LINE EXTERNAL LEAKAGE FMEA (03-2A-
201013-i, i/I) WITH CORRESPONDING RETENTION RATIONALE. THIS WAS
ALSO AN ACTION ITEM FROM THE RCS PRCB ON 12/23/87. IOA ALSO
RECOMMENDS THAT THE POSSIBLE PROP LEAKAGE EFFECTS OF THIS FAILURE
BE INCLUDED IN THE EFFECTS (CORROSION, FIRE, EXPLOSION, EXPOSURE
OF EVA AND GROUND CREWS).





NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-202112-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PROP TANK ISOL VLVS 1/2 & 3/4/5




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ z/1 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [A]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS FMEA COVERS ONLY THE BELLOWS LEAKAGE FAILURE MODE FOR THE
PROP TANK ISOL VALVES. IOA HAS NO ISSUE WITH THIS FAILURE MODE,
HOWEVER DOES RECOMMEND THAT THE EFFECTS INCLUDE THE POSSIBLE
EXPOSURE OF EVA AND GROUND CREWS TO PROP OR PROP VAPORS. NASA/RI
DO NOT COVER STRUCTURAL FAILURE, RUPTURE, OR EXTERNAL LEAKAGE OF
THE VALVE HOUSING ON THIS FMEA OR ELSEWHERE.
FINAL RESOLUTION: G. GRUSH (RCS SSM) ON 12/15/87 AGREED TO ADD
THIS VALVE BODY TO THE PROP LINE EXTERNAL LEAKAGE FMEA (03-2A-
202108-1, i/I) WITH CORRESPONDING RETENTION RATIONALE. THIS WAS
ALSO AN ACTION ITEM FROM THE RCS PRCB ON 12/23/87.














PROP TANK ISOL VLVS 1/2 & 3/4/5




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]





COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)




IOA ITEM LIST SHOULD NOT INCLUDE THE 3/4/5 VALVES. NASA/RI DO NOT
COVER THIS FAILURE MODE (RESTRICTED FLOW). IOA WITHDRAWS I/i
ISSUE, BUT MAINTAINS CONCERN THAT RESTRICTED FLOW OF PROP TO A
THRUSTER COULD RESULT IN BURN-THROUGH. IOA RECOMMENDS A 3/IR PPP,
I/i ABORT FMEA AND CIL FOR RESTRICTED FLOW OF THE PROP TANK ISOL
1/2 VALVES. LOSS OF PROP FLOW THROUGH THE 1/2 VALVE WOULD RESULT
IN THE LOSS OF ONE +X THRUSTER USED TO DUMP ARCS PROP DURING RTLS
& TAL ABORTS. INABILITY TO COMPLETE A PLANNED ARCS DUMP COULD
RESULT IN VIOLATIONS OF ENTRY MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS AND TANK
LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS.
FINAL R_SOLUTION: G. GRUSH (RCS SSM) ON 5/19/88 AGREED TO ADD
"RESTRICTED FLOW" TO THE FAILURE MODES ON 03-2A-202110-I (3/IR
PPP, FAILS CLOSED) DURING THE NEXT FMEA UPDATE ACTIVITY. IOA
WITHDRAWS I/I ABORT ISSUE (SEE ASSESSMENT SHEET RCS-251 FOR
RATIONALE.





NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-202110-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PROP TANK ISOL VLV 1/2




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THIS PROP TANK ISOL 1/2 VALVE FAILURE BE
UPGRADED TO A 3/IR PPP, i/i ABORT AND PLACED ON THE CIL. LOSS OF
FLOW THROUGH THE 1/2 VALVE WOULD RESULT IN THE LOSS OF ONE +X
THRUSTER USED TO DUMP ARCS PROP DURING RTLS & TAL ABORTS.
INABILITY TO COMPLETE A PLANNED ARCS DUMP COULD RESULT IN
VIOLATION OF ENTRY MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDRAWS i/i ABORT ISSUE BECAUSE OF THE
UNIQUE SET OF CIRCUMSTANCES REQUIRED FOR A i/i ABORT CRIT TO BE
POSSIBLE. FOR THE LOSS OF ONE +X THRUSTER TO CAUSE POSSIBLE LOSS
OF CREW/VEHICLE DURING RTLS & TAL ABORTS, THE PLANNED ENTRY X CG
OF THE ORBITER MUST BE AT OR NEAR THE AFT X CG LIMIT (1109.0
INCHES) SUCH THAT THE EXTRA AMOUNT OF ARCS PROP REMAINING IN THE
TANKS, WHICH COULD NOT BE DUMPED DUE TO THIS VALVE FAILURE, CAUSES
THE AFT X CG LIMIT TO BE VIOLATED. THE AFT LIMIT IS BASED ON
ORBITER THERMAL CONSTRAINTS. IOA ESTIMATES THIS FAILURE COULD
MOVE THE X CG AFT BY A MAXIMUM OF LESS THAN 1 INCH. IOA STILL
RECOMMENDS A i/i ABORT CRIT TO COVER THIS WORST-CASE SCENARIO, AND
FURTHER RECOMMENDS THAT SUCH AN OCCURRENCE BE PROTECTED AGAINST IN
PRE-FLIGHT CG PLANNING. HOWEVER, IOA RECOGNIZES THAT THE SCENARIO
REQUIRED FOR A i/i ABORT CRIT IS VERY UNIQUE.





NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-201080-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






MANIFOLD 1/2 GROUND PURGE COUPLING




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE )




IOA AGREES WITH NASA/RI RATIONALE FOR FAILURE OF A AND B SCREENS.
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT "POPPET FAILS OPEN" BE ADDED AS A FAILURE MODE
ON THIS FMEA. THIS IS A CREDIBLE MODE AND IS ADDRESSED ON OTHER
QD FMEAS. IOA ALSO RECOMMENDS ADDING STATEMENTS TO THE EFFECTS
REGARDING FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD AND HAZARD TO GROUND AND EVA
CREWS. THE QUANTITY ON THIS FMEA APPEARS TO BE INCORRECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDRAWS ISSUE. IOA MAINTAINS
RECOMMENDATION THE "POPPET FAILS OPEN" BE ADDED AS A FAILURE MODE
ON THIS CIL FOR COMPLETENESS, HOWEVER CIL IS ADEQUATE WITHOUT THIS
ADDITION.





NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-201080-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






MANIFOLD 3/4/5 GROUND PURGE COUPLING




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH NASA/RI RATIONALE FOR FAILURE OF A AND B SCREENS.
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT "POPPET FAILS OPEN" BE ADDED AS A FAILURE MODE
ON THIS FMEA. THIS IS A CREDIBLE MODE AND IS ADDRESSED ON OTHER
QD FMEAS. IOA ALSO RECOMMENDS ADDING STATEMENTS TO THE EFFECTS
REGARDING FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD AND HAZARD TO GROUND AND EVA
CREWS. THE QUANTITY ON THIS FMEA APPEARS TO BE INCORRECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDRAWS ISSUE. IOA MAINTAINS
RECOMMENDATION THE "POPPET FAILS OPEN" BE ADDED AS A FAILURE MODE
ON THIS CIL FOR COMPLETENESS, HOWEVER CIL IS ADEQUATE WITHOUT THIS
ADDITION.














RCS CROSSFEED VLV 1/2 OR 3/4/5




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]





COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [A]
(AD_DELETE)




NASA/RI DO NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE (RESTRICTED FLOW).
IOA WITHDRAWS i/i CRIT ISSUE, BUT MAINTAINS CONCERN THAT
RESTRICTED FLOW OF PROP TO A THRUSTER COULD RESULT IN BURN-
THROUGH.
FINAL RESOLUTION: S. GRUSH (RCS SSM) ON 5/19/88 AGREED TO ADD
"RESTRICTED FLOW" TO THE FAILURE MODES ON 03-2A-202111-2 (2/2, i/I
ABORT, FAILS CLOSED) DURING THE NEXT FMEA UPDATE ACTIVITY.





NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-202112-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RCS CROSSFEED VLV 1/2 OR 3/4/5




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /1 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS FMEA COVERS ONLY THE BELLOWS LEAKAGE FAILURE MODE FOR THE
CROSSFEED VALVES. IOA HAS NO ISSUE WITH THIS FAILURE MODE,
HOWEVER DOES RECOMMEND THAT THE EFFECTS INCLUDE THE POSSIBLE
EXPOSURE OF EVA AND GROUND CREWS TO PROP OR PROP VAPORS. NASA/RI
DO NOT COVER STRUCTURAL FAILURE, RUPTURE, OR EXTERNAL LEAKAGE OF
THE VALVE HOUSING ON THIS FMEA OR ELSEWHERE.
FINAL RESOLUTION: G. GRUSH (RCS SSM) ON 12/15/87 AGREED TO ADD
THIS VALVE BODY TO THE PROP LINE EXTERNAL LEAKAGE FMEA (03-2A-
202108-1, I/i) WITH CORRESPONDING RETENTION RATIONALE. THIS WAS
ALSO AN ACTION ITEM FROM THE RCS PRCB ON 12/23/87.





NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-202120-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






MANIFOLD I, ISOL VLV




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE )




IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THIS ITEM AND FAILURE MODE BE UPGRADED TO A
3/IR PPP, i/i ABORT AND PLACED ON THE CIL. LOSS OF ALL THRUSTERS
ON ONE MANIFOLD MAY RESULT IN THE INABILITY TO COMPLETE OMS OR
ARCS DUMPS DURING RTLS OR TAL, RESULTING IN POSSIBLE VIOLATION OF
ENTRY MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS OR OMS PROP TANK LANDING WEIGHT
CONSTRAINTS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDRAWS i/I ABORT ISSUE BECAUSE OF THE
UNIQUE SET OF CIRCUMSTANCES REQUIRED FOR A i/I ABORT CRIT TO BE
POSSIBLE. FOR THE LOSS OF THREE PRIMARY THRUSTERS TO CAUSE
POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DURING RTLS & TAL ABORTS, THE
PLANNED ENTRY X CG OF THE ORBITER MUST BE AT OR NEAR THE AFT X CG
LIMIT (1109.0 INCHES) SUCH THAT THE EXTRA AMOUNT OF ARCS AND OMS
PROP REMAINING IN THE TANKS, WHICH COULD NOT BE DUMPED DUE TO THIS
VALVE FAILURE, CAUSES THE AFT X CG LIMIT TO BE VIOLATED. THE AFT
LIMIT IS BASED ON ORBITER THERMAL CONSTRAINTS. IOA STILL
RECOMMENDS A i/i ABORT CRIT TO COVER THIS WORST-CASE SCENARIO, AND
FURTHER RECOMMENDS THAT SUCH AN OCCURRENCE BE PROTECTED AGAINST IN
PRE-FLIGHT CG PLANNING. HOWEVER, IOA RECOGNIZES THAT THE SCENARIO
REQUIRED FOR A i/i ABORT CRIT IS VERY UNIQUE.





NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-201080-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






MANIFOLD i, GROUND PURGE/DRAIN COUPLING




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH NASA/RI RATIONALE FOR FAILURE OF A AND B SCREENS.
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT "POPPET FAILS OPEN" BE ADDED AS A FAILURE MODE
ON THIS FMEA. THIS IS A CREDIBLE MODE AND IS ADDRESSED ON OTHER
QD FMEAS. IOA ALSO RECOMMENDS ADDING STATEMENTS TO THE EFFECTS
REGARDING FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD AND HAZARD TO GROUND AND EVA
CREWS. THE QUANTITY ON THIS FMEA APPEARS TO BE INCORRECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDRAWS ISSUE. IOA MAINTAINS
RECOMMENDATION THE "POPPET FAILS OPEN" BE ADDED AS A FAILURE MODE
ON THIS CIL FOR COMPLETENESS, HOWEVER CIL IS ADEQUATE WITHOUT THIS
ADDITION.





NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-202120-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






MANIFOLD 2, ISOL VLV




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)




IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THIS ITEM AND FAILURE MODE BE UPGRADED TO A
3/IR PPP, i/i ABORT AND PLACED ON THE CIL. LOSS OF ALL THRUSTERS
ON ONE MANIFOLD MAY RESULT IN THE INABILITY TO COMPLETE OMS OR
ARCS DUMPS DURING RTLS OR TAL, RESULTING IN POSSIBLE VIOLATION OF
ENTRY MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS OR OMS PROP TANK LANDING WEIGHT
CONSTRAINTS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDRAWS I/i ABORT ISSUE BECAUSE OF THE
UNIQUE SET OF CIRCUMSTANCES REQUIRED FOR A I/i ABORT CRIT TO BE
POSSIBLE. FOR THE LOSS OF THREE PRIMARY THRUSTERS TO CAUSE
POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DURING RTLS & TAL ABORTS, THE
PLANNED ENTRY X CG OF THE ORBITER MUST BE AT OR NEAR THE AFT X CG
LIMIT (1109.0 INCHES) SUCH THAT THE EXTRA AMOUNT OF ARCS AND OMS
PROP REMAINING IN THE TANKS, WHICH COULD NOT BE DUMPED DUE TO THIS
VALVE FAILURE, CAUSES THE AFT X CG LIMIT TO BE VIOLATED. THE AFT
LIMIT IS BASED ON ORBITER THERMAL CONSTRAINTS. IOA STILL
RECOMMENDS A i/I ABORT CRIT TO COVER THIS WORST-CASE SCENARIO, AND
FURTHER RECOMMENDS THAT SUCH AN OCCURRENCS BE PROTECTED AGAINST IN
PRE-FLIGHT CG PLANNING. HOWEVER, IOA RECOGNIZES THAT THE SCENARIO
REQUIRED FOR A I/i ABORT CRIT IS VERY UNIQUE.





NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-201080-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






MANIFOLD 2, GROUND PURGE/DRAIN COUPLING




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH NASA/RI RATIONALE FOR FAILURE OF A AND B SCREENS.
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT "POPPET FAILS OPEN" BE ADDED AS A FAILURE MODE
ON THIS FMEA. THIS IS A CREDIBLE MODE AND IS ADDRESSED ON OTHER
QD FMEAS. IOA ALSO RECOMMENDS ADDING STATEMENTS TO THE EFFECTS
REGARDING FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD AND HAZARD TO GROUND AND EVA
CREWS. THE QUANTITY ON THIS FMEA APPEARS TO BE INCORRECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDRAWS ISSUE. IOA MAINTAINS
RECOMMENDATION THE "POPPET FAILS OPEN" BE ADDED AS A FAILURE MODE
ON THIS CIL FOR COMPLETENESS, HOWEVER CIL IS ADEQUATE WITHOUT THIS
ADDITION.





NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-202120-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






MANIFOLD 3, ISOL VLV




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)




IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THIS ITEM AND FAILURE MODE BE UPGRADED TO A
3/IR PPP, i/i ABORT AND PLACED ON THE CIL. LOSS OF ALL THRUSTERS
ON ONE MANIFOLD MAY RESULT IN THE INABILITY TO COMPLETE OMS OR
ARCS DUMPS DURING RTLS OR TAL, RESULTING IN POSSIBLE VIOLATION OF
ENTRY MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS OR OMS PROP TANK LANDING WEIGHT
CONSTRAINTS.
F_NAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDRAWS I/i ABORT ISSUE BECAUSE OF THE
UNIQUE SET OF CIRCUMSTANCES REQUIRED FOR A i/I ABORT CRIT TO BE
POSSIBLE. FOR THE LOSS OF THREE PRIMARY THRUSTERS TO CAUSE
POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DURING RTLS & TAL ABORTS, THE
PLANNED ENTRY X CG OF THE ORBITER MUST BE AT OR NEAR THE AFT X CG
LIMIT (1109.0 INCHES) SUCH THAT THE EXTRA AMOUNT OF ARCS AND OMS
PROP REMAINING IN THE TANKS, WHICH COULD NOT BE DUMPED DUE TO THIS
VALVE FAILURE, CAUSES THE AFT X CG LIMIT TO BE VIOLATED. THE AFT
LIMIT IS BASED ON ORBITER THERMAL CONSTRAINTS. IOA STILL
RECOMMENDS A i/i ABORT CRIT TO COVER THIS WORST-CASE SCENARIO, AND
FURTHER RECOMMENDS THAT SUCH AN OCCURRENCE BE PROTECTED AGAINST IN
PRE-FLIGHT CG PLANNING. HOWEVER, IOA RECOGNIZES THAT THE SCENARIO
REQUIRED FOR A i/i ABORT CRIT IS VERY UNIQUE.





NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-201080-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






MANIFOLD 3, GROUND PURGE/DRAIN COUPLING




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DE_TE)




IOA AGREES WITH NASA/RI RATIONALE FOR FAILURE OF A AND B SCREENS.
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT "POPPET FAILS OPEN" BE ADDED AS A FAILURE MODE
ON THIS FMEA. THIS IS A CREDIBLE MODE AND IS ADDRESSED ON OTHER
QD FMEAS. IOA ALSO RECOMMENDS ADDING STATEMENTS TO THE EFFECTS
REGARDING FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD AND HAZARD TO GROUND AND EVA
CREWS. THE QUANTITY ON THIS FMEA APPEARS TO BE INCORRECT.
F_NAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDRAWS ISSUE. IOA MAINTAINS
RECOMMENDATION THE "POPPET FAILS OPEN" BE ADDED AS A FAILURE MODE
ON THIS CIL FOR COMPLETENESS, HOWEVER CIL IS ADEQUATE WITHOUT THIS
ADDITION.





NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-202120-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






MANIFOLD 4, ISOL VLV




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THIS ITEM AND FAILURE MODE BE UPGRADED TO A
3/IR PPP, i/I ABORT AND PLACED ON THE CIL. LOSS OF ALL THRUSTERS
ON ONE MANIFOLD MAY RESULT IN THE INABILITY TO COMPLETE OMS OR
ARCS DUMPS DURING RTLS OR TAL, RESULTING IN POSSIBLE VIOLATION OF
ENTRY MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS OR OMS PROP TANK LANDING WEIGHT
CONSTRAINTS.
F;NAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDRAWS i/i ABORT ISSUE BECAUSE OF THE
UNIQUE SET OF CIRCUMSTANCES REQUIRED FOR A I/i ABORT CRIT TO BE
POSSIBLE. FOR THE LOSS OF THREE PRIMARY THRUSTERS TO CAUSE
POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW VEHICLE DURING RTLS & TAL ABORTS, THE
PLANNED ENTRY X CG OF THE ORBITER MUST BE AT OR NEAR THE AFT X CG
LIMIT (1109.0 INCHES) SUCH THAT THE EXTRA AMOUNT OF ARCS AND OMS
PROP REMAINING IN THE TANKS, WHICH COULD NOT BE DUMPED DUE TO THIS
VALVE FAILURE, CAUSES THE AFT X CG LIMIT TO BE VIOLATED. THE AFT
LIMIT IS BASED ON ORBITER THERMAL CONSTRAINTS. IOA STILL
RECOMMENDS A i/i ABORT CRIT TO COVER THIS WORST-CASE SCENARIO, AND
FURTHER RECOMMENDS THAT SUCH AN OCCURRENCE BE PROTECTED AGAINST IN
PRE-FLIGHT CG PLANNING. HOWEVER, IOA RECOGNIZES THAT THE SCENARIO
REQUIRED FOR A i/I ABORT CRIT IS VERY UNIQUE.





NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-201080-i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






MANIFOLD 4, GROUND PURGE/DRAIN COUPLING




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH NASA/RI RATIONALE FOR FAILURE OF A AND B SCREENS.
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT "POPPET FAILS OPEN" BE ADDED AS A FAILURE MODE
ON THIS FMEA. THIS IS A CREDIBLE MODE AND IS ADDRESSED ON OTHER
QD FMEAS. IOA ALSO RECOMMENDS ADDING STATEMENTS TO THE EFFECTS
REGARDING FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD AND HAZARD TO GROUND AND EVA
CREWS. THE QUANTITY ON THIS FMEA APPEARS TO BE INCORRECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDRAWS ISSUE. IOA MAINTAINS
RECOMMENDATION THE "POPPET FAILS OPEN" BE ADDED AS A FAILURE MODE
ON THIS CIL FOR COMPLETENESS, HOWEVER CIL IS ADEQUATE WITHOUT THIS
ADDITION.





NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-201080-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






MANIFOLD 5, GROUND PURGE/DRAIN COUPLING




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)




IOA AGREES WITH NASA/RI RATIONALE FOR FAILURE OF A AND B SCREENS.
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT "POPPET FAILS OPEN" BE ADDED AS A FAILURE MODE
ON THIS FMEA. THIS IS A CREDIBLE MODE AND IS ADDRESSED ON OTHER
QD FMEAS. IOA ALSO RECOMMENDS ADDING STATEMENTS TO THE EFFECTS
REGARDING FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD AND HAZARD TO GROUND AND EVA
CREWS. THE QUANTITY ON THIS FMEA APPEARS TO BE INCORRECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDRAWS ISSUE. IOA MAINTAINS
RECOMMENDATION THE "POPPET FAILS OPEN" BE ADDED AS A FAILURE MODE
ON THIS CIL FOR COMPLETENESS, HOWEVER CIL IS ADEQUATE WITHOUT THIS
ADDITION.





NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-202112-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 286
ITEM: MANIFOLD ISOL VLVS




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS FMEA/CIL COVERS ONLY THE BELLOWS LEAKAGE FAILURE MODE FOR THE
PRIMARY MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVES. IOA HAS NO ISSUE WITH THIS
FAILURE MODE, HOWEVER DOES RECOMMEND THAT THE EFFECTS DISCUSS THE
POSSIBLE EXPOSURE OF EVA AND GROUND CREWS TO PROP OR PROP VAPORS.
NASA/RI DO NOT COVER STRUCTURAL FAILURE, RUPTURE, OR EXTERNAL
LEAKAGE OF THE VALVE HOUSING ON THIS FMEA OR ELSEWHERE.
FINAD RESOLUTION: G. GRUSH (RCS SSM) ON 12/15/87 AGREED TO ADD
THIS VALVE BODY TO THE PROP LINE EXTERNAL LEAKAGE FMEA (03-2A-
202108-1, i/I) WITH CORRESPONDING RETENTION RATIONALE. THIS WAS
ALSO AN ACTION ITEM FROM THE RCS PRCB ON 12/23/87.











ITEM: MANIFOLD ISOL VLVS




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ i /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS FMEA/CIL COVERS ONLY THE BELLOWS LEAKAGE FAILURE MODE FOR THE
VERNIER MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE. IOA HAS NO ISSUE WITH THIS
FAILURE MODE, HOWEVER DOES RECOMMEND THAT THE EFFECTS DISCUSS THE
POSSIBLE EXPOSURE OF EVA AND GROUND CREWS TO PROP OR PROP VAPORS.
NASA/RI DO NOT COVER STRUCTURAL FAILURE, RUPTURE, OR EXTERNAL
LEAKAGE OF THE VALVE HOUSING ON THIS FMEA OR ELSEWHERE.
FINA_ RESOLUTION: G. GRUSH (RCS SSM) ON 12/15/87 AGREED TO ADD
THIS VALVE BODY TO THE PROP LINE EXTERNAL LEAKAGE FMEA (03-2A-
202108-1, I/I) WITH CORRESPONDING RETENTION RATIONALE. THIS WAS
ALSO AN ACTION ITEM FROM THE RCS PRCB ON 12/23/87.





NASA FMEA #: NONE
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 287
ITEM: MANIFOLD ISOL VLVS







HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] ,
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA/RI DO NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE (RESTRICTED FLOW). IOA
WITHDRAWS i/i CRIT, BUT MAINTAINS CONCERN THAT RESTRICTED FLOW OF
PROP TO A THRUSTER COULD RESULT IN BURN-THROUGH. IOA RECOMMENDS
THAT THE RESTRICTED FLOW FAILURE MODE BE ADDRESSED ON THE
FMEA/CIL.
FINAL RESOLUTION: G. GRUSH (RCS SSM) ON 5/19/88 AGREED TO ADD
"RESTRICTED FLOW" TO THE FAILURE MODES ON 03-2A-202140-I (2/2,
FAILS CLOSED, VERNIER MANIFOLD ISOL VALVE) AND 03-2A-202120-3
(3/IR PPP, FAILS CLOSED, PRIMARY MANIFOLD ISOL VALVES) DURING THE
NEXT FMEA UPDATE ACTIVITY. IOA WITHDRAWS i/I ABORT ISSUE ON THE
PRIMARY MANIFOLD ISOL VALVES (SEE ASSESSMENT SHEETS RCS-267, 271,
275, & 279 FOR RATIONALE).





NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-221310-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






THRUSTERBIPROP SOLENOIDVLVS, PRIMARY, ALL AXES




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ i /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA FAILURE MODES ON ANALYSIS SHEET SHOULD NOT INCLUDE "FAILS ON".
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THE FAILED OPEN MODE BE UPGRADED TO A i/i
BECAUSE IT RESULTS IN LEAKAGE OF PROP. PER NSTS 22206, ANY SINGLE
FAILURE RESULTING IN PROP LEAKAGE SHOULD BE CLASSIFIED AS A i/I.
PROP LEAKAGE PRESENTS A HAZARD TO THE GROUND CREW.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDRAWS i/i ISSUE AFTER DISCUSSION WITH
RCS SSM ON 5/19/88. SSM BELIEVES THAT THE CRIT ASSIGNED TO THIS
FAILURE MODE SHOULD REFLECT ONLY THE EFFECTS ON THE MISSION, CREW,
AND VEHICLE DURING FLIGHT, AND NOT THE POTENTIAL EFFECTS TO THE
GROUND CREW DURING NON-FLIGHT PHASES. IOA ACCEPTS THIS
PHILOSOPHY, BUT RECOMMENDS THAT THE CRIT BE UPGRADED TO A i/i PER
NSTS 22206 GROUNDRULES AND BECAUSE THIS FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS
OF LIFE DURING THE PRE-LAUNCH AND LANDING/SAFING PHASES. FROM A
LOSS OF THRUSTER STANDPOINT, IOA CONCURS WITH THE NASA
CRITICALITY, BUT RECOMMENDS A i/i ABORT CRIT. SEE ASSESSMENT
SHEETS RCS-293, 295, & 297. THE SSM STATES THAT THE WORST-CASE
EFFECT OF ZOTS RESULTING FROM THIS FAILURE WOULD BE THRUSTER
INTERNAL LEAKAGE. ZOTS WOULD NOT RUPTURE THE THRUSTER HOUSING.














THRUSTERBIPROP SOLENOIDVLVS, PRIMARY, ALL AXES




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA/RI DO NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE (STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
RUPTURE, EXTERNAL LEAKAGE).
FINAL RESOLUTION: G. GRUSH (RCS SSM) ON 12/15/87 AGREED TO ADD
THIS VALVE BODY TO THE PROP LINE EXTERNAL LEAKAGE FMEA (03-2A-
202108-1, i/I) WITH CORRESPONDING RETENTION RATIONALE. THIS WAS
ALSO AN ACTION ITEM FROM THE RCS PRCB ON 12/23/87.














THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VLVS, PRIMARY, ALL AXES




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ i /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA/RI DO NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE (RESTRICTED FLOW). IOA
WITHDRAWS I/i CRIT, BUT MAINTAINS CONCERN THAT RESTRICTED FLOW OF
PROP COULD RESULT IN BURN-THROUGH. IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THE
RESTRICTED FLOW FAILURE MODE BE ADDRESSED ON THE FMEA/CIL.
FINAL RESOLUTION: G. GRUSH (RCS SSM) ON 5/19/88 AGREED TO ADD
"RESTRICTED FLOW" TO THE FAILURE MODES ON 03-2A-221310-4 (3/IR
FPP, FAILS CLOSED) DURING THE NEXT FMEA UPDATE ACTIVITY. IOA
WITHDRAWS I/I ABORT ISSUE (SEE ASSESSMENT SHEETS RCS-293, 295,
& 297 FOR RATIONALE).





NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-221310-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VLVS, PRIMARY, +X AXIS




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THIS FAILURE MODE BE UPGRADED TO A 3/IR FPP,
I/i ABORT. THE LOSS OF ONE PRIMARY THRUSTER DURING AN RTLS OR TAL
ABORT WOULD RESULT IN REDUCED OMS AND RCS PROP DUMPING CAPABILITY.
INABILITY TO COMPLETE PLANNED OMS AND RCS PROP DUMPS COULD RESULT
IN VIOLATION OF ENTRY MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS AND OMS PROP
TANK LANDING WT CONSTRAINTS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDRAWS I/i ABORT ISSUE BECAUSE OF THE
UNIQUE SET OF CIRCUMSTANCES REQUIRED FOR A i/1 ABORT CRIT TO BE
POSSIBLE. FOR THE LOSS OF ONE THRUSTER TO CAUSE POSSIBLE LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE DURING RTLS & TAL ABORTS, THE PLANNED ENTRY X CG OF
THE ORBITER MUST BE AT OR NEAR THE AFT X CG LIMIT (1109.0 INCHES)
SUCH THAT THE EXTRA AMOUNT OF ARCS AND OMS PROP REMAINING IN THE
TANKS, WHICH COULD NOT BE DUMPED DUE TO THIS THRUSTER FAILURE,
CAUSES THE AFT X CG LIMIT TO BE VIOLATED. THE AFT LIMIT IS BASED
ON ORBITER THERMAL CONSTRAINTS. IOA STILL RECOMMENDS A I/I ABORT
CRIT TO COVER THIS WORST-CASE SCENARIO, AND FURTHER RECOMMENDS
THAT SUCH AN OCCURRENCE BE PROTECTED AGAINST IN PRE-FLIGHT CG
PLANNING. HOWEVER, IOA RECOGNIZES THAT THE SCENARIO REQUIRED FOR
A I/i ABORT CRIT IS VERY UNIQUE.





NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-221310-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VLVS, PRIMARY, +X AXIS
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1/1 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THE INTERNAL LEAKAGE FAILURE MODE BE UPGRADED
TO A i/i BECAUSE IT RESULTS IN THE LEAKAGE OF PROP. PER NSTS
22206, A SINGLE FAILURE WHICH RESULTS IN PROP LEAKAGE SHOULD BE
CLASSIFIED AS A i/i. PROP LEAKAGE IS A HAZARD TO THE GROUND
CREW.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDRAWS i/I ISSUE AFTER DISCUSSION WITH
RCS SSM ON 5/19/88. SSM BELIEVES THAT THE CRIT ASSIGNED TO THIS
FAILURE MODE SHOULD REFLECT ONLY THE EFFECTS ON THE MISSION, CREW,
AND VEHICLE DURING FLIGHT, AND NOT THE POTENTIAL EFFECTS TO THE
GROUND CREW DURING NON-FLIGHT PHASES. IOA ACCEPTS THIS
PHILOSOPHY, BUT RECOMMENDS THAT THE CRIT BE UPGRADED TO A I/i PER
NSTS 22206 GROUNDRULES AND BECAUSE THIS FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS
OF LIFE DURING THE PRE-LAUNCH AND LANDING/SAFING PHASES. FROM A
LOSS OF THRUSTER STANDPOINT, IOA CONCURS WITH THE NASA
CRITICALITY, BUT RECOMMENDS A i/i ABORT CRIT. SEE ASSESSMENT
SHEET RCS-293. THE SSM STATES THAT THE WORST-CASE EFFECT OF ZOTS
RESULTING FROM THIS FAILURE WOULD BE THRUSTER INTERNAL LEAKAGE.
ZOTS WOULD NOT RUPTURE THE THRUSTER HOUSING.





NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-221310-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VLVS, PRIMARY, Y AXIS




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THIS FAILURE MODE BE UPGRADED TO A 3/IR FPP,
I/I ABORT. THE LOSS OF ONE PRIMARY THRUSTER DURING AN RTLS OR TAL
ABORT WOULD RESULT IN REDUCED OMS AND RCS PROP DUMPING CAPABILITY.
INABILITY TO COMPLETE PLANNED OMS AND RCS PROP DUMPS COULD RESULT
IN VIOLATION OF ENTRY MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS AND OMS PROP
TANK LANDING WT CONSTRAINTS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDRAWS i/i ABORT ISSUE BECAUSE OF THE
UNIQUE SET OF CIRCUMSTANCES REQUIRED FOR A i/I ABORT CRIT TO BE
POSSIBLE. FOR THE LOSS OF ONE THRUSTER TO CAUSE POSSIBLE LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE DURING RTLS & TAL ABORTS, THE PLANNED ENTRY X CG OF
THE ORBITER MUST BE AT OR NEAR THE AFT X CG LIMIT (1109.0 INCHES)
SUCH THAT THE EXTRA AMOUNT OF ARCS AND OMS PROP REMAINING IN THE
TANKS, WHICH COULD NOT BE DUMPED DUE TO THIS THRUSTER FAILURE,
CAUSES THE AFT X CG LIMIT TO BE VIOLATED. THE AFT LIMIT IS BASED
ON ORBITER THERMAL CONSTRAINTS. IOA STILL RECOMMENDS A i/i ABORT
CRIT TO COVER THIS WORST-CASE SCENARIO, AND FURTHER RECOMMENDS
THAT SUCH AN OCCURRENCE BE PROTECTED AGAINST IN PRE-FLIGHT CG
PLANNING. HOWEVER, IOA RECOGNIZES THAT THE SCENARIO REQUIRED FOR
A 1/1 ABORT CRIT IS VERY UNIQUE.





NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-221310-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VLVS, PRIMARY, Y AXIS




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1/1 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THE INTERNAL LEAKAGE FAILURE MODE BE UPGRADED
TO A i/i BECAUSE IT RESULTS IN THE LEAKAGE OF PROP. PER NSTS
22206, A SINGLE FAILURE WHICH RESULTS IN PROP LEAKAGE SHOULD BE
CLASSIFIED AS A I/i. PROP LEAKAGE IS A HAZARD TO THE GROUND
CREW.
F_NAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDRAWS i/i ISSUE AFTER DISCUSSION WITH
RCS SSM ON 5/19/88. SSM BELIEVES THAT THE CRIT ASSIGNED TO THIS
FAILURE MODE SHOULD REFLECT ONLY THE EFFECTS ON THE MISSION, CREW,
AND VEHICLE DURING FLIGHT, AND NOT THE POTENTIAL EFFECTS TO THE
GROUND CREW DURING NON-FLIGHT PHASES. IOA ACCEPTS THIS
PHILOSOPHY, BUT RECOMMENDS THAT THE CRIT BE UPGRADED TO A i/i PER
NSTS 22206 GROUNDRULES AND BECAUSE THIS FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS
OF LIFE DURING THE PRE-LAUNCH AND LANDING/SAFING PHASES. FROM A
LOSS OF THRUSTER STANDPOINT, IOA CONCURS WITH THE NASA
CRITICALITY, BUT RECOMMENDS A i/I ABORT CRIT. SEE ASSESSMENT
SHEET RCS-295. THE SSM STATES THAT THE WORST-CASE EFFECT OF ZOTS
RESULTING FROM THIS FAILURE WOULD BE THRUSTER INTERNAL LEAKAGE.
ZOTS WOULD NOT RUPTURE THE THRUSTER HOUSING.





NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-221310-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VLVS, PRIMARY, Z AXIS




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )




IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THIS FAILURE MODE BE UPGRADED TO A 3/IR FPP,
i/i ABORT. THE LOSS OF ONE PRIMARY THRUSTER DURING AN RTLS OR TAL
ABORT WOULD RESULT IN REDUCED OMS AND RCS PROP DUMPING CAPABILITY.
INABILITY TO COMPLETE PLANNED OMS AND RCS PROP DUMPS COULD RESULT
IN VIOLATION OF ENTRY MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS AND OMS PROP
TANK LANDING WT CONSTRAINTS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDRAWS 1/1 ABORT ISSUE BECAUSE OF THE
UNIQUE SET OF CIRCUMSTANCES REQUIRED FOR A 1/1 ABORT CRIT TO BE
POSSIBLE. FOR THE LOSS OF ONE THRUSTER TO CAUSE POSSIBLE LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE DURING RTLS & TAL ABORTS, THE PLANNED ENTRY X CG OF
THE ORBITER MUST BE AT OR NEAR THE AFT X CG LIMIT (1109.0 INCHES)
SUCH THAT THE EXTRA AMOUNT OF ARCS AND OMS PROP REMAINING IN THE
TANKS, WHICH COULD NOT BE DUMPED DUE TO THIS THRUSTER FAILURE,
CAUSES THE AFT X CG LIMIT TO BE VIOLATED. THE AFT LIMIT IS BASED
ON ORBITER THERMAL CONSTRAINTS. IOA STILL RECOMMENDS A i/I ABORT
CRIT TO COVER THIS WORST-CASE SCENARIO, AND FURTHER RECOMMENDS
THAT SUCH AN OCCURRENCE BE PROTECTED AGAINST IN PRE-FLIGHT CG
PLANNING. HOWEVER, IOA RECOGNIZES THAT THE SCENARIO REQUIRED FOR
A 1/1 ABORT CRIT IS VERY UNIQUE.





NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-221310-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VLVS, PRIMARY, Z AXIS




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THE INTERNAL LEAKAGE FAILURE MODE BE UPGRADED
TO A I/I BECAUSE IT RESULTS IN THE LEAKAGE OF PROP. PER NSTS
22206, A SINGLE FAILURE WHICH RESULTS IN PROP LEAKAGE SHOULD BE
CLASSIFIED AS A I/i. PROP LEAKAGE IS A HAZARD TO THE GROUND
CREW.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDRAWS i/i ISSUE AFTER DISCUSSION WITH
RCS SSM ON 5/19/88. SSM BELIEVES THAT THE CRIT ASSIGNED TO THIS
FAILURE MODE SHOULD REFLECT ONLY THE EFFECTS ON THE MISSION, CREW,
AND VEHICLE DURING FLIGHT, AND NOT THE POTENTIAL EFFECTS TO THE
GROUND CREW DURING NON-FLIGHT PHASES. IOA ACCEPTS THIS
PHILOSOPHY, BUT RECOMMENDS THAT THE CRIT BE UPGRADED TO A i/i PER
NSTS 22206 GROUNDRULES AND BECAUSE THIS FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS
OF LIFE DURING THE PRE-LAUNCH AND LANDING/SAFING PHASES. FROM A
LOSS OF THRUSTER STANDPOINT, IOA CONCURS WITH THE NASA
CRITICALITY, BUT RECOMMENDS A i/I ABORT CRIT. SEE ASSESSMENT
SHEET RCS-297. THE SSM STATES THAT THE WORST-CASE EFFECT OF ZOTS
RESULTING FROM THIS FAILURE WOULD BE THRUSTER INTERNAL LEAKAGE.
ZOTS WOULD NOT RUPTURE THE THRUSTER HOUSING.





NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-231310-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VLVS, VERNIERS, ALL AXES




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA FAILURE MODES ON ANALYSIS SHEET SHOULD NOT INCLUDE "FAILS ON".
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THE FAILED OPEN MODE BE UPGRADED TO A i/i
BECAUSE IT RESULTS IN LEAKAGE OF PROP. PER NSTS 22206, ANY SINGLE
FAILURE RESULTING IN PROP LEAKAGE SHOULD BE CLASSIFIED AS A i/i.
PROP LEAKAGE PRESENTS A HAZARD TO THE GROUND CREW. IOA ALSO
RECOMMENDS THAT THE SUBASSEMBLY ITEMS INCLUDED ON THIS FMEA BE
SEPARATED ONTO INDIVIDUAL FMEAS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDRAWS i/I ISSUE AFTER DISCUSSION WITH
RCS SSM ON 5/19/88. SSM BELIEVES THAT THE CRIT ASSIGNED TO THIS
FAILURE MODE SHOULD REFLECT ONLY THE EFFECTS ON THE MISSION, CREW,
AND VEHICLE DURING FLIGHT, AND NOT THE POTENTIAL EFFECTS TO THE
GROUND CREW DURING NON-FLIGHT PHASES. IOA ACCEPTS THIS
PHILOSOPHY, BUT RECOMMENDS THAT THE CRIT BE UPGRADED TO A i/I PER
NSTS 22206 GROUNDRULES AND BECAUSE THIS FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS
OF LIFE DURING THE PRE-LAUNCH AND LANDING/SAFING PHASES. FROM A
LOSS OF VERNIERS STANDPOINT, IOA RECOMMENDS A CRIT 2/2. HOWEVER,
IOA ACCEPTS NASA IR CRIT SINCE IT IS ON THE CIL. THE NASA CRITS
ASSIGNED TO THIS FAILURE MODE ARE INCONSISTENT BETWEEN THE FORWARD
AND AFT RCS SYSTEMS.














THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VLVS, VERNIERS, ALL AXES




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1 /1 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA/RI DO NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE (STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
RUPTURE, EXTERNAL LEAKAGE).
FINAL RESODUTION: G. GRUSH (RCS SSM) ON 12/15/87 AGREED TO ADD
THIS VALVE BODY TO THE PROP LINE EXTERNAL LEAKAGE FMEA (03-2A-
202108-1, i/i) WITH CORRESPONDING RETENTION RATIONALE. THIS WAS
ALSO AN ACTION ITEM FROM THE RCS PRCB ON 12/23/87.





NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-231310-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VLVS, VERNIERS, ALL AXES
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ i /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THE INTERNAL LEAKAGE FAILURE MODE BE UPGRADED
TO A i/I BECAUSE IT RESULTS IN LEAKAGE OF PROP. PER NSTS 22206,
ANY SINGLE FAILURE RESULTING IN PROP LEAKAGE SHOULD BE CLASSIFIED
AS A i/i. PROP LEAKAGE PRESENTS A HAZARD TO THE GROUND CREW. IOA
ALSO RECOMMENDS THAT THE SUBASSEMBLY ITEMS INCLUDED ON THIS FMEA
BE SEPARATED ONTO INDIVIDUAL FMEAS.
_INAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDRAWS 1/1 ISSUE AFTER DISCUSSION WITH
RCS SSM ON 5/19/88. SSM BELIEVES THAT THE CRIT ASSIGNED TO THIS
FAILURE MODE SHOULD REFLECT ONLY THE EFFECTS ON THE MISSION, CREW,
AND VEHICLE DURING FLIGHT, AND NOT THE POTENTIAL EFFECTS TO THE
GROUND CREW DURING NON-FLIGHT PHASES. IOA ACCEPTS THIS
PHILOSOPHY, BUT RECOMMENDS THAT THE CRIT BE UPGRADED TO A i/I PER
NSTS 22206 GROUNDRULES AND BECAUSE THIS FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS
OF LIFE DURING THE PRE-LAUNCH AND LANDING/SAFING PHASES. FROM A
LOSS OF VERNIERS STANDPOINT, IOA RECOMMENDS A CRIT 2/2. HOWEVER,
IOA ACCEPTS NASA IR CRIT SINCE IT IS ON THE CIL. THE NASA CRITS
ASSIGNED TO THIS FAILURE MODE ARE INCONSISTENT BETWEEN THE FORWARD
AND AFT RCS SYSTEMS.











ITEM: HE ISOL VLV




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ N ]
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA/RI DO NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE (RESTRICTED FLOW). IOA
RECOMMENDS THAT THE RESTRICTED FLOW MODE BE ADDRESSED ON THE
FMEA/CIL AS A 2/IR PFF. INABILITY TO REPRESS FRCS PROP TANK AND
SUBSEQUENT INABILITY TO USE OR DEPLETE FRCS PROP COULD RESULT IN
VIOLATIONS OF ENTRY MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS. LOSS OF FLOW
THROUGH ONE VALVE NOT DETECTABLE DURING DUAL LEG OPERATION.
CONTAMINATION CAN EFFECT BOTH VALVES.
FINAL RESOLUTION: G. GRUSH (RCS SSM) ON 5/19/88 AGREED TO ADD
"RESTRICTED FLOW" TO THE FAILURE MODES ON 03-2F-I01020-4 (3/IR
PPP, FAILS CLOSED) DURING THE NEXT FMEA UPDATE ACTIVITY. IOA
WITHDRAWS 2/IR ISSUE (SEE ASSESSMENT SHEET RCS-104 FOR RATIONALE).
IOA ALSO WITHDRAWS B AND C SCREEN ISSUES. THIS FAILURE WOULD BE
DETECTABLE BEFORE LAUNCH AND ON-ORBIT SINCE ONLY ONE VALVE IS OPEN
AT A TIME DURING PAD PRE-PRESS AND ON-ORBIT. HOWEVER, IOA
RECOMMENDS THAT THE B SCREEN BE FAILED FOR PHASES WHEN BOTH VALVES
ARE USED SIMULTANEOUSLY (ASCENT AND ENTRY), WHEN THIS FAILURE
WOULD NOT BE DETECTABLE. IOA ACCEPTS C SCREEN PASSAGE BASED ON
THE QUESTIONABLE CREDIBILITY OF AN AMOUNT OF CONTAMINATION
SUFFICIENT TO BLOCK BOTH VALVES. HOWEVER, ANY UPSTREAM
CONTAMINATION COULD AFFECT ALL REDUNDANCY, AND IOA RECOMMENDS
FAILURE OF THE C SCREEN.





NASA FMEA #: NONE
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 10003
ITEM: HE ISOL VLV
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ] [ ]




CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] C ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
[ ] *
IX]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[1/1 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE )




NASA/RI DO NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE (STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
RUPTURE, EXTERNAL LEAKAGE).
FINAL RESOLUTION: G. GRUSH (RCS SSM) ON 12/15/87 AGREED TO ADD
THIS VALVE BODY TO THE HELIUM LINE EXTERNAL LEAKAGE FMEA (03-2F-
101013-1, i/i) WITH CORRESPONDING RETENTION RATIONALE. THIS WAS
ALSO AN ACTION ITEM FROM THE RCS PRCB ON 12/23/87.





NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I01095-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






QUAD CHECK VALVE ASSEMBLY




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ i/1 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )




NASA ORIGINALLY DID NOT COVER THIS FAILURE (SINGLE INLET FILTER
BLOCKAGE), BUT ADDED CIL PER IOA ISSUE. IOA RECOMMENDS CRIT I/I.
INABILITY TO REPRESS FRCS PROP TANK AND DEPLETE PROP COULD RESULT
IN VIOLATION OF THE ENTRY X CG LIMIT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA HELD MTG ON 6/2/88 WITH RCS SSM, AND MOD,
BOEING, & RSOC PERSONNEL TO DISCUSS IOA ISSUE AND INCONSISTENCY
BETWEEN RCS HDW CRIT AND GN&C FMEA 05-I-FC6242-I. SSM STATED THAT
USE OF A FRCS DUMP FOR ENTRY X CG MANAGEMENT WAS NOT CONSIDERED IN
RCS CRIT ASSIGNMENT AS WAS DONE IN IOA AND GN&C CRITS. A POST-
DEORBIT FRCS DUMP IS USED TO MEET THE FWD X CG LIMIT (1076.7 IN).
THEREFORE, IF A PLANNED DUMP IS NOT COMPLETED BECAUSE OF A BLOCKED
CHECK VLV FILTER, THE X CG LIMIT MAY BE VIOLATED RESULTING IN LOSS
OF CREW/VEHICLE. THE CRIT ASSIGNED TO THIS FAILURE MODE SHOULD
REFLECT THE POTENTIAL ENTRY X CG LIMIT VIOLATION. IOA RELUCTANTLY
WITHDRAWS ISSUE BASED ON PARTIAL ULLAGE CAPABILITY, THE
"CONTINGENCY CG ENVELOPE", AND THE SSM'S JUDGMENT. HOWEVER, IOA
STRONGLY RECOMMENDS EITHER A i/i FOR THIS FAILURE MODE, OR A
FLIGHT RULE WHICH PROHIBITS RELIANCE ON A FRCS DUMP TO MEET THE
ENTRY X CG LIMIT. ALSO, THE INCONSISTENCY BETWEEN THE RCS CRIT
AND ABOVE GN&C FMEA SHOULD BE CORRECTED.











QUAD CHECK VALVE ASSEMBLY







HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA/RI DO NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE (STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
RUPTURE, EXTERNAL LEAKAGE).
FINAL RESOLUTION: G. GRUSH (RCS SSM) ON 12/15/87 AGREED TO ADD
THIS VALVE BODY TO THE HELIUM LINE EXTERNAL LEAKAGE FMEA (03-2F-
101013-1, i/I) WITH CORRESPONDING RETENTION RATIONALE. THIS WAS
ALSO AN ACTION ITEM FROM THE RCS PRCB ON 12/23/87. IOA ALSO
RECOMMENDS THAT THE EFFECTS OF POSSIBLE PROP LEAKAGE BE INCLUDED
ON THIS CIL (CORROSION, FIRE, EXPLOSION, EXPOSURE OF EVA AND
GROUND CREWS).














NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]









[ ] [ ]














RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ NA] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA/RI DO NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE (RESTRICTED FLOW).
FINAL RESOLUTION: G. GRUSH (RCS SSM) ON 5/19/88 AGREED TO ADD
"RESTRICTED FLOW" TO THE FAILURE MODES ON 03-2F-I01060-3 (3/IR
FNP, BURST DISK FAILS TO BURST) DURING THE NEXT FMEA UPDATE
ACTIVITY.





NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I01060-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS FMEA COVERS ONLY THE BELLOWS LEAKAGE FAILURE MODE. IOA HAS
NO ISSUE WITH THIS FAILURE MODE, HOWEVER DOES RECOMMEND ADDING
STATEMENTS TO THE EFFECTS ABOUT POSSIBLE VIOLATION OF ENTRY MASS
PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS AND THE HAZARDS OF PROP LEAKAGE TO
EVA CREW, VEHICLE, AND GROUND CREW. NASA/RI DO NOT COVER
STRUCTURAL FAILURE, RUPTURE, OR EXTERNAL LEAKAGE OF THE VALVE
HOUSING ON THIS FMEA OR ELSEWHERE.
FINAL RESOLUTION: G. GRUSH (RCS SSM) ON 12/15/87 AGREED TO ADD
THIS VALVE BODY TO THE HELIUM LINE EXTERNAL LEAKAGE FMEA (03-2F-
101013-1, i/i) WITH CORRESPONDING RETENTION RATIONALE. THIS WAS
ALSO AN ACTION ITEM FROM THE RCS PRCB ON 12/23/87.





NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I02120-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PROP TANK ISOL VLVS 1/2 & 3/4/5




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THIS ITEM AND FAILURE MODE (RELIEF DEVICE
FAILS CLOSED) BE UPGRADED TO A 2/IR PNP AND PLACED ON THE CIL.
THIS FAILURE COULD RESULT IN OVERPRESSURIZATION AND RUPTURE OF
DOWNSTREAM PROP LINES. IOA NOW CLASSIFIES THIS FAILURE AS A 2/IR
PNP SINCE A PREVIOUS FAILURE IS REQUIRED BEFORE THE VALVE WILL BE
CLOSED.
FINAL RESOLUTION: G. GRUSH (RCS SSM) STATED ON 5/19/88 THAT THIS
3/3 FMEA WAS DELETED, AND THE FAILURE MODE LISTED AS A CAUSE ON
THE PROP LINE EXTERNAL LEAKAGE FMEA (03-2F-I02108-I, i/i). IOA
ACCEPTS THIS AS ADEQUATE AND WITHDRAWS ISSUE, BUT RECOMMENDS THAT
THIS FAILURE MODE BE ADDRESSED INDIVIDUALLY ON A SEPARATE FMEA TO
ENSURE THAT IT RECEIVES PROPER ATTENTION (SUCH AS 03-2A-202140-3,
I/i, WHICH ADDRESSES "INTERNAL RELIEF SECTION OF VALVE FAILS
CLOSED" AS A FAILURE MODE FOR THE VERNIER MANIFOLD ISOLATION
VALVE).





NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I02110-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






MANIFOLD 1-4 ISOLATION VALVES




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THIS ITEM AND FAILURE MODE (RELIEF DEVICE
FAILS CLOSED) BE UPGRADED TO A I/i AND PLACED ON THE CIL. THIS
FAILURE COULD RESULT IN OVERPRESSURIZATION AND RUPTURE OF
DOWNSTREAM PROP LINES.
F_NAL RESOLUTION: G. GRUSH (RCS SSM) STATED ON 5/19/88 THAT THIS
3/3 FMEA WAS DELETED, AND THE FAILURE MODE LISTED AS A CAUSE ON
THE PROP LINE EXTERNAL LEAKAGE FMEA (03-2F-I02108-I, i/I). IOA
ACCEPTS THIS AS ADEQUATE AND WITHDRAWS ISSUE, BUT RECOMMENDS THAT
THIS FAILURE MODE BE ADDRESSED INDIVIDUALLY ON A SEPARATE FMEA TO
ENSURE THAT IT RECEIVES PROPER ATTENTION (SUCH AS 03-2A-202140-3,
i/i, WHICH ADDRESSES "INTERNAL RELIEF SECTION OF VALVE FAILS
CLOSED" AS A FAILURE MODE FOR THE VERNIER MANIFOLD ISOLATION
VALVE).











MANIFOLD 5 ISOLATION VALVE







HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)




NASA/RI DO NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE (RELIEF DEVICE FAILS TO
RELIEVE). IOA RECOMMENDS THAT A 2/IR PNP CIL BE CREATED FOR THIS
ITEM AND FAILURE MODE. THIS FAILURE COULD RESULT IN
OVERPRESSURIZATION AND RUPTURE OF DOWNSTREAM PROP LINES. IOA NOW
CLASSIFIES THIS FAILURE AS A 2/IR PNP SINCE A PREVIOUS FAILURE IS
REQUIRED BEFORE THE VALVE WOULD BE CLOSED.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDRAWS ISSUE. THIS FAILURE MODE IS
LISTED AS A CAUSE ON THE PROP LINE EXTERNAL LEAKAGE FMEA (03-2F-
102108-i, I/i). IOA ACCEPTS THIS AS ADEQUATE, BUT RECOMMENDS THAT
THIS FAILURE MODE BE ADDRESSED INDIVIDUALLY ON A SEPARATE FMEA TO
ENSURE THAT IT RECEIVES PROPER ATTENTION (SUCH AS 03-2A-202140-3,
WHICH ADDRESSES "INTERNAL RELIEF SECTION OF VALVE FAILS CLOSED" AS
A FAILURE MODE FOR THE VERNIER MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE).














THRUSTER INJECTOR HEAD ASSEMBLY, PRIMARY




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1 /1 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA/RI DO NOT COVER THIS ITEM AND FAILURE MODE (RESTRICTED FLOW),
HOWEVER, NOTE ON 03-2F-121312-I SAYS THAT THE INJECTOR FMEA WAS
DELETED AND ADDED AS A CAUSE ON 03-2F-121312-I. IOA RECOMMENDS
THAT THIS ITEM AND FAILURE MODE BE ADDRESSED INDEPENDENTLY ON THE
CIL WITH A I/i CRITICALITY. THE INJECTOR IS AT THE SAME LEVEL OF
DETAIL WITH OTHER THRUSTER COMPONENTS COVERED ON INDIVIDUAL FMEAS,
AND SHOULD ALSO RECEIVE I/i ATTENTION. RESTRICTED FLOW OF THE
INJECTOR COULD RESULT IN THRUSTER BURN-THROUGH.
FINA_ RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDRAWS ISSUE. RESTRICTED FLOW OF THE
INJECTOR HEAD ASSEMBLY IS ADEQUATELY COVERED ON 03-2F-121312-I
(1/1) WHICH INCLUDES "BLOCKED INJ ORIFICES" AS A CAUSE FOR THRUST
CHAMBER BURN-THROUGH. HOWEVER, IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THIS ITEM AND
FAILURE MODE BE ADDRESSED ON A SEPARATE i/i CIL TO ENSURE THAT
THEY RECEIVE PROPER ATTENTION. IOA CONSIDERS THIS ITEM TO BE AT
THE SAME LEVEL OF DETAIL AS OTHER THRUSTER COMPONENTS ADDRESSED
INDIVIDUALLY ON FMEAS.














THRUSTER INJECTOR HEAD ASSEMBLY, PRIMARY




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]





COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ i /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA/RI DO NOT COVER THIS ITEM AND FAILURE MODE (STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, BURN-THROUGH), HOWEVER, NOTE ON 03-2F-121312-I SAYS THAT
THE INJECTOR FMEA WAS DELETED AND ADDED AS A CAUSE ON 03-2F-
121312-1. IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THIS ITEM AND FAILURE MODE BE
ADDRESSED INDEPENDENTLY ON THE CIL WITH A I/1 CRITICALITY. THE
INJECTOR IS AT THE SAME LEVEL OF DETAIL WITH OTHER THRUSTER
COMPONENTS COVERED ON INDIVIDUAL FMEAS, AND SHOULD ALSO RECEIVE
I/i ATTENTION.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDRAWS ISSUE. STRUCTURAL FAILURE/BURN-
THROUGH OF THE INJECTOR ASSEMBLY IS COVERED ON 03-2F-121312-I
(I/i) WHICH INCLUDES "INJECTOR FRACTURE" AS A CAUSE FOR THRUST
CHAMBER BURN-THROUGH. HOWEVER, IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THIS ITEM AND
FAILURE MODE BE ADDRESSED ON A SEPARATE i/I CIL TO ENSURE THAT
THEY RECEIVE PROPER ATTENTION. IOA CONSIDERS THIS ITEM TO BE AT
THE SAME LEVEL OF DETAIL AS OTHER THRUSTER COMPONENTS ADDRESSED
INDIVIDUALLY ON FMEAS.











ITEM: HE ISOL VLV




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)




NASA/RI DO NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE (RESTRICTED FLOW). IOA
RECOMMENDS THAT THE RESTRICTED FLOW MODE BE ADDRESSED ON THE
FMEA/CIL AS A 2/IR PFF. INABILITY TO REPRESS ARCS PROP TANK AND
INABILITY TO USE OR DEPLETE ARCS PROP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
ENTRY CONTROL AND VIOLATIONS OF ENTRY MASS PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS.
LOSS OF FLOW THROUGH ONE VALVE NOT DETECTABLE DURING DUAL LEG
OPERATION, AND CONTAMINATION CAN AFFECT BOTH VALVES
S IMULTANEOUS LY.
FINAL RESOLUTION: G. GRUSH (RCS SSM) ON 5/19/88 AGREED TO ADD
"RESTRICTED FLOW" TO THE FAILURE MODES ON 03-2A-201020-I (2/IR
PPP, FAILS CLOSED) DURING THE NEXT FMEA UPDATE ACTIVITY. IOA
WITHDRAWS B AND C SCREEN ISSUES. THIS FAILURE WOULD BE DETECTABLE
BEFORE LAUNCH AND ON ORBIT SINCE ONLY ONE VALVE IS OPEN AT A TIME
DURING PAD PRE-PRESS AND ON ORBIT. HOWEVER, IOA RECOMMENDS THAT
THE B SCREEN BE FAILED FOR PHASES WHEN BOTH VALVES ARE USED
SIMULTANEOUSLY (ASCENT AND ENTRY), WHEN THIS FAILURE WOULD NOT BE
DETECTABLE. IOA ACCEPTS C SCREEN PASSAGE BASED ON THE QUESTIONABLE
CREDIBILITY OF AN AMOUNT OF CONTAMINATION SUFFICIENT TO BLOCK BOTH
VALVES. HOWEVER, ANY UPSTREAM CONTAMINATION COULD AFFECT ALL
REDUNDANCY, AND IOA RECOMMENDS FAILURE OF THE C SCREEN.











ITEM: HE ISOL VLV




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]





COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA/RI DO NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE (STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
RUPTURE, EXTERNAL LEAKAGE).
FINAL RESOLUTION: G. GRUSH (RCS SSM) ON 12/15/87 AGREED TO ADD
THIS VALVE BODY TO THE HELIUM LINE EXTERNAL LEAKAGE FMEA (03-2A--
201013-1, i/I) WITH CORRESPONDING RETENTION RATIONALE. THIS
ALSO AN ACTION ITEM FROM THE RCS PRCB ON 12/23/87.











QUAD CHECK VALVE ASSEMBLY







HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] ,
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA/RI DO NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE (STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
RUPTURE, EXTERNAL LEAKAGE).
FINAL RESOLUTION: G. GRUSH (RCS SSM) ON 12/15/87 AGREED TO ADD
THIS VALVE BODY TO THE HELIUM LINE EXTERNAL LEAKAGE FMEA (03-2A-
201013-1, I/I) WITH CORRESPONDING RETENTION RATIONALE. THIS WAS
ALSO AN ACTION ITEM FROM THE RCS PRCB ON 12/23/87. IOA ALSO
RECOMMENDS THAT THE EFFECTS OF POSSIBLE PROP LEAKAGE BE INCLUDED
ON THE FMEA (CORROSION, FIRE, EXPLOSION, EXPOSURE OF EVA AND
GROUND CREWS).























NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ NA] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA/RI DO NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE (RESTRICTED FLOW).
FINAL RESOLUTION: G. GRUSH (RCS SSM) ON 5/19/88 AGREED TO ADD
"RESTRICTED FLOW" TO THE FAILURE MODES ON 03-2A-201060-3 (3/IR
FNP, BURST DISK FAILS TO RUPTURE) DURING THE NEXT FMEA UPDATE
ACTIVITY.














NASA [ 1 /I ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]














[ ] [ ] [ ] IX]*
[ ] [ ] [ ] IX]
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS FMEA COVERS ONLY THE BELLOWS LEAKAGE FAILURE MODE. IOA HAS
NO ISSUE WITH THIS FAILURE MODE, HOWEVER DOES RECOMMEND ADDING
STATEMENTS TO THE EFFECTS ABOUT POSSIBLE VIOLATION OF ENTRY MASS
PROPERTIES CONSTRAINTS AND THE HAZARDS OF PROP LEAKAGE TO EVA
CREW, VEHICLE, AND GROUND CREW. NASA/RI DO NOT COVER STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, RUPTURE, OR EXTERNAL LEAKAGE OF THE VALVE HOUSING ON THIS
FMEA OR ELSEWHERE.
FINAL RESOLUTION: G. GRUSH (RCS SSM) ON 12/15/87 AGREED TO ADD
THIS VALVE BODY TO THE HELIUM LINE EXTERNAL LEAKAGE FMEA (03-2A-
201013-1, i/I) WITH CORRESPONDING RETENTION RATIONALE. THIS WAS
ALSO AN ACTION ITEM FROM THE RCS PRCB ON 12/23/87.











PROPTANK ISOL VLVS 3/4/5







HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA NOW CLASSIFIES C SCREEN AS "PASS". NASA/RI DO NOT COVER THIS
FAILURE MODE (RESTRICTED FLOW). IOA RECOMMENDS A 3/IR PFP FOR
RESTRICTED FLOW OF THE PROP TANK ISOL 3/4/5 VALVES. RESTRICTED
FLOW THROUGH ONE 3/4/5 VALVE WOULD NOT BE DETECTABLE DURING DUAL
LEG OPERATION. IOA WITHDRAWS 2/IR CRIT, BUT MAINTAINS CONCERN
THAT RESTRICTED FLOW OF PROP TO A THRUSTER COULD RESULT IN BURN-
THROUGH.
FINAL RESOLUTION: G. GRUSH (RCS SSM) ON 5/19/88 AGREED TO ADD
"RESTRICTED FLOW" TO THE FAILURE MODES ON 03-2A-202110-I (3/IR
PPP, FAILS CLOSED), AND TO UPGRADE THE B SCREEN TO "FAIL" DURING
THE NEXT FMEA UPDATE ACTIVITY.

















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] ,
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THIS FAILURE MODE (RELIEF DEVICE FAILS CLOSED)
BE UPGRADED TO A 2/IR PNP FOR THE 1/2 VALVE AND PLACED ON THE CIL.
THIS FAILURE COULD RESULT IN OVERPRESSURIZATION AND RUPTURE OF THE
DOWNSTREAM PROP LINES. IOA NOW CLASSIFIES THIS FAILURE AS A 2/IR
PNP SINCE A PREVIOUS FAILURE IS REQUIRED BEFORE THE VALVE WOULD BE
CLOSED.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDRAWS ISSUE. THIS FAILURE MODE IS
LISTED AS A CAUSE ON THE PROP LINE EXTERNAL LEAKAGE FMEA (03-2F-
102108-1, i/I). IOA ACCEPTS THIS AS ADEQUATE, BUT RECOMMENDS THAT
THIS FAILURE MODE BE ADDRESSED INDIVIDUALLY ON A SEPARATE FMEA TO
ENSURE THAT IT RECEIVES PROPER ATTENTION (SUCH AS 03-2A-202140-3,
WHICH ADDRESSES "INTERNAL RELIEF SECTION OF VALVE FAILS CLOSED" AS
A FAILURE MODE FOR THE VERNIER MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE).





NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-202120-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






MANIFOLD 1-4 ISOL VALVES




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THIS FAILURE MODE (RELIEF DEVICE FAILS CLOSED)
BE UPGRADED TO A 2/IR PNP AND PLACED ON THE CIL. THIS FAILURE
COULD RESULT IN OVERPRESSURIZATION AND RUPTURE OF THE DOWNSTREAM
PROP LINES. IOA NOW CLASSIFIES THIS FAILURE AS A 2/IR PNP SINCE A
PREVIOUS FAILURE IS REQUIRED BEFORE THE VALVE WOULD BE CLOSED.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDRAWS ISSUE. THIS FAILURE MODE IS
LISTED AS A CAUSE ON THE PROP LINE EXTERNAL LEAKAGE FMEA (03-2F-
102108-1, i/i). IOA ACCEPTS THIS AS ADEQUATE, BUT RECOMMENDS THAT
THIS FAILURE MODE BE ADDRESSED INDIVIDUALLY ON A SEPARATE FMEA TO
ENSURE THAT IT RECEIVES PROPER ATTENTION (SUCH AS 03-2A-202140-3,
WHICH ADDRESSES "INTERNAL RELIEF SECTION OF VALVE FAILS CLOSED" AS
A FAILURE MODE FOR THE VERNIER MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE).



















HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA/RI DO NOT COVER THIS ITEM AND FAILURE (RESTRICTED FLOW). IOA
RECOMMENDS THAT THIS ITEM AND FAILURE MODE BE ADDRESSED ON THE
FMEA/CIL WITH A I/i CRITICALITY. THE INJECTOR IS AT THE SAME
LEVEL OF DETAIL AS OTHER THRUSTER COMPONENTS WHICH ARE COVERED ON
INDIVIDUAL FMEA, AND SHOULD ALSO RECEIVE I/i ATTENTION.
RESTRICTED FLOW OF THE INJECTOR COULD RESULT IN THRUSTER BURN-
THROUGH.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDRAWS ISSUE. RESTRICTED FLOW OF THE
INJECTOR ASSEMBLY IS COVERED ON 03-2A-221312-I (i/I) WHICH
INCLUDES "BLOCKED INJ ORIFICES" AS A CAUSE FOR THRUST CHAMBER
BURN-THROUGH. HOWEVER, IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THIS ITEM AND FAILURE
MODE BE ADDRESSED ON A SEPARATE I/i CIL TO ENSURE THAT THEY
RECEIVE PROPER ATTENTION. IOA CONSIDERS THIS ITEM TO BE AT THE
SAME LEVEL OF DETAIL AS OTHER THRUSTER COMPONENTS ADDRESSED
INDIVIDUALLY ON FMEAS.














THRUSTER INJECTOR HEAD ASSY, PRIMARY




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]





COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[i/I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [A]
(ADD/DELETE )




NASA/RI DO NOT COVER THIS ITEM AND FAILURE (STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
BURN-THROUGH). IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THIS ITEM AND FAILURE MODE BE
ADDRESSED ON THE FMEA/CIL WITH A i/i CRITICALITY. THE INJECTOR IS
AT THE SAME LEVEL OF DETAIL AS OTHER THRUSTER COMPONENTS WHICH ARE
COVERED ON INDIVIDUAL FMEA, AND SHOULD ALSO RECEIVE I/i ATTENTION.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDRAWS ISSUE. STRUCTURAL FAILURE/BURN-
THROUGH OF THE INJECTOR ASSEMBLY IS COVERED ON 03-2A-221312-I
(i/I) WHICH INCLUDES "INJECTOR FRACTURE" AS A CAUSE FOR THRUST
CHAMBER BURN-THROUGH. HOWEVER, IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THIS ITEM AND
FAILURE MODE BE ADDRESSED ON A SEPARATE i/i CIL TO ENSURE THAT
THEY RECEIVE PROPER ATTENTION. IOA CONSIDERS THIS ITEM TO BE AT
THE SAME LEVEL OF DETAIL AS OTHER THRUSTER COMPONENTS ADDRESSED
INDIVIDUALLY ON FMEAS.














THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VALVE, PRIMARY, ALL AXES




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA/RI DO NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE (DELAYED OPERATION, ONE
VALVE OPENS SLOWLY OR LATE). IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THIS ITEM AND
FAILURE MODE BE ADDRESSED ON THE FMEA/CIL WITH A I/i CRIT. SUCH A
FAILURE COULD RESULT IN ZOTS CAUSING THRUSTER RUPTURE AND LEAKAGE
OF PROP.
F_NAL RESQLUTION: IOA WITHDRAWS ISSUE. THE WORST CASES OF THE
IOA FAILURE MODE ARE EITHER "FAILS CLOSED" OR "INTERNAL LEAKAGE".
THEREFORE, IOA NO LONGER RECOMMENDS THAT THIS "LESS THAN WORST
CASE" FAILURE MODE BE ADDRESSED. THE FMEA/CIL NEED ONLY ADDRESS
THE WORST-CASE. IOA'S ZOTS CONCERNS ARE NOW TRANSFERRED TO THE
ISSUE ON THE THRUSTER "INTERNAL LEAKAGE" CIL (03-2F-121310-2 VS.
RCS-181, 185, 187,& 189).














THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VALVE, PRIMARY, ALL AXES
LEAD ANALYST: C.D. PRUST
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
[ ] [ ] [ ] [x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA/RI DO NOT COVER THIS FAILURE MODE (DELAYED OPERATION, ONE
VALVE OPENS SLOWLY OR LATE). IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THIS ITEM AND
FAILURE MODE BE ADDRESSED ON THE FMEA/CIL WITH A i/i CRIT. SUCH A
FAILURE COULD RESULT IN ZOTS CAUSING THRUSTER RUPTURE AND
LEAKAGE OF PROP.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDRAWS ISSUE. THE WORST CASES OF THE
IOA FAILURE MODE ARE EITHER "FAILS CLOSED" OR "INTERNAL LEAKAGE".
THEREFORE, IOA NO LONGER RECOMMENDS THAT THIS "LESS THAN WORST
CASE" FAILURE MODE BE ADDRESSED. THE FMEA/CIL NEED ONLY ADDRESS
THE WORST-CASE. IOA'S ZOTS CONCERNS ARE NOW TRANSFERRED TO THE
ISSUE ON THE THRUSTER "INTERNAL LEAKAGE" CIL (03-2A-221310-i VS.
RCS-290, 294, 296, & 298).





NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-121310-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VLV, PRIMARY, ALL AXES




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THIS ITEM AND FAILURE MODE (PREMATURE
OPERATION DURING GROUND C/O TRICKLE CURRENT TEST) BE UPGRADED TO A
i/I AND PLACED ON THE CIL. FIRING OF A THRUSTER ON THE GROUND
COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF LIFE DUE TO EXPOSURE TO PROP, PROP
VAPORS, OR THRUSTER PLUME.
FINA_ REs0_UTION: IOA WITHDRAWS I/i ISSUE AFTER DISCUSSION WITH
G. GRUSH (RCS SSM) ON 5/19/88. SSM IS NOT CONCERNED THAT THE RCS
FMEA/CIL COVER FAILURES WHICH AFFECT ONLY GROUND TURNAROUND PHASES
AND, THEREFORE, DOES NOT AGREE WITH A CRIT 1/1 UPGRADE FOR THIS
FAILURE. SSM IS ONLY CONCERNED THAT THE RCS FMEA/CIL SHOULD COVER
FAILURES WHICH AFFECT MISSION, CREW, AND VEHICLE DURING FLIGHT
PHASES. IOA WILL ACCEPT SSM'S PHILOSOPHY. HOWEVER, PER IOA'S
INTERPRETATION, NSTS 22206 WOULD REQUIRE THAT THIS FAILURE BE
CLASSIFIED AS A 1/1. THIS TEST IS PERFORMED DURING OPS-9, WHICH
OVERLAPS THE IOA DEFINITION OF THE PRE-LAUNCH PHASE. THEREFORE,
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THIS FAILURE, WHICH COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
LIFE ON THE GROUND, BE CLASSIFIED AS A 1/1.





NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-221310-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






THRUSTER BIPROP SOLENOID VALVE, PRIMARY, ALL AXES




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[1/I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [A]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THIS ITEM AND FAILURE MODE (PREMATURE
OPERATION DURING GROUND C/O TRICKLE CURRENT TEST) BE UPGRADED TO A
I/i AND PLACED ON THE CIL. FIRING OF A THRUSTER ON THE GROUND
COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF LIFE DUE TO EXPOSURE TO PROP, PROP
VAPORS, OR THRUSTER PLUME.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDRAWS i/i ISSUE AFTER DISCUSSION WITH
G. GRUSH (RCS SSM) ON 5/19/88. SSM IS NOT CONCERNED THAT THE RCS
FMEA/CIL COVER FAILURES WHICH AFFECT ONLY GROUND TURNAROUND PHASES
AND, THEREFORE, DOES NOT AGREE WITH A CRIT I/I UPGRADE FOR THIS
FAILURE. SSM IS ONLY CONCERNED THAT THE RCS FMEA/CIL SHOULD COVER
FAILURES WHICH AFFECT MISSION, CREW, AND VEHICLE DURING FLIGHT
PHASES. IOA WILL ACCEPT SSM'S PHILOSOPHY. HOWEVER, PER IOA'S
INTERPRETATION, NSTS 22206 WOULD REQUIRE THAT THIS FAILURE BE
CLASSIFIED AS A i/i. THIS TEST IS PERFORMED DURING OPS-9, WHICH
OVERLAPS THE IOA DEFINITION OF THE PRE-LAUNCH PHASE. THEREFORE,
IOA RECOMMENDS THAT THIS FAILURE, WHICH COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
LIFE ON THE GROUND, BE CLASSIFIED AS A I/I.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2252 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. DIODE FAILING SHORT ALONE
HAS NO EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S
HIGHER CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2252 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. DIODE FAILING SHORT ALONE
HAS NO EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S
HIGHER CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2253 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S
HIGHER CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2253 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S
HIGHER CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2253 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S
HIGHER CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2253 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S
HIGHER CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY.




















NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S
HIGHER CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2254 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S
HIGHER CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2254 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S
HIGHER CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2254 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S
HIGHER CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2126 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




WITH THE LOSS OF THIS RELAY, VALVE CANNOT BE OPENED. INABILITY
TO OPEN VALVE PREVENTS OPERATION OF JETS REQUIRED FOR TO EXPEL
PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE THE ASSOCIATED
FRCS HARDWARE CIL ISSUE (TANK ISO VALVE STUCK CLOSED) HAS BEEN
WITHDRAWN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2126 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS, COUPLED WITH THE
LOSS OF ALL HARDWARE REDUNDANCY PREVENTS ISOLATION OF A THRUSTER
LEAK.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING THE HIGHER
NASA CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY. IOA
WILL NOT DISPUTE NASA'S MORE CONSERVATIVE (FAILED) B SCREEN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2126A-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE THE ASSOCIATED
FRCS HARDWARE CIL ISSUE (TANK ISO VALVE STUCK CLOSED) HAS BEEN
WITHDRAWN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2126A-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [N/ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE CAUSES
INABILITY TO OPEN THE VALVE. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY CAVUSES INABILITY TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG
LIMITS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE THE ASSOCIATED
FRCS HARDWARE CIL ISSUE (TANK ISO VALVE STUCK CLOSED) HAS BEEN
WITHDRAWN.
















NEW [ N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ] ,
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




WITH THE LOSS OF THIS RELAY, VALVE CANNOT BE OPENED. INABILITY
TO OPEN VALVE PREVENTS OPERATION OF JETS REQUIRED FOR TO EXPEL
PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE THE ASSOCIATED
FRCS HARDWARE CIL ISSUE (TANK ISO VALVE STUCK CLOSED) HAS BEEN
WITHDRAWN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2126 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ x ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS, COUPLED WITH THE
LOSS OF ALL HARDWARE REDUNDANCY PREVENTS ISOLATION OF A THRUSTER
LEAK.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S
HIGHER CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY. IOA
WILL NOT DISPUTE NASA'S MORE CONSERVATIVE (FAILED) B SCREEN.



















NEW [ N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILED ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE THE ASSOCIATED
FRCS HARDWARE CIL ISSUE (TANK ISO VALVE STUCK CLOSED) HAS BEEN
WITHDRAWN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2126A-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE CAUSES
INABILITY TO OPEN THE VALVE. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY CAUSES INABILITY TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG
LIMITS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE THE ASSOCIATED
FRCS HARDWARE CIL ISSUE (TANK ISO VALVE STUCK CLOSED) HAS BEEN
WITHDRAWN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2127A-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




WITH THE LOSS OF THIS RELAY, VALVE CANNOT BE OPENED. INABILITY
TO OPEN VALVE PREVENTS OPERATION OF JETS REQUIRED TO EXPEL
PROPELLANTS TO MEET LANDING CG LIMITS. ALSO THERE IS NO
REDUNDANCY FOR MANIFOLD 5 (VERNIERS - 2/2). IOA ORIGINALLY
FAILED THIS B SCREEN SINCE CREW CANNOT DETECT FAILURE (EXCEPT VIA
MCA STATUS) UNTIL AFTER CLOSING THE VALVE, WHICH IS TOO LATE TO
RECOVER BY NOT CLOSING THE VALVE.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE THE ASSOCIATED
FRCS HARDWARE CIL ISSUE (TANK ISO VALVE STUCK CLOSED) HAS BEEN
WITHDRAWN, AND SINCE ANOTHER FAILURE IS REQUIRED TO CAUSE THE
CREW TO CLOSE THE VALVE IN THE FIRST PLACE. ALSO, NSTS 22206
(2.3.4.B.2.B) SAYS THAT AN ITEM NOT USED DURING ANY NOMINAL
MISSION PHASE SHOULD HAVE AN "NA" B SCREEN. THIS ITEM IS SINCE
THE VALVE IS NOT NOMINALLY CLOSED. SO IOA CONCURS WITH A "PASS"
B SCREEN, SINCE "P" AND "NA" ARE NON-CILS.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2127A-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. HOWEVER, LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY PREVENTS ISOLATION OF A THRUSTER LEAK.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING THE HIGHER
NASA CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY. IOA
WILL NOT DISPUTE NASA'S MORE CONSERVATIVE (FAILED) B SCREEN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2127 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILED ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING THE HIGHER
NASA CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2127 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE CAUSES
INABILITY TO OPEN THE VALVE. REDUNDANCY PTROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY CAUSES INABILITY TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG
LIMITS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING THE HIGHER
NASA CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2127A-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




WITH THE LOSS OF THIS RELAY, VALVE CANNOT BE OPENED. INABILITY
TO OPEN VALVE PREVENTS OPERATION OF JETS REQUIRED TO EXPEL
PROPELLANTS TO MEET LANDING CG LIMITS. ALSO THEIR IS NO
REDUNDANCY FOR MANIFOLD 5 (VERNIERS - 2/2).
IOA ORIGINALLY FAILED THIS B SCREEN SINCE CREW CANNOT DETECT
FAILURE (EXCEPT VIA MCA STATUS) UNTIL AFTER CLOSING THE VALVE,
WHICH IS TOO LATE TO RECOVER BY NOT CLOSING THE VALVE.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE THE ASSOCIATED
FRCS HARDWARE CIL ISSUE (TANK ISO VALVE STUCK CLOSED) HAS BEEN
WITHDRAWN, AND SINCE ANOTHER FAILURE IS REQUIRED TO CAUSE THE
CREW TO CLOSE THE VALVE IN THE FIRST PLACE. ALSO, NSTS 22206
(2.3.4.B.2.B) SAYS THAT AN ITEM NOT USED DURING ANY NOMINAL
MISSION PHASE SHOULD HAVE AN "NA" B SCREEN. THIS ITEM IS SINCE
THE VALVE IS NOT NOMINALLY CLOSED. SO IOA CONCURS WITH A "PASS"
B SCREEN, SINCE "P" AND "NA" ARE NON-CILS.













NEW [ N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
H DW/FUN C A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
I0A [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )




NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS, COUPLED WITH THE
LOSS OF ALL HARDWARE REDUNDANCY PREVENTS ISOLATION OF A THRUSTER
LEAK.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING THE HIGHER
NASA CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY. IOA
WILL NOT DISPUTE NASA'S MORE CONSERVATIVE (FAILED) B SCREEN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2127 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILED ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING THE HIGHER
NASA CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2127 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE CAUSES
INABILITY TO OPEN THE VALVE. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY CAUSES INABILITY TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG
LIMITS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING THE HIGHER
NASA CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2083 -I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 496
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. HOWEVER, LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY TO MONITOR VALVE POSITION MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING
THE VALVE CLOSED.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S
HIGHER CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY. IOA
WILL NOT DISPUTE NASA'S MORE CONSERVATIVE (FAILED) B SCREEN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2083 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDACID: 498
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. HOWEVER, LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY TO MONITOR VALVE POSITION MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING
THE VALVE CLOSED.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S
HIGHER CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY. IOA
WILL NOT DISPUTE NASA'S MORE CONSERVATIVE (FAILED) B SCREEN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2083 -i
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 500
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. HOWEVER, LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY TO MONITOR VALVE POSITION MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING
THE VALVE CLOSED.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S
HIGHER CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY. IOA
WILL NOT DISPUTE NASA'S MORE CONSERVATIVE (FAILED) B SCREEN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2084 -I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 514
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. HOWEVER, LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY TO MONITOR VALVE POSITION MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING
THE VALVE CLOSED.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S
HIGHER CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY. IOA
WILL NOT DISPUTE NASA'S MORE CONSERVATIVE (FAILED) B SCREEN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2084 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 516
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. HOWEVER, LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY TO MONITOR VALVE POSITION MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING
THE VALVE CLOSED.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S
HIGHER CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY. IOA
WILL NOT DISPUTE NASA'S MORE CONSERVATIVE (FAILED) B SCREEN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2084 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 518
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. HOWEVER, LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY TO MONITOR VALVE POSITION MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING
THE VALVE CLOSED.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S
HIGHER CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY. IOA
WILL NOT DISPUTE NASA'S MORE CONSERVATIVE (FAILED) B SCREEN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2255F-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ x] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S
HIGHER CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2255F-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILED SHORT DIODE
CAUSES EXCESSIVE MOTOR OPERATION (CONTINUOUS POWER THAT OPENS THE
VALVE SLIGHTLY THEN CLOSES IT, CONSTANTLY REPEATING ITSELF).
MOTOR DAMAGE WOULD LIKELY CAUSE THE VALVE TO CLOSE, CAUSING
LOSS OF JETS ON ASSOCIATED MANIFOLD. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS
ON ANOTHER MANIFOLD. LOSS OF REDUNDANCY CAUSES THE INABILITY TO
EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG CONSTRAINTS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE THE ASSOCIATED
FRCS HARDWARE CIL ISSUE (MANIFOLD ISO VALVE STUCK CLOSED) HAS
BEEN WITHDRAWN.











NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]









NEW [ N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[p] IF] [P]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S
HIGHER CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2255E-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S
HIGHER CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY.














NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]









[ P ] [ F ]











[ X ] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILED SHORT DIODE
CAUSES EXCESSIVE MOTOR OPERATION (CONTINUOUS POWER THAT OPENS THE
VALVE SLIGHTLY THEN CLOSES IT, CONSTANTLY REPEATING ITSELF).
MOTOR DAMAGE WOULD LIKELY CAUSE THE VALVE TO CLOSE, CAUSING
LOSS OF JETS ON ASSOCIATED MANIFOLD. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS
ON ANOTHER MANIFOLD. LOSS OF REDUNDANCY CAUSES THE INABILITY TO
EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG CONSTRAINTS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE THE ASSOCIATED
FRCS HARDWARE CIL ISSUE (MANIFOLD ISO VALVE STUCK CLOSED) HAS
BEEN WITHDRAWN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2255 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ x] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S
HIGHER CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2268 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S
HIGHER CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2268 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S
HIGHER CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2255F-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S
HIGHER CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2255F-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILED SHORT DIODE
CAUSES EXCESSIVE MOTOR OPERATION (CONTINUOUS POWER THAT OPENS THE
VALVE SLIGHTLY THEN CLOSES IT, CONSTANTLY REPEATING ITSELF).
MOTOR DAMAGE WOULD LIKELY CAUSE THE VALVE TO CLOSE, CAUSING
LOSS OF JETS ON ASSOCIATED MANIFOLD. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS
ON ANOTHER MANIFOLD. LOSS OF REDUNDANCY CAUSES THE INABILITY TO
EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG CONSTRAINTS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE THE ASSOCIATED
FRCS HARDWARE CIL ISSUE (MANIFOLD ISO VALVE STUCK CLOSED) HAS
BEEN WITHDRAWN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2255 -1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S
HIGHER CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2255E-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S
HIGHER CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2255E-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILED SHORT DIODE
CAUSES EXCESSIVE MOTOR OPERATION (CONTINUOUS POWER THAT OPENS THE
VALVE SLIGHTLY THEN CLOSES IT, CONSTANTLY REPEATING ITSELF).
MOTOR DAMAGE WOULD LIKELY CAUSE THE VALVE TO CLOSE, CAUSING
LOSS OF JETS ON ASSOCIATED MANIFOLD. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS
ON ANOTHER MANIFOLD. LOSS OF REDUNDANCY CAUSES THE INABILITY TO
EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG CONSTRAINTS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE THE ASSOCIATED
FRCS HARDWARE CIL ISSUE (MANIFOLD ISO VALVE STUCK CLOSED) HAS
BEEN WITHDRAWN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2255 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S
HIGHER CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2268 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S
HIGHER CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2268 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S
HIGHER CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2255F-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S
HIGHER CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2255F-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILED SHORT DIODE
CAUSES EXCESSIVE MOTOR OPERATION (CONTINUOUS POWER THAT OPENS THE
VALVE SLIGHTLY THEN CLOSES IT, CONSTANTLY REPEATING ITSELF).
MOTOR DAMAGE WOULD LIKELY CAUSE THE VALVE TO CLOSE, CAUSING
LOSS OF JETS ON ASSOCIATED MANIFOLD. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS
ON ANOTHER MANIFOLD. LOSS OF REDUNDANCY CAUSES THE INABILITY TO
EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG CONSTRAINTS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE THE ASSOCIATED
FRCS HARDWARE CIL ISSUE (MANIFOLD ISO VALVE STUCK CLOSED) HAS
BEEN WITHDRAWN.













NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]




NEW [ N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
H DW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S
HIGHER CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2255E-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ x ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S
HIGHER CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2255E-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILED SHORT DIODE
CAUSES EXCESSIVE MOTOR OPERATION (CONTINUOUS POWER THAT OPENS THE
VALVE SLIGHTLY THEN CLOSES IT, CONSTANTLY REPEATING ITSELF).
MOTOR DAMAGE WOULD LIKELY CAUSE THE VALVE TO CLOSE, CAUSING
LOSS OF JETS ON ASSOCIATED MANIFOLD. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS
ON ANOTHER MANIFOLD. LOSS OF REDUNDANCY CAUSES THE INABILITY TO
EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG CONSTRAINTS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE THE ASSOCIATED
FRCS HARDWARE CIL ISSUE (MANIFOLD ISO VALVE STUCK CLOSED) HAS
BEEN WITHDRAWN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2255 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S
HIGHER CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2268 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )




NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S
HIGHER CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2268 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S
HIGHER CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2255F-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S
HIGHER CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2255F-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILED SHORT DIODE
CAUSES EXCESSIVE MOTOR OPERATION (CONTINUOUS POWER THAT OPENS THE
VALVE SLIGHTLY THEN CLOSES IT, CONSTANTLY REPEATING ITSELF).
MOTOR DAMAGE WOULD LIKELY CAUSE THE VALVE TO CLOSE, CAUSING
LOSS OF JETS ON ASSOCIATED MANIFOLD. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS
ON ANOTHER MANIFOLD. LOSS OF REDUNDANCY CAUSES THE INABILITY TO
EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG CONSTRAINTS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE THE ASSOCIATED
FRCS HARDWARE CIL ISSUE (MANIFOLD ISO VALVE STUCK CLOSED) HAS
BEEN WITHDRAWN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2255 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S
HIGHER CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2255E-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILED SHORT DIODE
CAUSES EXCESSIVE MOTOR OPERATION (CONTINUOUS POWER THAT OPENS THE
VALVE SLIGHTLY THEN CLOSES IT, CONSTANTLY REPEATING ITSELF).
MOTOR DAMAGE WOULD LIKELY CAUSE THE VALVE TO CLOSE, CAUSING
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S
HIGHER CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2255E-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




LEAD ANALYST : D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILED SHORT DIODE
CAUSES EXCESSIVE MOTOR OPERATION (CONTINUOUS POWER THAT OPENS THE
VALVE SLIGHTLY THEN CLOSES IT, CONSTANTLY REPEATING ITSELF).
MOTOR DAMAGE WOULD LIKELY CAUSE THE VALVE TO CLOSE, CAUSING
LOSS OF JETS ON ASSOCIATED MANIFOLD. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS
ON ANOTHER MANIFOLD. LOSS OF REDUNDANCY CAUSES THE INABILITY TO
EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG CONSTRAINTS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE THE ASSOCIATED
FRCS HARDWARE CIL ISSUE (MANIFOLD ISO VALVE STUCK CLOSED) HAS
BEEN WITHDRAWN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2255 -I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S
HIGHER CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2268 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S
HIGHER CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2268 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ x ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S
HIGHER CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY.













NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]




NEW [ N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[p] IF] [p]
C ] [ ] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. HOWEVER, IF DRIVER FAILS
OPEN, LOSE CAPABILITY TO MONITOR VALVE STATUS WITH THE SWITCH
TALKBACK. MDM DISCRETES PROVIDE REDUNDANCY. LOSS OF THIS
REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY
EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S
HIGHER CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY. IOA
WILL NOT DISPUTE NASA'S MORE CONSERVATIVE (FAILED) B SCREEN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2208 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMP_E [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSE CAPABILITY TO OPEN ISOLATION VALVE. THIS COUPLED WITH THE
LOSS OF HARDWARE REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE LOSS OF JETS REQUIRED TO
EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE THE ASSOCIATED
FRCS HARDWARE CIL ISSUE (MANIFOLD ISO VALVE STUCK CLOSED) HAS
BEEN WITHDRAWN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2208 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. HOWEVER, IF DRIVER FAILS
OPEN, LOSE CAPABILITY TO MONITOR VALVE STATUS WITH THE SWITCH
TALKBACK. MDM DISCRETES PROVIDE REDUNDANCY. LOSS OF THIS
REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING TRHE VALVE CLOSED,
POSSIBLY
EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S
HIGHER CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY. IOA
WILL NOT DISPUTE NASA'S MORE CONSERVATIVE (FAILED) B SCREEN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2208 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ x ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. HOWEVER, IF DRIVER FAILS
OPEN, LOSE CAPABILITY TO MONITOR VALVE STATUS WITH THE SWITCH
TALKBACK. MDM DISCRETES PROVIDE REDUNDANCY. LOSS OF THIS
REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING TRHE VALVE CLOSED,
POSSIBLY
EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S
HIGHER CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY. IOA
WILL NOT DISPUTE NASA'S MORE CONSERVATIVE (FAILED) B SCREEN.













NEW [ N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSE CAPABILITY TO OPEN ISOLATION VALVE. THIS COUPLED WITH THE
LOSS OF HARDWARE REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE LOSS OF JETS REQUIRED TO
EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE THE ASSOCIATED
FRCS HARDWARE CIL ISSUE (MANIFOLD ISO VALVE STUCK CLOSED) HAS
BEEN WITHDRAWN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2208 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. HOWEVER, IF DRIVER FAILS
OPEN, LOSE CAPABILITY TO MONITOR VALVE STATUS WITH THE SWITCH
TALKBACK. MDM DISCRETES PROVIDE REDUNDANCY. LOSS OF THIS
REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING TRHE VALVE CLOSED,
POSSIBLY
EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S
HIGHER CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY. IOA
WILL NOT DISPUTE NASA'S MORE CONSERVATIVE (FAILED) B SCREEN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2208 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. HOWEVER, IF DRIVER FAILS
OPEN, LOSE CAPABILITY TO MONITOR VALVE STATUS WITH THE SWITCH
TALKBACK. MDM DISCRETES PROVIDE REDUNDANCY. LOSS OF THIS
REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING TRHE VALVE CLOSED,
POSSIBLY
EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S
HIGHER CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY. IOA
WILL NOT DISPUTE NASA'S MORE CONSERVATIVE (FAILED) B SCREEN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2208 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMP_ [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSE CAPABILITY TO OPEN ISOLATION VALVE. THIS COUPLED WITH THE
LOSS OF HARDWARE REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE LOSS OF JETS REQUIRED TO
EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE THE ASSOCIATED
FRCS HARDWARE CIL ISSUE (MANIFOLD ISO VALVE STUCK CLOSED) HAS
BEEN WITHDRAWN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2208 -I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. HOWEVER, IF DRIVER FAILS
OPEN, LOSE CAPABILITY TO MONITOR VALVE STATUS WITH THE SWITCH
TALKBACK. MDM DISCRETES PROVIDE REDUNDANCY. LOSS OF THIS
REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING TRHE VALVE CLOSED,
POSSIBLY
EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S
HIGHER CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY. IOA
WILL NOT DISPUTE NASA'S MORE CONSERVATIVE (FAILED) B SCREEN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2208 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. HOWEVER, IF DRIVER FAILS
OPEN, LOSE CAPABILITY TO MONITOR VALVE STATUS WITH THE SWITCH
TALKBACK. MDM DISCRETES PROVIDE REDUNDANCY. LOSS OF THIS
REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING TRHE VALVE CLOSED,
POSSIBLY
EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S
HIGHER CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY. IOA
WILL NOT DISPUTE NASA'S MORE CONSERVATIVE (FAILED) B SCREEN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2208 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )




LOSE CAPABILITY TO OPEN ISOLATION VALVE. THIS COUPLED WITH THE
LOSS OF HARDWARE REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE LOSS OF JETS REQUIRED TO
EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE THE ASSOCIATED
FRCS HARDWARE CIL ISSUE (MANIFOLD ISO VALVE STUCK CLOSED) HAS
BEEN WITHDRAWN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2208 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. HOWEVER, IF DRIVER FAILS
OPEN, LOSE CAPABILITY TO MONITOR VALVE STATUS WITH THE SWITCH
TALKBACK. MDM DISCRETES PROVIDE REDUNDANCY. LOSS OF THIS
REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING TRHE VALVE CLOSED,
POSSIBLY
EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S
HIGHER CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY. IOA
WILL NOT DISPUTE NASA'S MORE CONSERVATIVE (FAILED) B SCREEN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2128A-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSE CAPABILITY TO OPEN ISOLATION VALVE. THIS, COUPLED WITH THE
LOSS OF HARDWARE REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE INABILITY TO EXPEL
PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE THE ASSOCIATED
FRCS HARDWARE CIL ISSUE (MANIFOLD ISO VALVE STUCK CLOSED) HAS
BEEN WITHDRAWN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2128A-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. HOWEVER, RELAY FAILING
HIGH CREATES INABILITY TO CLOSE THE VALVE. THIS, COUPLED WITH
THE LOSS OF ALL HARDWARE REDUNDANCY PREVENTS ISOLATION OF A
THRUSTER LEAK.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING THE HIGHER
NASA CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2128 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. LOSE CAPABILITY TO OPEN
THE VALVE. THIS, COUPLED WITH THE LOSS OF ALL HARDWARE
REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE LOSS OF JETS REQUIRED TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS
TO MEET CG LIMITS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING THE HIGHER
NASA CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY. IOA
WILL NOT DISPUTE NASA'S MORE CONSERVATIVE (FAILED) B SCREEN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2128A-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSE CAPABILITY TO OPEN ISOLATION VALVE. THIS, COUPLED WITH THE
LOSS OF HARDWARE REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE INABILITY TO EXPEL
PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE THE ASSOCIATED
FRCS HARDWARE CIL ISSUE (MANIFOLD ISO VALVE STUCK CLOSED) HAS
BEEN WITHDRAWN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2128A-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CiL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. HOWEVER, RELAY FAILING
HIGH CREATES INABILITY TO CLOSE THE VALVE. THIS, COUPLED WITH
THE LOSS OF ALL HARDWARE REDUNDANCY PREVENTS ISOALTION OF A
THRUSTER LEAK.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING THE HIGHER
NASA CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2128 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. LOSE CAPABILITY TO OPEN
THE VALVE. THIS, COUPLED WITH THE LOSS OF ALL HARDWARE
REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE LOSS OF JETS REQUIRED TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS
TO MEET CG LIMITS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING THE HIGHER
NASA CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY. IOA
WILL NOT DISPUTE NASA'S MORE CONSERVATIVE (FAILED) B SCREEN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2128A-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSE CAPABILITY TO OPEN ISOLATION VALVE. THIS, COUPLED WITH THE
LOSS OF HARDWARE REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE INABILITY TO EXPEL
PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE THE ASSOCIATED
FRCS HARDWARE CIL ISSUE (MANIFOLD ISO VALVE STUCK CLOSED) HAS
BEEN WITHDRAWN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2128A-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. HOWEVER, RELAY FAILING
HIGH CREATES INABILITY TO CLOSE THE VALVE. THIS, COUPLED WITH
THE LOSS OF ALL HARDWARE REDUNDANCY PREVENTS ISOLATION OF A
THRUSTER LEAK.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING THE HIGHER
NASA CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2128 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. LOSE CAPABILITY TO OPEN
THE VALVE. THIS, COUPLED WITH THE LOSS OF ALL HARDWARE
REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE LOSS OF JETS REQUIRED TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS
TO MEET CG LIMITS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING THE HIGHER
NASA CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY. IOA
WILL NOT DISPUTE NASA'S MORE CONSERVATIVE (FAILED) B SCREEN.













NEW [ N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSE CAPABILITY TO OPEN ISOLATION VALVE. THIS, COUPLED WITH THE
LOSS OF HARDWARE REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE INABILITY TO EXPEL
PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE THE ASSOCIATED
FRCS HARDWARE CIL ISSUE (MANIFOLD ISO VALVE STUCK CLOSED) HAS
BEEN WITHDRAWN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2128A-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. HOWEVER, RELAY FAILING
HIGH CREATES INABILITY TO CLOSE THE VALVE. THIS, COUPLED WITH
THE LOSS OF ALL HARDWARE REDUNDANCY PREVENTS ISOLATION OF A
THRUSTER LEAK.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING THE HIGHER
NASA CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2128 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMP_ [ / ] [ ] [N] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. LOSE CAPABILITY TO OPEN
THE VALVE. THIS, COUPLED WITH THE LOSS OF ALL HARDWARE
REDUNDANCY MAY CAUSE LOSS OF JETS REQUIRED TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS
TO MEET CG LIMITS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING THE HIGHER
NASA CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY. IOA
WILL NOT DISPUTE NASA'S MORE CONSERVATIVE (FAILED) B SCREEN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2089 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 718
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ x ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. HOWEVER, LOSS OF
CAPABILITY TO MONITOR VALVE STATUS MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING
THE VALVE CLOSED POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S
HIGHER CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY. IOA
WILL NOT DISPUTE NASA'S MORE CONSERVATIVE (FAILED) B SCREEN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2089 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 732
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ x ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. HOWEVER, LOSS OF
CAPABILITY TO MONITOR VALVE STATUS MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING
THE VALVE CLOSED POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S
HIGHER CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY. IOA
WILL NOT DISPUTE NASA'S MORE CONSERVATIVE (FAILED) B SCREEN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2089 -1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 746
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. HOWEVER, LOSS OF
CAPABILITY TO MONITOR VALVE STATUS MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING
THE VALVE CLOSED POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S
HIGHER CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY. IOA
WILL NOT DISPUTE NASA'S MORE CONSERVATIVE (FAILED) B SCREEN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2089 -I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 760
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. HOWEVER, LOSS OF
CAPABILITY TO MONITOR VALVE STATUS MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING
THE VALVE CLOSED POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S
HIGHER CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY. IOA
WILL NOT DISPUTE NASA'S MORE CONSERVATIVE (FAILED) B SCREEN.











NEW [ N ]
FRCS
880
MANIFOLD I, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH TALKBACK




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ] [ ]
COMP_E [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. HOWEVER, LOSS OF ACCURATE
INDICATION OF VALVE STATUS WITH SWITCH TALKBACK COUPLED WITH THE
LOSS OF REDUNDANCY (MDM DISCRETES) MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING
THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S
HIGHER CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY. IOA
WILL NOT DISPUTE NASA'S MORE CONSERVATIVE (FAILED) B SCREEN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2155 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






MANIFOLD 2, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH TALKBACK




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMP_E [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. HOWEVER, LOSS OF ACCURATE
INDICATION OF VALVE STATUS WITH SWITCH TALKBACK COUPLED WITH THE
LOSS OF REDUNDANCY (MDM DISCRETES) MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING
THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING THE HIGHER
NASA CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY. IOA
WILL NOT DISPUTE NASA'S MORE CONSERVATIVE (FAILED) B SCREEN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2155 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






MANIFOLD 3, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH TALKBACK




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. HOWEVER, LOSS OF ACCURATE
INDICATION OF VALVE STATUS WITH SWITCH TALKBACK COUPLED WITH THE
LOSS OF REDUNDANCY (MDM DISCRETES) MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING
THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING THE HIGHER
NASA CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY. IOA
WILL NOT DISPUTE NASA'S MORE CONSERVATIVE (FAILED) B SCREEN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2155 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






MANIFOLD 4, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH TALKBACK




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMP_E [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. HOWEVER, LOSS OF ACCURATE
INDICATION OF VALVE STATUS WITH SWITCH TALKBACK COUPLED WITH THE
LOSS OF REDUNDANCY (MDM DISCRETES) MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING
THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING THE HIGHER
NASA CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY. IOA
WILL NOT DISPUTE NASA'S MORE CONSERVATIVE (FAILED) B SCREEN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2179 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )




LOSE JETS ON MANIFOLD I. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON MANIFOLD
3. JETS REQUIRED TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE THE ASSOCIATED
FRCS HARDWARE CIL ISSUE (THRUSTER FAILED CLOSED) HAS BEEN
WITHDRAWN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2179 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ x] *
[x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING THE HIGHER
NASA CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY.
















NEW [ N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSE JETS ON MANIFOLD i. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON MANIFOLD
3. JETS REQUIRED TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE THE ASSOCIATED
FRCS HARDWARE CIL ISSUE (THRUSTER FAILED CLOSED) HAS BEEN
WITHDRAWN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2179 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSE JETS ON MANIFOLD 2. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON MANIFOLD
4. JETS REQUIRED TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE THE ASSOCIATED
FRCS HARDWARE CIL ISSUE (THRUSTER FAILED CLOSED) HAS BEEN
WITHDRAWN.
















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING THE HIGHER
NASA CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2180 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSE JETS ON MANIFOLD 2. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON MANIFOLD
4. JETS REQUIRED TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE THE ASSOCIATED
FRCS HARDWARE CIL ISSUE (THRUSTER FAILED CLOSED) HAS BEEN
WITHDRAWN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2179 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING THE HIGHER
NASA CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2179 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING THE HIGHER
NASA CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2180 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSE JETS ON MANIFOLD 4. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON MANIFOLD
2. JETS REQUIRED TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE THE ASSOCIATED
FRCS HARDWARE CIL ISSUE (THRUSTER FAILED CLOSED) HAS BEEN
WITHDRAWN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2179 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSE JETS ON MANIFOLD 4. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON MANIFOLD
2. JETS REQUIRED TO EXPEL PROPELLANTRS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE THE ASSOCIATED
FRCS HARDWARE CIL ISSUE (THRUSTER FAILED CLOSED) HAS BEEN
WITHDRAWN.
















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]





COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING THE HIGHER
NASA CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2183 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING THE HIGHER
NASA CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY.













NEW [ N ]
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ X ] *
[X]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSE JETS ON MANIFOLD i. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON MANIFOLD
3. JETS REQUIRED TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE THE ASSOCIATED
FRCS HARDWARE CIL ISSUE (THRUSTER FAILED CLOSED) HAS BEEN
WITHDRAWN. IOA WILL NOT DISPUTE NASA'S MORE CONSERVATIVE
(FAILED) B SCREEN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2259 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSE JETS ON MANIFOLD i. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY MANIFOLD 3 JETS.
JETS REQUIRED TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE THE ASSOCIATED
FRCS HARDWARE CIL ISSUE (THRUSTER FAILED CLOSED) HAS BEEN
WITHDRAWN. IOA WILL NOT DISPUTE NASA'S MORE CONSERVATIVE
(FAILED) B SCREEN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2260 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSE JETS ON MANIFOLD 2. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON MANIFOLD
4. JETS REQUIRED TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE THE ASSOCIATED
FRCS HARDWARE CIL ISSUE (THRUSTER FAILED CLOSED) HAS BEEN
WITHDRAWN. IOA WILL NOT DISPUTE NASA'S MORE CONSERVATIVE
(FAILED) B SCREEN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2259 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSE JETS ON MANIFOLD 2. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON MANIFOLD
4. JETS REQUIRED TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE THE ASSOCIATED
FRCS HARDWARE CIL ISSUE (THRUSTER FAILED CLOSED) HAS BEEN
WITHDRAWN. IOA WILL NOT DISPUTE NASA'S MORE CONSERVATIVE
(FAILED) B SCREEN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2259 -I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[X]*
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
REMARKS:
LOSE JETS ON MANIFOLD 4 AND 5.
PROVIDED BY JETS ON MANIFOLD 2.
PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REDUNDANCY FOR MANIFOLD 4 JETS
JETS REQUIRED TO EXPEL
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE THE ASSOCIATED
FRCS HARDWARE CIL ISSUE (THRUSTER FAILED CLOSED) HAS BEEN
WITHDRAWN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2260 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSE JETS ON MANIFOLD 4. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON MANIFOLD
2. JETS REQUIRED TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE THE ASSOCIATED
FRCS HARDWARE CIL ISSUE (THRUSTER FAILED CLOSED) HAS BEEN
WITHDRAWN. IOA WILL NOT DISPUTE NASA'S MORE CONSERVATIVE
(FAILED) B SCREEN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2214 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X ] *
[X]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSE JETS ON MANIFOLD I. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON MANIFOLD
3. JETS REQUIRED TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE THE ASSOCIATED
FRCS HARDWARE CIL ISSUE (THRUSTER FAILED CLOSED) HAS BEEN
WITHDRAWN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2214 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S
HIGHER CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2214 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ x ] *
[X]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSE JETS ON MANIFOLD 2. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON MANIFOLD
4. JETS REQUIRED TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE THE ASSOCIATED
FRCS HARDWARE CIL ISSUE (THRUSTER FAILED CLOSED) HAS BEEN
WITHDRAWN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2214 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [2/2] [ ] [ ] [ ] [X]
COMP_E [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S
HIGHER CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2214 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S
HIGHER CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2214 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S
HIGHER CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2214 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[p] IF] [P]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
IN] IN] IN]
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S
HIGHER CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2214 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSE JETS ON MANIFOLD 4. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON MANIFOLD
2. JETS REQUIRED TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE THE ASSOCIATED
FRCS HARDWARE CIL ISSUE (THRUSTER FAILED CLOSED) HAS BEEN
WITHDRAWN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2220 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S
HIGHER CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2009 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSE JETS ON MANIFOLD I. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON MANIFOLD
3. JETS REQUIRED FOR TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE THE ASSOCIATED
FRCS HARDWARE CIL ISSUE (THRUSTER FAILED CLOSED) HAS BEEN
WITHDRAWN.











NEW [ N ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ] .
IOA [ 2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSE JETS ON MANIFOLD 1. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON MANIFOLD
3. JETS REQUIRED TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE THE ASSOCIATED
FRCS HARDWARE CIL ISSUE (THRUSTER FAILED CLOSED) HAS BEEN
WITHDRAWN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2007 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELET_ }




LOSE JETS ON MANIFOLD i. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON MA_rI_
3. JETS REQUIRED TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE THE ASSOCIATIL_
FRCS HARDWARE CIL ISSUE (THRUSTER FAILED CLOSED) HAS BEEN
WITHDRAWN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2009 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSE JETS ON MANIFOLD 2. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON MANIFOLD
4. JETS REQUIRED FOR TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE THE ASSOCIATED
FRCS HARDWARE CIL ISSUE (THRUSTER FAILED CLOSED) HAS BEEN
WITHDRAWN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2008 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSE JETS ON MANIFOLD 2. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON MANIFOLD
4. JETS REQUIRED TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE THE ASSOCIATED
FRCS HARDWARE CIL ISSUE (THRUSTER FAILED CLOSED) HAS BEEN
WITHDRAWN.














NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]









[ P ] [ P ]
[ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSE JETS ON MANIFOLD 2. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON MANIFOLD
4. JETS REQUIRED TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE THE ASSOCIATED
FRCS HARDWARE CIL ISSUE (THRUSTER FAILED CLOSED) HAS BEEN
WITHDRAWN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2009 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )




LOSE JETS ON MANIFOLD 4. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON MANIFOLD
2. JETS REQUIRED TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE THE ASSOCIATED
FRCS HARDWARE CIL ISSUE (THRUSTER FAILED CLOSED) HAS BEEN
WITHDRAWN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2008 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSE JETS ON MANIFOLD 3. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON MANIFOLD
I. JETS REQUIRED TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE THE ASSOCIATED
FRCS HARDWARE CIL ISSUE (THRUSTER FAILED CLOSED) HAS BEEN
WITHDRAWN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2007 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSE JETS ON MANIFOLD 3. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON MANIFOLD
i. JETS REQUIRED TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE THE ASSOCIATED
FRCS HARDWARE CIL ISSUE (THRUSTER FAILED CLOSED) HAS BEEN
WITHDRAWN.











NEW [ N ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ] [ ] .
IOA [ 2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )




LOSE JETS ON MANIFOLD 4. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON MANIFOLD
2. JETS REQUIRED TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE THE ASSOCIATED
FRCS HARDWARE CIL ISSUE (THRUSTER FAILED CLOSED) HAS BEEN
WITHDRAWN.














NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]










NEW [ N ]
A B
[P] [P]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSE JETS ON MANIFOLD i. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON MANIFOLD
3. JETS REQUIRED TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE THE ASSOCIATED
FRCS HARDWARE CIL ISSUE (THRUSTER FAILED CLOSED) HAS BEEN
WITHDRAWN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2130 -I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSE JETS OF MANIFOLD 2. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON MANIFOLD
4. JETS REQUIRED TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE THE ASSOCIATED
FRCS HARDWARE CIL ISSUE (THRUSTER FAILED CLOSED) HAS BEEN
WITHDRAWN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2130 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSE JETS ON MANIFOLD 4. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY JETS ON MANIFOLD
2. JETS REQUIRED TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE THE ASSOCIATED
FRCS HARDWARE CIL ISSUE (THRUSTER FAILED CLOSED) HAS BEEN
WITHDRAWN.




















HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] ,
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




VERNIER THRUSTERS CHAMBER PRESSURE SENSORS NOT ADDRESSED BY A
FMEA. IOA RECOMMENDS THEIR INCLUSION INTO A FMEA. NOTE:
PRIMARY SENSORS CONTAINED IN 03-2F-121314-2 FMEA.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, BECAUSE THIS ITEM IS
WITHIN THE VERNIER THRUSTER ASSEMBLY AND SO IS CONSIDERED TO BE
COVERED BY THE THRUSTER'S FMEA. IOA MAINTAINS A CONCERN THAT
THIS ITEM SHOULD BE COVERED SEPARATELY.














CHAMBER PRESSURE (Pc) SENSOR, THRUSTERS FSL, F5R
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




VERNIER THRUSTERS CHAMBER PRESSURE SENSORS NOT ADDRESSED BY A
FMEA. IOA RECOMMENDS THEIR INCLUSION INTO A FMEA. NOTE:
PRIMARY SENSORS CONTAINED IN 03-2F-121314-I FMEA.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, BECAUSE THIS ITEM IS
WITHIN THE VERNIER THRUSTER ASSEMBLY AND SO IS CONSIDERED TO BE
COVERED BY THE THRUSTER'S FMEA. IOA MAINTAINS A CONCERN THAT
THIS ITEM SHOULD BE COVERED SEPARATELY.















OX OR FU INJECTOR TEMP SENSOR, THRUSTERS F5L,
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




VERNIER THRUSTERS INJECTOR TEMPERATURE SENSORS NOT ADDRESSED BY A
FMEA. IOA RECOMMENDS THEIR INCLUSION INTO A FMEA. NOTE:
PRIMARY SENSORS CONTAINED IN 03-2F-121315-2 FMEA.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, BECAUSE THIS ITEM IS
WITHIN THE VERNIER THRUSTER ASSEMBLY AND SO IS CONSIDERED TO BE
COVERED BY THE THRUSTER'S FMEA. IOA MAINTAINS A CONCERN THAT
THIS ITEM SHOULD BE COVERED SEPARATELY.















OX OR FU INJECTOR TEMP SENSOR, THRUSTERS F5L,
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




VERNIER THRUSTERS INJECTOR TEMPERATURE SENSORS NOT ADDRESSED BY A
FMEA. IOA RECOMMENDS THEIR INCLUSION INTO A FMEA. NOTE:
PRIMARY SENSORS CONTAINED IN 03-2F-121315-I FMEA.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, BECAUSE THIS ITEM IS
WITHIN THE VERNIER THRUSTER ASSEMBLY AND SO IS CONSIDERED TO BE
COVERED BY THE THRUSTER'S FMEA. IOA MAINTAINS A CONCERN THAT
THIS ITEM SHOULD BE COVERED SEPARATELY.





NASA FMEA #: 03-2F-I03345-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






THERMOSTAT, VERNIER THRUSTERS, ALL AXES
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION OPERATONS. NOTE: VERNIER
THRUSTERS THERMAL SWITCH NOT SPECIFICALLY ADDRESSED ON THIS FMEA.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, BECAUSE THIS ITEM IS
WITHIN THE VERNIER THRUSTER ASSEMBLY, AND SO IS CONSIDERED TO BE
COVERED BY THE THRUSTER'S FMEA. IOA MAINTAINS A CONCERN THAT
THIS ITEM SHOULD BE COVERED SEPARATELY.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2032 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. LOSE CAPABILITY TO OPEN
THE VALVE. THIS CAUSES LOSS OF VERNIERS THUS MISSION OPERATIONS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES
OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2032 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






MANIFOLD 5, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. LOSE CAPABILITY TO CLOSE
THE VALVE TO ISOLATE A THRUSTER LEAK.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES
OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2090 -I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 11008
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE
LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE STAUTS. REDUNDANCY
PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE
VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S
HIGHER CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY. IOA
WILL NOT DISPUTE NASA'S MORE CONSERVATIVE (FAILED) B SCREEN.













HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE
LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE STAUTS. REDUNDANCY
PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE
VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S
HIGHER CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY. IOA
WILL NOT DISPUTE NASA'S MORE CONSERVATIVE (FAILED) B SCREEN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2177 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S
HIGHER CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY.























NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ] .
IOA [ 2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FAILURE CAUSES THE INABILITY TO OPEN THE ISOLATION VALVE TO
PERFORM MISSION OPERATIONS
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, BECAUSE A SECOND
FAILURE IS REQUIRED TO CAUSE THE CREW TO CLOSE THE NORMALLY-OPEN
VALVE IN THE FIRST PLACE.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2178 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S
HIGHER CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY.











NEW [ N ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE
LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY
PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE
VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S
HIGHER CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY. IOA
WILL NOT DISPUTE NASA'S MORE CONSERVATIVE (FAILED) B SCREEN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2210 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE CAUSES LOSS
OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY
PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDNACY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE
VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S
HIGHER CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY. IOA
WILL NOT DISPUTE NASA'S MORE CONSERVATIVE (FAILED) B SCREEN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2210 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS FAILURE CAUSES THE INABILITY TO OPEN THE VALVE, CAUSING LOSS
OF VERNIERS FOR MISSION OPERATIONS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, BECAUSE A SECOND
FAILURE IS REQUIRED TO CAUSE THE CREW TO CLOSE THE NORMALLY-OPEN
VALVE IN THE FIRST PLACE.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2213 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S
HIGHER CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2212 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS DRIVER FAILED HIGH
CAUSES INABILITY TO OPEN THE ISOLATION VALVE. THIS CAUSES LOSS
OF VERNIERS THUS MISSION OPERATIONS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S
HIGHER CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY. IOA
WILL NOT DISPUTE NASA'S MORE CONSERVATIVE (FAILED) B SCREEN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2211 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS FAILURE CAUSES THE INABILITY TO OPEN THE VALVE FOR VERNIERS,
THUS CAUSING LOSS OF MISSION OPERATIONS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, BECAUSE A SECOND
FAILURE IS REQUIRED TO CAUSE THE CREW TO CLOSE THE NORMALLY-OPEN
VALVE IN THE FIRST PLACE.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2211 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S
HIGHER CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2113A-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[P] [P] [P]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] .
[x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS FAILURE CAUSES THE INABILITY TO OPEN THE VALVE, CAUSING LOSS
OF VERNIERS THUS MISSION OPERATIONS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, BECAUSE A SECOND
FAILURE IS REQUIRED TO CAUSE THE CREW TO CLOSE THE NORMALLY-OPEN
VALVE IN THE FIRST PLACE.











NEW [ N ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. LOSE CAPABILITY TO CLOSE
THE VALVE TO ISOLATE A THRUSTER LEAK.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S
HIGHER CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2224 -I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS FAILURE CAUSES THE INABILITY TO OPEN THE VALVE, CAUSING LOSS
OF VERNIERS THUS MISSION OPERATIONS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, BECAUSE A SECOND
FAILURE IS REQUIRED TO CAUSE THE CREW TO CLOSE THE NORMALLY-OPEN
VALVE IN THE FIRST PLACE.













NEW [ N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S
HIGHER CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2257 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S
HIGHER CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2257A-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S
HIGHER CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2258 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[X]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS FAILURE CAUSES THE INABILITY TO OPEN THE ISOLATION VALVE,
CAUSING LOSS OF VERNIERS THUS MISSION OPERATIONS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, BECAUSE A SECOND
FAILURE IS REQUIRED TO CAUSE THE CREW TO CLOSE THE NORMALLY-OPEN
VALVE IN THE FIRST PLACE.













NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]







NEW [ N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S
HIGHER CRIT WHICH IS DUE TO A CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS
22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES. IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW
PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2026 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B SWITCH




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




WITH VALVE CLOSED, A SHORT ACROSS CLOSE CONTACTS PREVENTS FURTHER
VALVE MOVEMENT. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY CAUSES INABILITY TO EXPEL
PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE THE ASSOCIATED
FRCS HARDWARE CIL ISSUE (HE PRESS ISO VALVE STUCK CLOSED) HAS
BEEN WITHDRAWN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2026 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B SWITCH




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ] •
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




WITH VALVE CLOSED, A SHORT ACROSS CLOSE CONTACTS PREVENTS FURTHER
VALVE MOVEMENT. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY CAUSES INABILITY TO EXPEL
PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE THE ASSOCIATED
FRCS HARDWARE CIL ISSUE (HE PRESS ISO VALVE STUCK CLOSED) HAS
BEEN WITHDRAWN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2030 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






MANIFOLD i, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH 30
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY CAUSES INABILITY TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO
MEET CG LIMITS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE THE ASSOCIATED
FRCS HARDWARE CIL ISSUE (MANIFOLD ISO VALVE STUCK CLOSED) HAS
BEEN WITHDRAWN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2030 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






MANIFOLD I, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH 30




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY CAUSES INABILITY TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO
MEET CG LIMITS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE THE ASSOCIATED
FRCS HARDWARE CIL ISSUE (MANIFOLD ISO VALVE STUCK CLOSED) HAS
BEEN WITHDRAWN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2030 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






MANIFOLD 2, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH 31




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS FAILURE CAUSES LOSS INABILITY TO OPEN THE VALVE. LOSS OF
ALL REDUNDANCY CAUSES INABILITY TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG
LIMITS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE THE ASSOCIATED
FRCS HARDWARE CIL ISSUE (MANIFOLD ISO VALVE STUCK CLOSED) HAS
BEEN WITHDRAWN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2030 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






MANIFOLD 2, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH 31




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS FAILURE CAUSES LOSS INABILITY TO OPEN THE VALVE. LOSS OF
ALL REDUNDANCY CAUSES INABILITY TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG
LIMITS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE THE ASSOCIATED
FRCS HARDWARE CIL ISSUE (MANIFOLD ISO VALVE STUCK CLOSED) HAS
BEEN WITHDRAWN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2030 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






MANIFOLD 3, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH 32




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




THIS FAILURE CAUSES INABILITY TO OPEN THE VALVE. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY CAUSES INABILITY TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG
LIMITS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE THE ASSOCIATED
FRCS HARDWARE CIL ISSUE (MANIFOLD ISO VALVE STUCK CLOSED) HAS
BEEN WITHDRAWN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2030 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






MANIFOLD 3, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH 32




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ] ,
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS FAILURE CAUSES INABILITY TO OPEN THE VALVE. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY CAUSES INABILITY TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG
LIMITS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE THE ASSOCIATED
FRCS HARDWARE CIL ISSUE (MANIFOLD ISO VALVE STUCK CLOSED) HAS
BEEN WITHDRAWN.







NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2030 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






MANIFOLD 4, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH 33




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS FAILURE CAUSES INABILITY TO OPEN TH VALVE. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY CAUSES INABILITY TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG
LIMITS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE THE ASSOCIATED
FRCS HARDWARE CIL ISSUE (MANIFOLD ISO VALVE STUCK CLOSED) HAS
BEEN WITHDRAWN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2030 -2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






MANIFOLD 4, OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH 33




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




THIS FAILURE CAUSES INABILITY TO OPEN TH VALVE. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY CAUSES INABILITY TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG
LIMITS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE THE ASSOCIATED
FRCS HARDWARE CIL ISSUE (MANIFOLD ISO VALVE STUCK CLOSED) HAS
BEEN WITHDRAWN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2035 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RJDFIB F1 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 7




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSE CAPABILITY TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE THE ASSOCIATED
FRCS HARDWARE CIL ISSUE (THRUSTER FAILED CLOSED) HAS BEEN
WITHDRAWN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2035 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RJDFIB F1 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 7




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ] [ ] ,
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSE CAPABILITY TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE THE ASSOCIATED
FRCS HARDWARE CIL ISSUE (THRUSTER FAILED CLOSED) HAS BEEN
WITHDRAWN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2036 -1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RJDFIB F1 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 8




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANT JETS CAUSES INABILITY TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS
TO MEET CG LIMITS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE THE ASSOCIATED
FRCS HARDWARE CIL ISSUE (THRUSTER FAILED CLOSED) HAS BEEN
WITHDRAWN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2036 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RJDFIB F1 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 8




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ] .
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANT JETS CAUSES INABILITY TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS
TO MEET CG LIMITS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE THE ASSOCIATED
FRCS HARDWARE CIL ISSUE (THRUSTER FAILED CLOSED) HAS BEEN
WITHDRAWN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2035 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RJDFIA F2 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 7




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSE CAPABILITY TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE THE ASSOCIATED
FRCS HARDWARE CIL ISSUE (THRUSTER FAILED CLOSED) HAS BEEN
WITHDRAWN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2035 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RJDFIA F2 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 7




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSE CAPABILITY TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE THE ASSOCIATED
FRCS HARDWARE CIL ISSUE (THRUSTER FAILED CLOSED) HAS BEEN
WITHDRAWN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2036 -I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RJDFIA F2 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 8




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSE CAPABILITY TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE THE ASSOCIATED
FRCS HARDWARE CIL ISSUE (THRUSTER FAILED CLOSED) HAS BEEN
WITHDRAWN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2036 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RJDFIA F2 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 8




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSE CAPABILITY TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE THE ASSOCIATED
FRCS HARDWARE CIL ISSUE (THRUSTER FAILED CLOSED) HAS BEEN
WITHDRAWN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2035 -I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 5




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




LOSE CAPABILITY TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE THE ASSOCIATED
FRCS HARDWARE CIL ISSUE (THRUSTER FAILED CLOSED) HAS BEEN
WITHDRAWN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2035 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 5




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSE CAPABILITY TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE THE ASSOCIATED
FRCS HARDWARE CIL ISSUE (THRUSTER FAILED CLOSED) HAS BEEN
WITHDRAWN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2036 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 6




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSE CAPABILITY TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE THE ASSOCIATED
FRCS HARDWARE CIL ISSUE (THRUSTER FAILED CLOSED) HAS BEEN
WITHDRAWN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2036 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 6




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ] [ ] ,
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMP_ IN/ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSE CAPABILITY TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE THE ASSOCIATED
FRCS HARDWARE CIL ISSUE (THRUSTER FAILED CLOSED) HAS BEEN
WITHDRAWN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2036 -I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RJDF2A F4/F5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 13




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANT JETS CAUSES INABILITY TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS
TO MEET CG LIMITS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE THE ASSOCIATED
FRCS HARDWARE CIL ISSUE (THRUSTER FAILED CLOSED) HAS BEEN
WITHDRAWN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2036 -i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RJDF2A F4/F5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 13




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANT JETS CAUSES INABILITY TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS
TO MEET CG LIMITS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE THE ASSOCIATED
FRCS HARDWARE CIL ISSUE (THRUSTER FAILED CLOSED) HAS BEEN
WITHDRAWN.



















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




SIGNAL CONDITIONER NOT ADDRESSED BY A FMEA. IOA RECOMMENDS ITS
INCLUSION INTO A FMEA.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, BECAUSE THIS IS NOT A
DEDICATED SIGNAL CONDITIONER AND IS COVERED BY THE GN&C
SUBSYSTEM.







FRCS-II202X BASELINE [ ]






NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
D. HARTMAN
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[p] IF] [p]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




DIODES NOT ADDRESSED BY A FMEA. IOA RECOMMENDS THEIR INCLUSION
INTO A FMEA.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE THESE DIODES
ARE PART OF THE HELIUM PRESSURE ISOLATION VALVE AND ARE COVERED
BY THE VALVE'S FMEA, AND BECAUSE THE ASSOCIATED HARDWARE CIL
ISSUE (HE PRESS ISO VALVE STUCK CLOSED) HAS BEEN WITHDRAWN.




















NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




MICROSWITCHES NOT ADDRESSED BY A FMEA. IOA RECOMMENDS THEIR
INCLUSION INTO A FMEA.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE THESE MICRO (OR
LIMIT) SWITCHES ARE PART OF A VALVE AND ARE CONSIDERED TO BE
COVERED BY THE VALVE'S FMEA, AND BECAUSE THE ASSOCIATED HARDWARE
CIL ISSUE (VALVE STUCK CLOSED) HAS BEEN WITHDRAWN.
HOWEVER, IOA MAINTAINS A CONCERN FOR COMPLETENESS AND RECOMMENDS
THAT VALVE LIMIT OR MICROSWITCHES BE COVERED IN A SEPARATE FMEA.












LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




MICROSWITCHES NOT ADDRESSED BY A FMEA. IOA RECOMMENDS THEIR
INCLUSION INTO A FMEA.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE THESE MICRO (OR
LIMIT) SWITCHES ARE PART OF A VALVE AND ARE CONSIDERED TO BE
COVERED BY THE VALVE'S FMEA, AND BECAUSE THE ASSOCIATED HARDWARE
CIL ISSUE (VALVE STUCK CLOSED) HAS BEEN WITHDRAWN.
HOWEVER, IOA MAINTAINS A CONCERN FOR COMPLETENESS AND RECOMMENDS
THAT VALVE LIMIT OR MICROSWITCHES BE COVERED IN A SEPARATE FMEA.













NEW [ N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO DIFFERENCES IN CRITICALITY. B SCREEN SHOULD BE "NA" BECAUSE
ISOLATION OF A LEAK IS A STANDBY FUNCTION.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW PROBABILITY OF THE MULTIPLE
FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY. IOA WILL NOT DISPUTE NASA'S
MORE CONSERVATIVE (FAILED) B SCREEN.











NEW [ N ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO DIFFERENCES IN CRITICALITY. B SCREEN SHOULD BE "NA" BECAUSE
ISOLATION OF A LEAK IS A STANDBY FUNCTION.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW PROBABILITY OF THE MULTIPLE
FAILURES OCCURRING SIMULTANEOUSLY.














NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
























RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANT JETS CAUSES INABILITY TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS
TO MEET CG LIMITS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE THE ASSOCIATED
FRCS HARDWARE CIL ISSUE (THRUSTER FAILED CLOSED) HAS BEEN
WITHDRAWN.
















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]





COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANT JETS CAUSES INABILITY TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS
TO MEET CG LIMITS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE THE ASSOCIATED
FRCS HARDWARE CIL ISSUE (THRUSTER FAILED CLOSED) HAS BEEN
WITHDRAWN.
















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANT JETS CAUSES INABILITY TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS
TO MEET CG LIMITS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE THE ASSOCIATED
FRCS HARDWARE CIL ISSUE (THRUSTER FAILED CLOSED) HAS BEEN
WITHDRAWN.














NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
























RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANT JETS CAUSES INABILITY TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS
TO MEET CG LIMITS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE THE ASSOCIATED
FRCS HARDWARE CIL ISSUE (THRUSTER FAILED CLOSED) HAS BEEN
WITHDRAWN.


















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANT JETS CAUSES INABILITY TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS
TO MEET CG LIMITS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, SINCE THE ASSOCIATED
FRCS HARDWARE CIL ISSUE (THRUSTER FAILED CLOSED) HAS BEEN
WITHDRAWN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2258 -3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS FAILURE CAUSES THE INABILITY TO OPEN THE VALVE, CAUSING LOSS
OF VERNIERS THIUS MISSION OPERATIONS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, BECAUSE A SECOND
FAILURE IS REQUIRED TO CAUSE THE CREW TO CLOSE THE NORMALLY-OPEN
VALVE IN THE FIRST PLACE.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2252-2
NASA DATA :
BASELINE [ ]




LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2252-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2252-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2252-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2207-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE
LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY
PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE
VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.











NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE
LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY
PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE
VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2219-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE
LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VAVLE POSITION. REDUNDANCY
PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE
VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2219-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2207-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE
LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY
PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE
VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2207-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE
LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY
PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE
VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2219-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR J [ P _ _ F _ _ P J _ X J *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE
LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VAVLE POSITION. REDUNDANCY
PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE
VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2219-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2208-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE
LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE STATUS. REDUNDANCY
PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE
VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2208-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE
LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE STATUS. REDUNDANCY
PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE
VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2208-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[p] IF] [P]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE
LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE STATUS. REDUNDANCY
PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE
VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2208-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE
LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE STATUS. REDUNDANCY
PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE
VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2208-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE
LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE STATUS. REDUNDANCY
PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE
VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.




















NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE
LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE STATUS. REDUNDANCY
PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE
VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2208-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE
LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE STATUS. REDUNDANCY
PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE
VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2208-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE
LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE STATUS. REDUNDANCY
PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE
VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2136-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE CAUSES
INABILITY TO CLOSE THE 1/2 VALVE. THIS PREVENTS CROSSFEDD
CAPABILITY THUS LOSS OF MISSION OPERATIONS. INABILITY TO
CROSSFEED MAY CAUSE INCOMPLETE OMS ABORT DUMP.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.













NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
H DW/FUN C A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE CAUSES
INABILITY TO CLOSE THE 1/2 VALVE. THIS PREVENTS CROSSFEDD
CAPABILITY THUS LOSS OF MISSION OPERATIONS. INABILITY TO
CROSSFEED MAY CAUSE INCOMPLETE OMS ABORT DUMP.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2126-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSE CAPABILITY TO CLOSE TANK ISOLATION 1/2 VALVE. THIS PREVENTS
CROSSFEED OPERATIONS THUS LOSS OF MISSION. INABILITY TO
CROSSFEED DURING AN RTLS/TAL ABORT MAY CAUSE INCOMPLETE OMS ABORT
DUMP.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, BECAUSE THIS FAILURE
PREVENTS CROSSFEEDING TO MANIFOLDS 1 & 2, BUT NOT TO MANIFOLDS 3,
4, & 5.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2126-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ x] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.














NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]




























RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSE CAPABILITY TO CLOSE VALVE. THIS PREVENTS CROSSFEED
OPERATIONS THUS LOSS OF MISSION. INABILITY TO CROSSFEED DURING
AN RTLS/TAL ABORT MAY CAUSE INCOMPLETE OMS ABORT DUMP.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, BECAUSE THIS FAILURE
PREVENTS CROSSFEEDING TO MANIFOLDS 1 & 2, BUT NOT TO MANIFOLDS 3,
4, & 5.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2126-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2137-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE CAUSES THE
INABILITY TO CLOSE 3/4/5 VALVE. THIS PREVENTS CROSSFEED
CAPABILITY THUS LOSS OF MISSION OPERATIONS. INABILITY TO
CROSSFEED DURING RTLS/TAL MAY CAUSE INCOMPLETE OMS ABORT DUMP.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2127-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)








INABILITY TO CLOSE VALVE PREVENTS ISOLATION
IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, BECAUSE IOA'S AND
NASA'S CRITS AND SCREENS ARE THE SAME. IOA HAD MISSED THE FACT
THAT NASA HAD ADDED A I/i ABORT TO THIS FMEA.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2127-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE WILL CLOSE
THE VALVE AND CAUSE INABILITY TO RE-OPEN IT. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED
BY SECOND LEG OF 3/4/5 AND CROSSFEED LEG. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY
PREVENTS PROPELLANTS TO BE EXPELLED TO MEET LANDING
WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2137-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[p] IF] [P]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ x ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE CAUSES THE
INABILITY TO CLOSE 3/4/5 VALVE. THIS PREVENTS CROSSFEED
CAPABILITY THUS LOSS OF MISSION OPERATIONS. INABILITY TO
CROSSFEED DURING RTLS/TAL MAY CAUSE INCOMPLETE OMS ABORT DUMP.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2127-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)







INABILITY TO CLOSE VALVE PREVENTS ISOLATION
IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, BECAUSE IOA'S AND
NASA'S CRITS AND SCREENS ARE THE SAME. IOA HAD MISSED THE FACT
THAT NASA HAD ADDED A i/i ABORT TO THIS FMEA.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2127-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE WILL CLOSE
THE VALVE AND CAUSE INABILITY TO RE-OPEN IT. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED
BY SECOND LEG OF 3/4/5 AND CROSSFEED LEG. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY
PREVENTS PROPELLANTS TO BE EXPELLED TO MEET LANDING
WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.














NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]

























[ x ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. FAILURE CAUSES INABILITY
TO CROSSFEED WITH THE GPC. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED WITH SWITCH AND
OTHER GPC COMMANDS. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY CAUSES INABILITY TO
CROSSFEED, THUS LOSS OF MISSION.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.













NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. LOSE CAPABILITY TO CLOSE
THE VALVE TO ISOLATE A THRUSTER LEAK. NOTE: NASA FMEA
INCORRECTLY IDENTIFIES RELAY 56V76AII6K44. IT SHOULD BE
56V76AII6K46.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2133-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. FAILURE CAUSES INABILITY
TO CROSSFEED WITH THE GPC. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED WITH SWITCH AND
OTHER GPC COMMANDS. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY CAUSES INABILITY TO
CROSSFEED, THUS LOSS OF MISSION.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.













NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]




NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[p] IF] [p]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. LOSE CAPABILITY TO CLOSE
THE VALVE TO ISOLATE A THRUSTER LEAK.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2132-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2132-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2133-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. FAILURE CAUSES INABILITY
TO CROSSFEED WITH THE GPC. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED WITH SWITCH AND
OTHER GPC COMMANDS. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY CAUSES INABILITY TO
CROSSFEED, THUS LOSS OF MISSION.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2133-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ x] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. LOSE CAPABILITY TO CLOSE
THE VALVE TO ISOLATE A THRUSTER LEAK.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2133-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. FAILURE CAUSES INABILITY
TO CROSSFEED WITH THE GPC. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED WITH SWITCH AND
OTHER GPC COMMANDS. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY CAUSES INABILITY TO
CROSSFEED, THUS LOSS OF MISSION.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.













NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]




NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[p] IF] [p]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ X ] *
[X]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. LOSE CAPABILITY TO CLOSE
THE VALVE TO ISOLATE A THRUSTER LEAK.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2132-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ x ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.

















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
H DW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
[ ] IN] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2128A-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. WITH RELAY FAILED HIGH,
LOSE CAPABILITY TO CLOSE VALVE. THIS, COUPLED WITH THE LOSS OF
ALL HARDWARE REDUNDANCY, MAY PREVENT ISOLATION OF A THRUSTER
LEAK.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2128-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE WILL CLOSE
THE VALVE AND CAUSE INABILITY TO RE-OPEN IT CAUSING LOSS OF JETS.
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY PREVENTS PROPELLANTS
TO BE EXPELLED TO MEET LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS.
LOSS OF MANIFOLD THRUSTERS DURING RTLS/TAL ABORT COULD RESULT IN
INABILITY TO COMPLETE A PROPELLANT DUMP (i/i ABORT)
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, BECAUSE IT WAS
DEPENDENT ON A HARDWA._E ISSUE (MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE FAILED
CLOSE), WHICH WAS WITHDRAWN.














NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]










NEW [ X ]
A B
[P] [F]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. WITH RELAY FAILED HIGH,
LOSE CAPABILITY TO CLOSE VALVE. THIS, COUPLED WITH THE LOSS OF
ALL HARDWARE REDUNDANCY, MAY PREVENT ISOLATION OF A THRUSTER
LEAK.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2128-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE WILL CLOSE
THE VALVE AND CAUSE INABILITY TO RE-OPEN IT CAUSING LOSS OF JETS.
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY PREVENTS PROPELLANTS
TO BE EXPELLED TO MEET LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS.
LOSS OF MANIFOLD THRUSTERS DURING RTLS/TAL ABORT COULD RESULT IN
INABILITY TO COMPLETE A PROPELLANT DUMP (I/1 ABORT)
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, BECAUSE IT WAS
DEPENDENT ON A HARDWARE ISSUE (MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE FAILED
CLOSE), WHICH WAS WITHDRAWN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2128A-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ x] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. WITH RELAY FAILED HIGH,
LOSE CAPABILITY TO CLOSE VALVE. THIS, COUPLED WITH THE LOSS OF
ALL HARDWARE REDUNDANCY, MAY PREVENT ISOLATION OF A THRUSTER
LEAK.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2128-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE WILL CLOSE
THE VALVE AND CAUSE INABILITY TO RE-OPEN IT CAUSING LOSS OF JETS.
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY PREVENTS PROPELLANTS
TO BE EXPELLED TO MEET LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS.
LOSS OF MANIFOLD THRUSTERS DURING RTLS/TAL ABORT COULD RESULT IN
INABILITY TO COMPLETE A PROPELLANT DUMP (i/i ABORT)
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, BECAUSE IT WAS
DEPENDENT ON A HARDWARE ISSUE (MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE FAILED
CLOSE), WHICH WAS WITHDRAWN.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2128-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ x ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE WILL CLOSE
THE VALVE AND CAUSE INABILITY TO RE-OPEN IT CAUSING LOSS OF JETS.
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY PREVENTS PROPELLANTS
TO BE EXPELLED TO MEET LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS.
LOSS OF MANIFOLD THRUSTERS DURING RTLS/TAL ABORT COULD RESULT IN
INABILITY TO COMPLETE A PROPELLANT DUMP (I/i ABORT)
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, BECAUSE IT WAS
DEPENDENT ON A HARDWARE ISSUE (MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE FAILED
CLOSE), WHICH WAS WITHDRAWN.

















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
[ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. WITH RELAY FAILED HIGH,
LOSE CAPABILITY TO CLOSE VALVE. THIS, COUPLED WITH THE LOSS OF
ALL HARDWARE REDUNDANCY, MAY PREVENT ISOLATION OF A THRUSTER
LEAK.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2081-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, BECAUSE NASA
CONSIDERED THE GPC SOFTWARE'S USE OF THE MEASUREMENT PROVIDED
THROUGH THIS RESISTOR. THIS LED TO NASA ASSIGNING A I/I ABORT
CRITICALITY, WHICH PUTS THIS FMEA ON THE CIL LIST.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2081-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, BECAUSE NASA
CONSIDERED THE GPC SOFTWARE'S USE OF THE MEASUREMENT PROVIDED
THROUGH THIS RESISTOR. THIS LED TO NASA ASSIGNING A i/i ABORT
CRITICALITY, WHICH PUTS THIS FMEA ON THE CIL LIST.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2083-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE
LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY
PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE
VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2083-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE
LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY
PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE
VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2083-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ x ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE
LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY
PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE
VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, BECAUSE NASA
CONSIDERED THE GPC SOFTWARE'S USE OF THE MEASUREMENT PROVIDED
THROUGH THIS RESISTOR. THIS LED TO NASA ASSIGNING A i/i ABORT
CRITICALITY, WHICH PUTS THIS FMEA ON THE CIL LIST.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2081-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO DIFFERENCES, EXCEPT FOR NASA'S i/i ABORT CRITICALITY.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, BECAUSE NASA
CONSIDERED THE GPC SOFTWARE'S USE OF THE MEASUREMENT PROVIDED
THROUGH THIS RESISTOR. THIS LED TO NASA ASSIGNING A i/i ABORT
CRITICALITY, WHICH PUTS THIS FMEA ON THE CIL LIST.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2081-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST : D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, BECAUSE NASA
CONSIDERED THE GPC SOFTWARE'S USE OF THE MEASUREMENT PROVIDED
THROUGH THIS RESISTOR. THIS LED TO NASA ASSIGNING A i/i ABORT
CRITICALITY, WHICH PUTS THIS FMEA ON THE CIL LIST.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2086-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, BECAUSE NASA
CONSIDERED THE GPC SOFTWARE'S USE OF THE MEASUREMENT PROVIDED
THROUGH THIS RESISTOR. THIS LED TO NASA ASSIGNING A I/i ABORT
CRITICALITY, WHICH PUTS THIS FMEA ON THE CIL LIST.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2084-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE
LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY
PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE
VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2086-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, BECAUSE NASA
CONSIDERED THE GPC SOFTWARE'S USE OF THE MEASUREMENT PROVIDED
THROUGH THIS RESISTOR. THIS LED TO NASA ASSIGNING A I/i ABORT
CRITICALITY, WHICH PUTS THIS FMEA ON THE CIL LIST.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2086-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST : D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, BECAUSE NASA
CONSIDERED THE GPC SOFTWARE'S USE OF THE MEASUREMENT PROVIDED
THROUGH THIS RESISTOR. THIS LED TO NASA ASSIGNING A i/i ABORT
CRITICALITY, WHICH PUTS THIS FMEA ON THE CIL LIST.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2084-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE
LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY
PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE
VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2086-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, BECAUSE NASA
CONSIDERED THE GPC SOFTWARE'S USE OF THE MEASUREMENT PROVIDED
THROUGH THIS RESISTOR. THIS LED TO NASA ASSIGNING A i/I ABORT
CRITICALITY, WHICH PUTS THIS FMEA ON THE CIL LIST.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2086-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO DIFFERENCES, EXCEPT FOR NASA'S i/i ABORT CRITICALITY.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, BECAUSE NASA
CONSIDERED THE GPC SOFTWARE'S USE OF THE MEASUREMENT PROVIDED
THROUGH THIS RESISTOR. THIS LED TO NASA ASSIGNING A i/i ABORT
CRITICALITY, WHICH PUTS THIS FMEA ON THE CIL LIST.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2084-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE
LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY
PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE
VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]





COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, BECAUSE NASA
CONSIDERED THE GPC SOFTWARE'S USE OF THE MEASUREMENT PROVIDED
THROUGH THIS RESISTOR. THIS LED TO NASA ASSIGNING A i/I ABORT
CRITICALITY, WHICH PUTS THIS FMEA ON THE CIL LIST.












LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, BECAUSE NASA
CONSIDERED THE GPC SOFTWARE'S USE OF THE MEASUREMENT PROVIDED
THROUGH THIS RESISTOR. THIS LED TO NASA ASSIGNING A i/i ABORT
CRITICALITY, WHICH PUTS THIS FMEA ON THE CIL LIST.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2086-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, BECAUSE NASA
CONSIDERED THE GPC SOFTWARE'S USE OF THE MEASUREMENT PROVIDED
THROUGH THIS RESISTOR. THIS LED TO NASA ASSIGNING A i/I ABORT
CRITICALITY, WHICH PUTS THIS FMEA ON THE CIL LIST.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2086-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, BECAUSE NASA
CONSIDERED THE GPC SOFTWARE'S USE OF THE MEASUREMENT PROVIDED
THROUGH THIS RESISTOR. THIS LED TO NASA ASSIGNING A I/i ABORT
CRITICALITY, WHICH PUTS THIS FMEA ON THE CIL LIST.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2084-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ x ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE
LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY
PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE
VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.














NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ x ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE
LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY
PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE
VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2103-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE
LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY
PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE
VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2103-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE
LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY
PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE
VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2103-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE
LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY
PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE
VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2103-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ x ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE
LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY
PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE
VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2103-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ x ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / J [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE
LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY
PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE
VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.














NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE
LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY
PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE
VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2089-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE
LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY
PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE
VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2089-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ x ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE
LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY
PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE
VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2089-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE
LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY
PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE
VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2154-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A OR B SWITCH




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE
LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY
PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE
VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2155-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







MANIFOLD i, 2, 3, 4, 5, L/R OX & FU VLV SWITCH




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE
LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY
PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE
VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.














NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS RPC INADVERTENTLY
OPERATING ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES
OCCURING SIMULTANEOUSLY.
















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS RPC INADVERTENTLY
OPERATING ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES
OCCURING SIMULTANEOUSLY.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2179-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS RPC INADVERTENTLY
OPERATING ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES
OCCURING SIMULTANEOUSLY.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2179-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS RPC INADVERTENTLY
OPERATING ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES
OCCURING SIMULTANEOUSLY.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2179-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS RPC INADVERTENTLY
OPERATING ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES
OCCURING SIMULTANEOUSLY.
















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS RPC INADVERTENTLY
OPERATING ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES
OCCURING SIMULTANEOUSLY.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2179-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS RPC INADVERTENTLY
OPERATING ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES
OCCURING SIMULTANEOUSLY.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2179-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS RPC INADVERTENTLY
OPERATING ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES
OCCURING SIMULTANEOUSLY.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2184-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ x ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




_ASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS RPC INADVERTENTLY
OPERATING ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES
OCCURING SIMULTANEOUSLY.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2184-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS RPC INADVERTENTLY
OPERATING ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES
OCCURING SIMULTANEOUSLY.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2214-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS DRIVER OPERATING
ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES
OCCURING SIMULTANEOUSLY.


















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
[ ] IN] [ ] IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS DRIVER OPERATING
ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES
OCCURING SIMULTANEOUSLY.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2214-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS DRIVER OPERATING
ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES
OCCURING SIMULTANEOUSLY.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2214-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
ClL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS DRIVER OPERATING
ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES
OCCURING SIMULTANEOUSLY.











NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS DRIVER OPERATING
ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES
OCCURING SIMULTANEOUSLY.











NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS DRIVER OPERATING
ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES
OCCURING SIMULTANEOUSLY.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2214-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS DRIVER OPERATING
ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES
OCCURING SIMULTANEOUSLY.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2214-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS DRIVER OPERATING
ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES
OCCURING SIMULTANEOUSLY.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2220-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES
OCCURING SIMULTANEOUSLY.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2220-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ x ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES
OCCURING SIMULTANEOUSLY.











NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS DRIVER INADVERTENTLY
OPERATING ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES
OCCURING SIMULTANEOUSLY.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2185-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ x ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS DRIVER INADVERTENTLY
OPERATING ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
IOA RETAINS A CONCERN OF THE LOW PROBABILITY OF MULTIPLE FAILURES
OCCURING SIMULTANEOUSLY.











NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]






THERMOSTAT, PRIMARY THRUSTERS, +X AXIS
D. HARTMAN
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




PROPELLANT IN JET MAY FREEZE. IF JET IS REQUIRED, ORBITER ORIENT
ITSELF TOWARD SOLAR HEATING. THIS MAY AFFECT MISSION OPERATIONS.
IOA RECOMMENDS THE PRIMARY THRUSTER THERMOSTATS BE INCORPORATED
INTO A FMEA.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, BECAUSE THESE
THERMOSTATS ARE WITHIN THE PRIMARY THRUSTER ASSEMBLY, AND SO IS
CONSIDERED TO BE COVERED BY THAT HARDWARE THRUSTER'S FMEA. IOA
MAINTAINS A CONCERN THAT THiS ITEM SHOULD BE COVERED SEPARATELY.














THERMOSTAT, PRIMARY THRUSTERS, Y AXIS
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




PROPELLANT IN JET MAY FREEZE. IF JET IS REQUIRED, ORBITER ORIENT
ITSELF TOWARD SOLAR HEATING. THIS MAY AFFECT MISSION OPERATIONS.
IOA RECOMMENDS THE PRIMARY THRUSTER THERMOSTATS BE INCORPORATED
INTO A FMEA.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, BECAUSE THESE
THERMOSTATS ARE WITHIN THE PRIMARY THRUSTER ASSEMBLY, AND SO IS
CONSIDERED TO BE COVERED BY THAT HARDWARE THRUSTER'S FMEA. IOA
MAINTAINS A CONCERN THAT THIS ITEM SHOULD BE COVERED SEPARATELY.














NASA [ / ]




COMPARE [ N /N ]
ARCS
2338




[ ] [ ]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




PROPELLANT IN JET MAY FREEZE. IF JET IS REQUIRED, ORBITER ORIENT
ITSELF TOWARD SOLAR HEATING. THIS MAY AFFECT MISSION OPERATIONS.
IOA RECOMMENDS THE PRIMARY THRUSTER THERMOSTATS BE INCORPORATED
INTO A FMEA.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, BECAUSE THESE
THERMOSTATS ARE WITHIN THE PRIMARY THRUSTER ASSEMBLY, AND SO IS
CONSIDERED TO BE COVERED BY THAT HARDWARE THRUSTER'S FMEA. IOA
MAINTAINS A CONCERN THAT THIS ITEM SHOULD BE COVERED SEPARATELY.














THERMOSTAT, VERNIER THRUSTERS, ALL AXES
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
[ ] [ ] [ ] [X]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




PROPELLANT IN JET MAY FREEZE. NO REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. THIS MAY
EFFECT MISSION OPERATIONS. IOA RECOMMENDS THIS FAILURE BE
INCORPORATED INTO A FMEA.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, BECAUSE THESE
THERMOSTATS ARE WITHIN THE VERNIER THRUSTER ASSEMBLY, AND SO IS
CONSIDERED TO BE COVERED BY THAT HARDWARE THRUSTER'S FMEA. IOA
MAINTAINS A CONCERN THAT THIS ITEM SHOULD BE COVERED SEPARATELY.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2032-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






MANIFOLD #5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. INABILITY TO CLOSE THE
VALVE PREVENTS ISOLATION OF A THRUSTER LEAK.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2032-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






MANIFOLD #5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. INABILITY TO CLOSE THE
VALVE PREVENTS ISOLATION OF A THRUSTER LEAK.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2032-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






MANIFOLD #5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. INABILITY TO CLOSE THE
VALVE PREVENTS ISOLATION OF A THRUSTER LEAK.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2090-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE
LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY
PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE
VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.













NEW [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CI L
FLIGHT ITEM
H DW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
[ ] IN] [ ] IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE
LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY
PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE
VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2177-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ x ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS
NO EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASAJS MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.














NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSE CAPABILITY TO OPEN THE ISOLATION VALVE. THIS PREVENTS
VERNIER OPERATION THUS LOSS OF MISSION OPERATIONS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE. THE MANIFOLD 5 VALVE
IS NOMINALLY ALWAYS OPEN, SO ANOTHER FAILURE (LEAK) IS REQUIRED
TO CAUSE THE CREW TO CLOSE THE VALVE BEFORE AN "INABILITY TO OPEN
VALVE" FAILURE HAS AN EFFECT.
ALSO, IOA HAD IMPROPERLY TIED THIS FAILURE TO THE HARDWARE FMEA
FOR MANIFOLD 5 VALVE FAILED CLOSED, WHICH IS A CRIT 2/2.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2178-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS
NO EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.




















NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE
LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE STATUS. REDUNDANCY
PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE
VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2210-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ J [ ] [ ] [ J
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE
LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE STATUS. REDUNDANCY
PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE
VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.











NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS FAILURE CAUSES INABILITY TO OPEN THE ISOLATION VALVE WHICH
CAUSES LOSS OF MISSION OPERATIONS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE. THE MANIFOLD 5 VALVE
IS NOMINALLY ALWAYS OPEN, SO ANOTHER FAILURE (LEAK) IS REQUIRED
TO CAUSE THE CREW TO CLOSE THE VALVE BEFORE AN "INABILITY TO OPEN
VALVE" FAILURE HAS AN EFFECT.
ALSO, IOA HAD IMPROPERLY TIED THIS FAILURE TO THE HARDWARE FMEA
FOR MANIFOLD 5 VALVE FAILED CLOSED, WHICH IS A CRIT 2/2.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2213-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.













NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2211-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSE CAPABILITY TO OPEN THE ISOLATION VALVE. THIS PREVENTS
VERNIER OPERATION THUS LOSS OF MISSION OPERATIONS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE. THE MANIFOLD 5 VALVE
IS NOMINALLY ALWAYS OPEN, SO ANOTHER FAILURE (LEAK) IS REQUIRED
TO CAUSE THE CREW TO CLOSE THE VALVE BEFORE AN "INABILITY TO OPEN
VALVE" FAILURE HAS AN EFFECT.
ALSO, IOA HAD IMPROPERLY TIED THIS FAILURE TO THE HARDWARE FMEA
FOR MANIFOLD 5 VALVE FAILED CLOSED, WHICH IS A CRIT 2/2.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2211-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2213A-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[p] [P] [P]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
IN] IN] IN]
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSE CAPABILITY TO OPEN THE ISOLATION VALVE. THIS PREVENTS
VERNIER OPERATION THUS LOSS OF MISSION OPERATIONS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE. THE MANIFOLD 5 VALVE
IS NOMINALLY ALWAYS OPEN, SO ANOTHER FAILURE (LEAK) IS REQUIRED
TO CAUSE THE CREW TO CLOSE THE VALVE BEFORE AN "INABILITY TO OPEN
VALVE" FAILURE HAS AN EFFECT.
ALSO, IOA HAD IMPROPERLY TIED THIS FAILURE TO THE HARDWARE FMEA
FOR MANIFOLD 5 VALVE FAILED CLOSED, WHICH IS A CRIT 2/2.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2213A-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2224-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / J [ J [ ] [ J [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




LOSE CAPABILITY TO OPEN THE ISOLATION VALVE. THIS PREVENTS
VERNIER OPERATION THUS LOSS OF MISSION OBJECTIVES.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE. THE MANIFOLD 5 VALVE
IS NOMINALLY ALWAYS OPEN, SO ANOTHER FAILURE (LEAK) IS REQUIRED
TO CAUSE THE CREW TO CLOSE THE VALVE BEFORE AN "INABILITY TO OPEN
VALVE" FAILURE HAS AN EFFECT.
ALSO, IOA HAD IMPROPERLY TIED THIS FAILURE TO THE HARDWARE FMEA
FOR MANIFOLD 5 VALVE FAILED CLOSED, WHICH IS A CRIT 2/2.











NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ x ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.













NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]




NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[p] IF] [P]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
IN] IN] IN]
[ X ] *
[ ]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2257-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS FAILURE CAUSES THE INABILITY TO OPEN THE VALVE. REDUNDANCY
PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REEDUNDANCY CAUSES LOSS OF MISSION
OPERATIONS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE. THE MANIFOLD 5 VALVE
IS NOMINALLY ALWAYS OPEN, SO ANOTHER FAILURE (LEAK) IS REQUIRED
TO CAUSE THE CREW TO CLOSE THE VALVE BEFORE AN "INABILITY TO OPEN
VALVE" FAILURE HAS AN EFFECT.
ALSO, THE VALVE WILL NOT NEED TO BE OPENED AFTER A LEAK, ANYWAY.













NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]




NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[p] IF] [P]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
IN] IN] IN]
[ X ] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2258-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
H DW/FUNC A B C
[P] [P] [P]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSE CAPABILTY TO OPEN THE VALVE. THIS PREVENTS VERNIER
OPERATION THUS LOSS OF MISSION OBJECTIVES
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE. THE MANIFOLD 5 VALVE
IS NOMINALLY ALWAYS OPEN, SO ANOTHER FAILURE (LEAK) IS REQUIRED
TO CAUSE THE CREW TO CLOSE THE VALVE BEFORE AN "INABILITY TO OPEN
VALVE" FAILURE HAS AN EFFECT.
ALSO, IOA HAD IMPROPERLY TIED THIS FAILURE TO THE HARDWARE FMEA
FOR MANIFOLD 5 VALVE FAILED CLOSED, WHICH IS A CRIT 2/2.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2280-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSE CAPABILTY TO OPEN THE VALVE. THIS PREVENTS VERNIER
OPERATION THUS LOSS OF MISSION OBJECTIVES
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE. THE MANIFOLD 5 VALVE
IS NOMINALLY ALWAYS OPEN, SO ANOTHER FAILURE (LEAK) IS REQUIRED
TO CAUSE THE CREW TO CLOSE THE VALVE BEFORE AN "INABILITY TO OPEN
VALVE" FAILURE HAS AN EFFECT.
ALSO, IOA HAD IMPROPERLY TIED THIS FAILURE TO THE HARDWARE FMEA
FOR MANIFOLD 5 VALVE FAILED CLOSED, WHICH IS A CRIT 2/2.













NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]







NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[p] IF] [P]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
IN] IN] IN]
[ X ] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2028-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




SWITCH FAILED SHORT ACROSS OPEN CONTACTS CAUSES INABILITY TO
CLOSE THE VALVE. THIS PREVENTS CROSSFEED CAPABILITY THUS LOSS OF
MISSION. INABILITY TO CROSSFEED DURING AN RTLS/TAL ABORT MAY
CAUSE INCOMPLETE OMS ABORT DUMP.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA RELUCTANTLY WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, BECAUSE
IOA HAD MISINTERPRETED NASA'S TOGGLE SWITCH FAILURE MODE FOR THIS
FMEA. IOA STILL RECOMMENDS CONSIDERING IOA'S FAILURE MODE.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2028-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




SWITCH FAILED SHORT ACROSS OPEN CONTACTS CAUSES INABILITY TO
CLOSE THE VALVE. THIS PREVENTS CROSSFEED CAPABILITY THUS LOSS OF
MISSION. INABILITY TO CROSSFEED DURING AN RTLS/TAL ABORT MAY
CAUSE INCOMPLETE OMS ABORT DUMP.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA RELUCTANTLY WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, BECAUSE
IOA HAD MISINTERPRETED NASA'S TOGGLE SWITCH FAILURE MODE FOR THIS
FMEA. IOA STILL RECOMMENDS CONSIDERING IOA'S FAILURE MODE.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2028-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




SWITCH FAILED SHORT ACROSS OPEN CONTACTS CAUSES INABILITY TO
CLOSE THE VALVE. THIS PREVENTS CROSSFEED CAPABILITY THUS LOSS OF
MISSION. INABILITY TO CROSSFEED DURING AN RTLS/TAL ABORT MAY
CAUSE INCOMPLETE OMS ABORT DUMP.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA RELUCTANTLY WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, BECAUSE
IOA HAD MISINTERPRETED NASA'S TOGGLE SWITCH FAILURE MODE FOR THIS
FMEA. IOA STILL RECOMMENDS CONSIDERING IOA'S FAILURE MODE.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2253-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE - LIMIT SWITCH (OPEN CIRCUIT)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.













NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
ARCS
12088
DIODE - LIMIT SWITCH (CLOSED CIRCUIT)
D. HARTMAN
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[p] [P] [P]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ x ] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )




NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2253E-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE - MANUAL OPEN/CLOSE INHIBIT
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2253E-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE - MANUAL OPEN/CLOSE INHIBIT




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE CAUSES
INABILITY TO CLOSE THE VALVE THUS PREVENTING CROSSFEED
OPERATIONS. INABILITY TO CROSSFEED DURING RTLS/TAL ABORT MAY
CAUSE INCOMPLETE OMS ABORT DUMP.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2253F-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE - MANUAL CLOSE/OPEN INHIBIT
LEAD ANALYST : D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2253F-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE - MANUAL CLOSE/OPEN INHIBIT




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ x ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2029-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A OR B SWITCH




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




SWITCH FAILED SHORT ACROSS OPEN CONTACTS CAUSES INABILITY TO
CLOSE THE VALVE. THIS PREVENTS CROSSFEED CAPABILITY THUS LOSS OF
MISSION. INABILITY TO CROSSFEED DURING AN RTLS/TAL ABORT MAY
CAUSE INCOMPLETE OMS ABORT DUMP.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA RELUCTANTLY WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, BECAUSE
IOA HAD MISINTERPRETED NASA'S TOGGLE SWITCH FAILURE MODE FOR THIS
FMEA. IOA STILL RECOMMENDS CONSIDERING IOA'S FAILURE MODE.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2029-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A OR B SWITCH




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




SWITCH FAILED SHORT ACROSS OPEN CONTACTS CAUSES INABILITY TO
CLOSE THE VALVE. THIS PREVENTS CROSSFEED CAPABILITY THUS LOSS OF
MISSION. INABILITY TO CROSSFEED DURING AN RTLS/TAL ABORT MAY
CAUSE INCOMPLETE OMS ABORT DUMP.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA RELUCTANTLY WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, BECAUSE
IOA HAD MISINTERPRETED NASA'S TOGGLE SWITCH FAILURE MODE FOR THIS
FMEA. IOA STILL RECOMMENDS CONSIDERING IOA'S FAILURE MODE.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2029-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A OR B SWITCH




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




SWITCH FAILED SHORT ACROSS OPEN CONTACTS CAUSES INABILITY TO
CLOSE THE VALVE. THIS PREVENTS CROSSFEED CAPABILITY THUS LOSS OF
MISSION. INABILITY TO CROSSFEED DURING AN RTLS/TAL ABORT MAY
CAUSE INCOMPLETE OMS ABORT DUMP.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA RELUCTANTLY WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, BECAUSE
IOA HAD MISINTERPRETED NASA'S TOGGLE SWITCH FAILURE MODE FOR THIS
FMEA. IOA STILL RECOMMENDS CONSIDERING IOA'S FAILURE MODE.











NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]





NEW [ X ]
ARCS
12107
DIODE - LIMIT SWITCH (OPEN CIRCUIT)
D. HARTMAN
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[p] IF] [P]
[ ] [ ] C ]
IN] IN] IN]
[ X ] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ 3 [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2254-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE - LIMIT SWITCH (CLOSE CIRCUIT)
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.











NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]





NEW [ X ]
ARCS
12119
DIODE - MANUAL OPEN/CLOSE INHIBIT
D. HARTMAN
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ x ] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2254E-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE - MANUAL OPEN/CLOSE INHIBIT
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[p] IF] [P]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ X ] *
[x]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE CAUSES THE
INABILITY TO CLOSE THE VALVE THUS PREVENTING CROSSFEED
OPERATIONS. INABILITY TO CROSSFEED DURING AN RTLS/TAL ABORT MAY
CAUSE AN INCOMPLETE OMS ABORT DUMP.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2254F-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE - MANUAL CLOSE/OPEN INHIBIT




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ x ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2254F-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE - MANUALCLOSE/OPEN INHIBIT




HDW/FUNC A S C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE CAUSES THE
VALVE TO CLOSE. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY
CAUSES INABILITY TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET LANDING WEIGHT
CONSTRAINTS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, BECAUSE IOA'S AND
NASA'S CRITS AND SCREENS ARE THE SAME. IOA STILL RECOMMENDS
MODIFYING NASA'S EFFECTS FIELD WITH IOA'S FAILURE SCENARIO.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2039-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






L/R OX & FU CROSSFEEDVLV 1/2 SWITCH 32, 34
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[p] IF] [P]
C ] [ ] [ ]
IN] IN] IN]
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE WILL CLOSE
THE VALVE AND CAUSE INABILITY TO RE-OPEN IT. THIS PREVENTS
CROSSFEED CAPABILITY THUS LOSS OF MISSION. INABILITY TO
CROSSFEED MAY CAUSE INCOMPLETE OMS ABORT DUMP DURING RTLS/TAL -
I/i ABORT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA RELUCTANTLY WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, BECAUSE
IOA HAD MISINTERPRETED NASA'S TOGGLE SWITCH FAILURE MODE FOR THIS
FMEA. IOA STILL RECOMMENDS CONSIDERING IOA'S FAILURE MODE.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2039-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2 SWITCH 32, 34




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ x ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOmmENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE WILL CLOSE
THE VALVE AND CAUSE INABILITY TO RE-OPEN IT. THIS PREVENTS
CROSSFEED CAPABILITY THUS LOSS OF MISSION. INABILITY TO
CROSSFEED MAY CAUSE INCOMPLETE OMS ABORT DUMP DURING RTLS/TAL -
i/i ABORT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA RELUCTANTLY WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, BECAUSE
IOA HAD MISINTERPRETED NASA'S TOGGLE SWITCH FAILURE MODE FOR THIS
FMEA. IOA STILL RECOMMENDS CONSIDERING IOA'S FAILURE MODE.














NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
ARCS
12130
DIODE - LIMIT SWITCH (OPEN CIRCUIT)
D. HARTMAN
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
IN] IN] IN]
[ X ] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2261-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE - LIMIT SWITCH (CLOSED CIRCUIT)




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2261E-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE - MANUAL OPEN/CLOSE INHIBIT




HDW/FUNC A S C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2261E-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE - MANUAL OPEN/CLOSE INHIBIT




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE CAUSES THE
INABILITY TO CLOSE THE VALVE TO ISOLATE A THRUSTER LEAK.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, BECAUSE IOA'S AND
NASA'S CRITS AND SCREENS ARE THE SAME. IOA STILL RECOMMENDS
MODIFYING NASA'S EFFECTS FIELD WITH IOA'S FAILURE SCENARIO.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2261F-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE - MANUAL CLOSE/OPEN INHIBIT




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2261F-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE - MANUALCLOSE/OPEN INHIBIT




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.













NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
ARCS
12147
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH 33, 35
D. HARTMAN
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[p] IF] [P]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
IN] IN] IN]
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE WILL CLOSE
THE VALVE AND CAUSE INABILITY TO RE-OPEN IT. THIS PREVENTS
CROSSFEED CAPABILITY THUS LOSS OF MISSION. INABILITY TO
CROSSFEED MAY CAUSE INCOMPLETE OMS ABORT DUMP DURING RTLS/TAL -
i/i ABORT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA RELUCTANTLY WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, BECAUSE
IOA HAD MISINTERPRETED NASA'S TOGGLE SWITCH FAILURE MODE FOR THIS
FMEA. IOA STILL RECOMMENDS CONSIDERING IOA'S FAILURE MODE.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2039-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






L/R OX & FU CROSSFEEDVLV 3/4/5 SWITCH 33, 35




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE WILL CLOSE
THE VALVE AND CAUSE INABILITY TO RE-OPEN IT. THIS PREVENTS
CROSSFEED CAPABILITY THUS LOSS OF MISSION. INABILITY TO
CROSSFEED MAY CAUSE INCOMPLETE OMS ABORT DUMP DURING RTLS/TAL -
i/i ABORT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA RELUCTANTLY WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, BECAUSE
IOA HAD MISINTERPRETED NASA'S TOGGLE SWITCH FAILURE MODE FOR THIS
FMEA. IOA STILL RECOMMENDS CONSIDERING IOA'S FAILURE MODE.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2261-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE - LIMIT SWITCH (OPEN CIRCUIT)
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[p] IF] [P]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
IN] IN] IN]
[ X ] *
[ ]
IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2261-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE - LIMIT SWITCH (CLOSED CIRCUIT)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ x ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.
REPORT DATE 21 JULY 1988





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2261E-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE - MANUAL OPEN/CLOSE INHIBIT




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
IX ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2261E-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE - MANUAL OPEN/CLOSE INHIBIT




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE CAUSES THE
INABILITY TO CLOSE THE VALVE TO ISOLATE A THRUSTER LEAK.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, BECAUSE IOA'S AND
NASA'S CRITS AND SCREENS ARE THE SAME. IOA STILL RECOMMENDS
MODIFYING NASA'S EFFECTS FIELD WITH IOA'S FAILURE SCENARIO..





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2261F-I
NASA DATA :
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE - MANUAL CLOSE/OPEN INHIBIT




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2261F-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE - MANUAL CLOSE/OPEN INHIBIT




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ x ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.











NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]





NEW [ X ]
ARCS
12192
DIODE - LIMIT SWITCH (OPEN CIRCUIT)
D. HARTMAN
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[p] IF] [P]
[ ] C ] [ ]
IN] IN] IN]
[ X ] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.













NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
ARCS
12194
DIODE - LIMIT SWITCH (CLOSE CIRCUIT)
D. HARTMAN
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[p] IF] [P]
[ ] C ] [ ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.














NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
ARCS
12204




[ P ] [ F ]











RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2255E-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE - MANUAL OPEN/CLOSE INHIBIT




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE CAUSES
INABILITY TO CLOSE THE VALVE TO ISOLATE A THRUSTER LEAK.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, BECAUSE IOA'S AND
NASA'S CRITS AND SCREENS ARE THE SAME. IOA STILL RECOMMENDS
MODIFYING NASA'S EFFECTS FIELD WITH IOA'S FAILURE SCENARIO.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2255F-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE - MANUAL CLOSE/OPEN INHIBIT
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2255F-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE - MANUAL CLOSE/OPEN INHIBIT




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE
INABILITY TO OPEN THE VALVE IF COMMAND WAS FROM THE GPC. LOSS OF
ALL REDUNDANCY TO OPEN THE VALVE PREVENT PROPELLANTS TO BE
EXPELLED TO MEET LANDING CONSTRAINTS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, BECAUSE IOA'S AND
NASA'S CRITS AND SCREENS ARE THE SAME. IOA STILL RECOMMENDS
MODIFYING NASA'S EFFECTS FIELD WITH IOA'S FAILURE SCENARIO.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2255-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE - LIMIT SWITCH (OPEN CIRCUIT)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2255-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE - LIMIT SWITCH (CLOSE CIRCUIT)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ x ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.













NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
ARCS
12220
DIODE - MANUAL OPEN/CLOSE INHIBIT
D. HARTMAN
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
IN] IN] IN]
[ x ] *
[ ]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2255E-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE - MANUAL OPEN/CLOSE INHIBIT




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE CAUSES
INABILITY TO CLOSE THE VALVE TO ISOLATE A THRUSTER LEAK.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, BECAUSE IOA'S AND
NASA'S CRITS AND SCREENS ARE THE SAME. IOA STILL RECOMMENDS
MODIFYING NASA'S EFFECTS FIELD WITH IOA'S FAILURE SCENARIO..





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2255F-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE - MANUAL CLOSE/OPEN INHIBIT




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2255F-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE - MANUAL CLOSE/OPEN INHIBIT




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE
INABILITY TO OPEN THE VALVE IF COMMAND WAS FROM THE GPC. LOSS OF
ALL REDUNDANCY TO OPEN THE VALVE PREVENT PROPELLANTS TO BE
EXPELLED TO MEET LANDING CONS
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, BECAUSE IOA'S AND
NASA'S CRITS AND SCREENS ARE THE SAME. IOA STILL RECOMMENDS
MODIFYING NASA'S EFFECTS FIELD WITH IOA'S FAILURE SCENARIO..











NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]





NEW [ X ]
ARCS
12224
DIODE - LIMIT SWITCH (OPEN CIRCUIT)
D. HARTMAN
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
IN] IN] IN]
[ x ] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2255-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE - LIMIT SWITCH (CLOSE CIRCUIT)




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2255E-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE - MANUAL OPEN/CLOSE INHIBIT




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ x ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2255E-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE - MANUAL OPEN/CLOSE INHIBIT




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE CAUSES
INABILITY TO CLOSE THE VALVE TO ISOLATE A THRUSTER LEAK.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, BECAUSE IOA'S AND
NASA'S CRITS AND SCREENS ARE THE SAME. IOA STILL RECOMMENDS
MODIFYING NASA'S EFFECTS FIELD WITH IOA'S FAILURE SCENARIO..













NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
ARCS
12238
DIODE - MANUAL CLOSE/OPEN INHIBIT
D. HARTMAN
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ x ] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2255F-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE - MANUAL CLOSE/OPEN INHIBIT




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE
INABILITY TO OPEN THE VALVE IF COMMAND WAS FROM THE GPC. LOSS OF
ALL REDUNDANCY TO OPEN THE VALVE PREVENT PROPELLANTS TO BE
EXPELLED TO MEET LANDING CONS
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, BECAUSE IOA'S AND
NASA'S CRITS AND SCREENS ARE THE SAME. IOA STILL RECOMMENDS
MODIFYING NASA'S EFFECTS FIELD WITH IOA'S FAILURE SCENARIO..





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2255-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE - LIMIT SWITCH (OPEN CIRCUIT)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2255-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE - LIMIT SWITCH (CLOSE CIRCUIT)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ x] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )




NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2255E-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE - MANUALOPEN/CLOSE INHIBIT
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
H DW/FUN C A B C
[p] IF] [P]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2255E-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE - MANUAL OPEN/CLOSE INHIBIT




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE CAUSES
INABILITY TO CLOSE THE VALVE TO ISOLATE A THRUSTER LEAK.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, BECAUSE IOA'S AND
NASA'S CRITS AND SCREENS ARE THE SAME. IOA STILL RECOMMENDS
MODIFYING NASA'S EFFECTS FIELD WITH IOA'S FAILURE SCENARIO..





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2255F-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DIODE - MANUAL CLOSE/OPEN INHIBIT




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, ACCEPTING NASA'S MORE
CONSERVATIVE INTERPRETATION OF NSTS 22206 REDUNDANCY GROUNDRULES.















NEW [ X ]
ARCS
12255




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P _ [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE
INABILITY TO OPEN THE VALVE IF COMMAND WAS FROM THE GPC. LOSS OF
ALL REDUNDANCY TO OPEN THE VALVE PREVENT PROPELLANTS TO BE
EXPELLED TO MEET LANDING CONS
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, BECAUSE IOA'S AND
NASA'S CRITS AND SCREENS ARE THE SAME. IOA STILL RECOMMENDS
MODIFYING NASA'S EFFECTS FIELD WITH IOA'S FAILURE SCENARIO..





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2035-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RJDAIB LI/L5/RI MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 3




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X ] *
[X]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




NO DIFFERENCES FOR MANIFOLDS 1-4. NASA FMEA SHOULD INCLUDE BOTH
MANIFOLD 5 EFFECTS ALSO (2/2).
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, BECAUSE IOA'S AND
NASA'S CRITS AND SCREENS ARE THE SAME. IOA STILL RECOMMENDS
MODIFYING NASA'S EFFECTS FIELD.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2035-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RJDAIB LI/L5/RI MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 3
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[p] IF] [P]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




NO DIFFERENCES FOR MANIFOLDS 1-4. NASA FMEA SHOULD INCLUDE BOTH
MANIFOLD 5 EFFECTS ALSO (2/2)..
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, BECAUSE IOA'S AND
NASA'S CRITS AND SCREENS ARE THE SAME. IOA STILL RECOMMENDS
MODIFYING NASA'S EFFECTS FIELD.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2035-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 3
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
H DW/FUNC A B C
[p] IF] [P]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ x ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO DIFFERENCES FOR MANIFOLDS 1-4. NASA FMEA SHOULD INCLUDE BOTH
MANIFOLD 5 EFFECTS ALSO (2/2)..
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, BECAUSE IOA'S AND
NASA'S CRITS AND SCREENS ARE THE SAME. IOA STILL RECOMMENDS
MODIFYING NASA'S EFFECTS FIELD.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2035-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RJDA2B L3/R3/R5 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 3




HDW/FUNC A S C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO DIFFERENCES FOR MANIFOLDS 1-4. NASA FMEA SHOULD INCLUDE BOTH
MANIFOLD 5 EFFECTS ALSO (2/2)..
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, BECAUSE IOA'S AND
NASA'S CRITS AND SCREENS ARE THE SAME. IOA STILL RECOMMENDS
MODIFYING NASA'S EFFECTS FIELD.


















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THIS FAILED OPEN DIODE CAUSES INABILITY TO OPEN THE VALVE.
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY OTHER VALVE. LOSS OF THIS CAUSES
INABILITY TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET LANDING WEIGHT
CONSTRAINTS.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, BECAUSE THESE DIODES
ARE WITHIN THE HELIUM PRESSURE ISO VALVE ASSEMBLY, AND SO IS
CONSIDERED TO BE COVERED BY THAT HARDWARE VALVE'S FMEA. IOA
MAINTAINS A CONCERN THAT THIS ITEM SHOULD BE COVERED SEPARATELY.







ARCS-12332X BASELINE [ ]









HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] ,
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOmmENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE MICROSWITCH FAILURE ACROSS THE CLOSE CONTACTS WILL NOT ALLOW
THE VALVE TO BE CLOSED. THIS PREVENTS CROSSFEED CAPABILITY THUS
LOSS OF MISSION OPERATIONS. INABILITY TO CROSSFEED DURING
RTLS/TAL MAY CAUSE INCOMPLETE OMS ABORT DUMP.
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE, BECAUSE THESE (LIMIT)
MICROSWITCHES ARE WITHIN THE TANK ISO VALVE 1/2 ASSEMBLY, AND SO
IS CONSIDERED TO BE COVERED BY THAT VALVE'S FMEA. IOA MAINTAINS
A CONCERN THAT THIS ITEM SHOULD BE COVERED SEPARATELY.













NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[p] [P] [P]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




LOSE CAPABILTY TO OPEN THE VALVE. THIS PREVENTS VERNIER
OPERATION THUS LOSS OF MISSION OBJECTIVES
FINAL RESOLUTION: IOA WITHDREW THIS ISSUE. THE MANIFOLD 5 VALVE
IS NOMINALLY ALWAYS OPEN, SO ANOTHER FAILURE (LEAK) IS REQUIRED
TO CAUSE THE CREW TO CLOSE THE VALVE BEFORE AN "INABILITY TO OPEN
VALVE" FAILURE HAS AN EFFECT.
ALSO, IOA HAD IMPROPERLY TIED THIS FAILURE TO THE HARDWARE FMEA
FOR MANIFOLD 5 VALVE FAILED CLOSED, WHICH IS A CRIT 2/2.

























HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSS OF ACTIVE NSP DOWNLINK COULD CAUSE MINIMUM DURATION FLIGHT
BECAUSE ONLY ONE NSP PATH WOULD REMAIN FOR INSIGHT INTO VEHICLE
SYSTEMS VIA TELEMETRY. IOA ACCEPTS NASA FMEA CRITICALITY BASED
ON ACCOMPLISHING FM DOWNLINK OF TELEMETRY DATA THROUGH USE OF
A CABLE KIT WHICH ALLOWS USE OF THE FM SIGNAL PROCESSOR AND FM
TRANSMITTER FOR DOWNLINKING DATA AFTER FAILURE OF SECOND NSP.






















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSS OF ACTIVE NSP DOWNLINK COULD CAUSE MINIMUM DURATION FLIGHT
BECAUSE ONLY ONE NSP PATH WOULD REMAIN FOR INSIGHT INTO VEHICLE
SYSTEMS VIA TELEMETRY. IOA ACCEPTS NASA FMEA CRITICALITY BASED
ON ACCOMPLISHING FM DO_4LINK OF TELEMETRY DATA THROUGH USE OF
A CABLE KIT WHICH ALLOWS USE OF THE FM SIGNAL PROCESSOR AND FM
TRANSMITTER FOR DOWNLINKING DATA AFTER FAILURE OF SECOND NSP.
















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]





COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




SAME FAILURE MODES (e.g., FAIL MID-TRAVEL) COULD PREVENT
SELECTION OF "NSP ENCRYPTION SELECT" FUNCTIONS FOR SELECTION OF
"T/R" OR "REV" ENCRYPTION/DECRYPTION OF NSP DATA. THERE IS NO
HARDWARE OR COMMAND REDUNDANCY FOR THE SWITCH'S FUNCTION.
IOA CRITICALITY AGREES WITH NASA FMEA/CIL 05-2G-21801-2 (CRIT-
2/2) FOR COMPLETE SWITCH FAILURE. SWITCH HAS DUAL SET OF
CONTACTS THAT MUST BE INVOLVED IN THE FAILURE.





NASA FMEA #: 05-2G-21801-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






NSP ENCRYPTION MODE SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
SAME FAILURE MODES COULD PREVENT PROPER SELECTION OF "NSP
ENCRYPTION SELECT" FUNCTIONS "T/R" OR "REV" ENCRYPTION/DECRYPTION
OF NSP DATA. THERE IS NOT HARDWARE OR COMMAND REDUNDANCY FOR THE
SWITCH'S FUNCTION. RECOMMEND FMEA UPGRADE TO 2/2 (CIL STATUS).
AFTER NASA FMEA/CIL REEVALUATION, NASA REASSIGNED CRITICALITY
FROM 2/IR TO 2/2. IOA AND NASA NOW AGREE.





NASA FMEA #: 05-2G-21802-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






NSP ENCRYPTION SELECT SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




SAME FAILURE MODES (e.g., FAIL MID-TRAVEL) COULD PREVENT
SELECTION OF "NSP ENCRYPTION SELECT" FUNCTIONS FOR SELECTION OF
"T/R" OR "REV" ENCRYPTION/DECRYPTION OF NSP DATA. THERE IS NO
HARDWARE OR COMMAND REDUNDANCY FOR THE SWITCH'S FUNCTION.
IOA CRITICALITY AGREES WITH NASA FMEA/CIL 05-2G-21802-2 (CRIT-
2/2) FOR COMPLETE SWITCH FAILURE. SWITCH HAS DUAL SET OF
CONTACTS THAT MUST BE INVOLVED IN THE FAILURE.





NASA FMEA #: 05-2G-21802-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






NSP ENCRYPTION SELECT SWITCH




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ x ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
SAME FAILURE MODES COULD PREVENT PROPER SELECTION OF "NSP
ENCRYPTION SELECT" FUNCTIONS "T/R" OR "REV" ENCRYPTION/DECRYPTION
OF NSP DATA. THERE IS NOT HARDWARE OR COMMAND REDUNDANCY FOR THE
SWITCH'S FUNCTION. RECOMMEND FMEA UPGRADE TO 2/2 (CIL STATUS).
AFTER NASA FMEA/CIL REEVALUATION, NASA REASSIGNED CRITICALITY
FROM 2/IR TO 2/2. IOA AND NASA NOW AGREE.





NASA FMEA #: 05-2G-21803-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] ,
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )




BRIDGING SHORT IN SWITCH COULD CAUSE INADVERTENT ZEROIZING OF THE
KEY, CAUSING LOSS OF ENCRYPTION/DECRYPTION CAPABILITY AND LOSS OF
MISSION. IOA ACCEPTS NASA REVISED CRITICALITY 3/2R BASED ON NON
VIABLE FAILURE FOR BOTH SETS OF CONTACTS TO FAIL SINCE
SWITCH IS NOT USED DURING FLIGHT.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6PG-22000-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA 1068 ASSIGNS 2/IR FOR ORBIT OPS - LOSS OF MISSION PLUS
POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE FOR FAILURE OF ALL PATHS FOR STATE
VECTOR UPDATE. (NASA FMEA WRITEUP ACKNOWLEDGES THE IR FUNCTIONAL
CRITICALITY BUT FMEA ASSIGNS FUNCTIONAL CRITICALITY 2).
IOA ACCEPTS THE NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON ORBITER WIRING CHANGES
WHICH PREVENTS LOSS OF STATE VECTOR UPDATE UPON SWITCH FAILURE.





NASA FMEA #: 05-2R-5100-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






KU BD EA-I (INTERFACE AND CONTROLUNIT)




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ANALYSIS ONLY COVERED COMM FUNCTION. WHEN INCLUDING BOTH RADAR
AND COMM FUNCTIONS CRITICALITY IS IN AGREEMENT. RADAR FUNCTION
COVERED UNDER SEPARATE FMEA, 7000 SERIES. IOA ACCEPTS THE MORE
SEVERE NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON THEIR MORE CONSERVATIVE
APPROACH TO ASSIGNING CRITICAILY.













NEW [ X ]
COMM AND TRACK
4002
KU BD EA-2 (RADAR SIGNAL PROCESSOR)
W.C. LONG
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ANALYSIS ONLY COVERED COMM FUNCTION. WHEN INCLUDING BOTH RADAR
AND COMM FUNCTIONS CRITICALITY IS IN AGREEMENT. RADAR FUNCTION
COVERED UNDER SEPARATE FMEA, 7000 SERIES. IOA ACCEPTS THE MORE
SEVERE NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON THEIR MORE CONSERVATIVE
APPROACH TO ASSIGNING CRITICAILY.














NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]

























RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ANALYSIS ONLY COVERED COM]4 FUNCTION. WHEN INCLUDING BOTH RADAR
AND COMM FUNCTIONS CRITICALITY IS IN AGREEMENT. RADAR FUNCTION
COVERED UNDER SEPARATE FMEA, 7000 SERIES. IOA ACCEPTS THE MORE
SEVERE NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON THEIR MORE CONSERVATIVE
APPROACH TO ASSIGNING CRITICAILY.





NASA FMEA #: 05-2R-5400-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






KU BD SPA (SIGNAL PROCESSOR ASSY)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ANALYSIS ONLY COVERED COMM FUNCTION. WHEN INCLUDING BOTH RADAR
AND COMM FUNCTIONS CRITICALITY IS IN AGREEMENT. RADAR FUNCTION
COVERED UNDER SEPARATE FMEA, 7000 SERIES. IOA ACCEPTS THE MORE
SEVERE NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON THEIR MORE CONSERVATIVE
APPROACH TO ASSIGNING CRITICAILY.





NASA FMEA #: 05-2R-5400-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






KU BD SPA (SIGNAL PROCESSORASSY)




HDW/FUNC A B C
ClL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ANALYSIS ONLY COVERED COMM FUNCTION. WHEN INCLUDING BOTH RADAR
AND COMM FUNCTIONS CRITICALITY IS IN AGREEMENT. RADAR FUNCTION
COVERED UNDER SEPARATE FMEA, 7000 SERIES. IOA ACCEPTS THE MORE
SEVERE NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON THEIR MORE CONSERVATIVE
APPROACH TO ASSIGNING CRITICAILY.





NASA FMEA #: 05-2R-5300-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






KU BD DEA (DEPLOYED ELECTRONIC ASSY)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ANALYSIS ONLY COVERED COMM FUNCTION. WHEN INCLUDING BOTH RADAR
AND COMM FUNCTIONS CRITICALITY IS IN AGREEMENT. RADAR FUNCTION
COVERED UNDER SEPARATE FMEA, 7000 SERIES. IOA ACCEPTS THE MORE
SEVERE NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON THEIR MORE CONSERVATIVE
APPROACH TO ASSIGNING CRITICAILY.





NASA FMEA #: 05-2R-5300-3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






KU BD DEA (DEPLOYED ELECTRONIC ASSY)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ x ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ANALYSIS ONLY COVERED COMM FUNCTION. WHEN INCLUDING BOTH RADAR
AND COMM FUNCTIONS CRITICALITY IS IN AGREEMENT. RADAR FUNCTION
COVERED UNDER SEPARATE FMEA, 7000 SERIES. IOA ACCEPTS THE MORE
SEVERE NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON THEIR MORE CONSERVATIVE
APPROACH TO ASSIGNING CRITICAILY.





NASA FMEA #: 05-2R-5300-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






KU BD DEA (DEPLOYEDELECTRONIC ASSY)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ANALYSIS ONLY COVERED COMM FUNCTION. WHEN INCLUDING BOTH RADAR
AND COMM FUNCTIONS CRITICALITY IS IN AGREEMENT. RADAR FUNCTION
COVERED UNDER SEPARATE FMEA, 7000 SERIES. IOA ACCEPTS THE MORE
SEVERE NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON THEIR MORE CONSERVATIVE
APPROACH TO ASSIGNING CRITICAILY.





NASA FMEA #: 05-2R-5300-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






KU BD DMA (DEPLOYEDMECHANICAL ASSY)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ANALYSIS ONLY COVERED COMM FUNCTION. WHEN INCLUDING BOTH RADAR
AND COMM FUNCTIONS CRITICALITY IS IN AGREEMENT. RADAR FUNCTION
COVERED UNDER SEPARATE FMEA, 7000 SERIES. IOA ACCEPTS THE MORE
SEVERE NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON THEIR MORE CONSERVATIVE
APPROACH TO ASSIGNING CRITICAILY.





NASA FMEA #: 05-2R-5300-I
NASA DATA :
BASELINE [ ]






KU BD DMA (DEPLOYED MECHANICAL ASSY)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ANALYSIS ONLY COVERED COMM FUNCTION. WHEN INCLUDING BOTH RADAR
AND COMM FUNCTIONS CRITICALITY IS IN AGREEMENT. RADAR FUNCTION
COVERED UNDER SEPARATE FMEA, 7000 SERIES. IOA ACCEPTS THE MORE
SEVERE NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON THEIR MORE CONSERVATIVE
APPROACH TO ASSIGNING CRITICAILY.





NASA FMEA #: 05-2R-5300-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






KU BD DMA (DEPLOYEDMECHANICALASSY)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ANALYSIS ONLY COVERED COMM FUNCTION. WHEN INCLUDING BOTH RADAR
AND COMM FUNCTIONS CRITICALITY IS IN AGREEMENT. RADAR FUNCTION
COVERED UNDER SEPARATE FMEA, 7000 SERIES. IOA ACCEPTS THE MORE
SEVERE NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON THEIR MORE CONSERVATIVE
APPROACH TO ASSIGNING CRITICAILY.





NASA FMEA #: 05-2R-5100-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






KU BD COMM UP/FORWARD LINK MODE 1




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ANALYSIS ONLY COVERED COMM FUNCTION. WHEN INCLUDING BOTH RADAR
AND COMM FUNCTIONS CRITICALITY IS IN AGREEMENT. RADAR FUNCTION
COVERED UNDER SEPARATE FMEA, 7000 SERIES. IOA ACCEPTS THE MORE
SEVERE NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON THEIR MORE CONSERVATIVE
APPROACH TO ASSIGNING CRITICAILY.













NEW [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ]
COMM AND TRACK
4012
KU BD COMM UP/FORWARD LINK MODE 1
W. C. LONG
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ANALYSIS ONLY COVERED COMM FUNCTION. WHEN INCLUDING BOTH RADAR
AND COMM FUNCTIONS CRITICALITY IS IN AGREEMENT. RADAR FUNCTION
COVERED UNDER SEPARATE FMEA, 7000 SERIES. IOA ACCEPTS THE MORE
SEVERE NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON THEIR MORE CONSERVATIVE
APPROACH TO ASSIGNING CRITICAILY.





NASA FMEA #: 05-2R-5100-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






KU BD COMM UP/FORWARD LINK MODE 1
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ANALYSIS ONLY COVERED COMM FUNCTION. WHEN INCLUDING BOTH RADAR
AND COMM FUNCTIONS CRITICALITY IS IN AGREEMENT. RADAR FUNCTION
COVERED UNDER SEPARATE FMEA, 7000 SERIES. IOA ACCEPTS THE MORE
SEVERE NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON THEIR MORE CONSERVATIVE
APPROACH TO ASSIGNING CRITICAILY.





NASA FMEA #: 05-2R-5100-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






KU BD COMMUP/FORWARDLINK MODE 2




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ANALYSIS ONLY COVERED COMM FUNCTION. WHEN INCLUDING BOTH RADAR
AND COMM FUNCTIONS CRITICALITY IS IN AGREEMENT. RADAR FUNCTION
COVERED UNDER SEPARATE FMEA, 7000 SERIES. IOA ACCEPTS THE MORE
SEVERE NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON THEIR MORE CONSERVATIVE
APPROACH TO ASSIGNING CRITICAILY.





NASA FMEA #: 05-2R-5100-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






KU BD COMM UP/FORWARD LINK MODE 2




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ANALYSIS ONLY COVERED COMM FUNCTION. WHEN INCLUDING BOTH RADAR
AND COMM FUNCTIONS CRITICALITY IS IN AGREEMENT. RADAR FUNCTION
COVERED UNDER SEPARATE FMEA, 7000 SERIES. IOA ACCEPTS THE MORE
SEVERE NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON THEIR MORE CONSERVATIVE
APPROACH TO ASSIGNING CRITICAILY.













NEW [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ]
COMMAND TRACK
4016
KU BD COMM UP/FORWARD LINK MODE 2
W.C. LONG
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
[ ] [ ] [ ] IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ANALYSIS ONLY COVERED COMM FUNCTION. WHEN INCLUDING BOTH RADAR
AND COMM FUNCTIONS CRITICALITY IS IN AGREEMENT. RADAR FUNCTION
COVERED UNDER SEPARATE FMEA, 7000 SERIES. IOA ACCEPTS THE MORE
SEVERE NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON THEIR MORE CONSERVATIVE
APPROACH TO ASSIGNING CRITICAILY.





NASA FMEA #: 05-2R-5100-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






KU BD COMM DOWN/RETURN LINK MODE 1
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ANALYSIS ONLY COVERED COMM FUNCTION. WHEN INCLUDING BOTH RADAR
AND COMM FUNCTIONS CRITICALITY IS IN AGREEMENT. RADAR FUNCTION
COVERED UNDER SEPARATE FMEA, 7000 SERIES. IOA ACCEPTS THE MORE
SEVERE NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON THEIR MORE CONSERVATIVE
APPROACH TO ASSIGNING CRITICAILY.





NASA FMEA #: 05-2R-5100-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






KU BD COMMDOWN/RETURNLINK MODE 1 CHANNEL1




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ANALYSIS ONLY COVERED COMM FUNCTION. WHEN INCLUDING BOTH RADAR
AND COMM FUNCTIONS CRITICALITY IS IN AGREEMENT. RADAR FUNCTION
COVERED UNDER SEPARATE FMEA, 7000 SERIES. IOA ACCEPTS THE MORE
SEVERE NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON THEIR MORE CONSERVATIVE
APPROACH TO ASSIGNING CRITICAILY.





NASA FMEA #: 05-2R-5100-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






KU BD COMMDOWN/RETURNLINK MODE 1 CHANNEL2




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ANALYSIS ONLY COVERED COMM FUNCTION. WHEN INCLUDING BOTH RADAR
AND COMM FUNCTIONS CRITICALITY IS IN AGREEMENT. RADAR FUNCTION
COVERED UNDER SEPARATE FMEA, 7000 SERIES. IOA ACCEPTS THE MORE
SEVERE NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON THEIR MORE CONSERVATIVE
APPROACH TO ASSIGNING CRITICAILY.





NASA FMEA #: 05-2R-5100-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






KU BD COMMDOWN/RETURNLINK MODE 1 CHANNEL 3




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ANALYSIS ONLY COVERED COMM FUNCTION. WHEN INCLUDING BOTH RADAR
AND COMM FUNCTIONS CRITICALITY IS IN AGREEMENT. RADAR FUNCTION
COVERED UNDER SEPARATE FMEA, 7000 SERIES. IOA ACCEPTS THE MORE
SEVERE NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON THEIR MORE CONSERVATIVE
APPROACH TO ASSIGNING CRITICAILY.





NASA FMEA #: 05-2R-5100-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






KU BD COMMDOWN/RETURNLINK MODE2




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ANALYSIS ONLY COVERED COMM FUNCTION. WHEN INCLUDING BOTH RADAR
AND COMM FUNCTIONS CRITICALITY IS IN AGREEMENT. RADAR FUNCTION
COVERED UNDER SEPARATE FMEA, 7000 SERIES. IOA ACCEPTS THE MORE
SEVERE NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON THEIR MORE CONSERVATIVE
APPROACH TO ASSIGNING CRITICAILY.





NASA FMEA #: 05-2R-5100-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






KU BD COMMDOWN/RETURNLINK MODE 2 CHANNEL 1




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMP_ [N/ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ANALYSIS ONLY COVERED COMM FUNCTION. WHEN INCLUDING BOTH RADAR
AND COMM FUNCTIONS CRITICALITY IS IN AGREEMENT. RADAR FUNCTION
COVERED UNDER SEPARATE FMEA, 7000 SERIES. IOA ACCEPTS THE MORE
SEVERE NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON THEIR MORE CONSERVATIVE
APPROACH TO ASSIGNING CRITICAILY.





NASA FMEA #: 05-2R-5100-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






KU BD COMM DOWN/RETURN LINK MODE 2 CHANNEL 2




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ANALYSIS ONLY COVERED COMM FUNCTION. WHEN INCLUDING BOTH RADAR
AND COMM FUNCTIONS CRITICALITY IS IN AGREEMENT. RADAR FUNCTION
COVERED UNDER SEPARATE FMEA, 7000 SERIES. IOA ACCEPTS THE MORE
SEVERE NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON THEIR MORE CONSERVATIVE
APPROACH TO ASSIGNING CRITICAILY.





NASA FMEA #: 05-2R-5100-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






KU BD COMMDOWN/RETURNLINK MODE 2 CHANNEL 3




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ANALYSIS ONLY COVERED COMM FUNCTION. WHEN INCLUDING BOTH RADAR
AND COMM FUNCTIONS CRITICALITY IS IN AGREEMENT. RADAR FUNCTION
COVERED UNDER SEPARATE FMEA, 7000 SERIES. IOA ACCEPTS THE MORE
SEVERE NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON THEIR MORE CONSERVATIVE
APPROACH TO ASSIGNING CRITICAILY.





NASA FMEA #: 05-2R-5112-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






KU A PWRSW (REF NAVAIDS RR)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ANALYSIS ONLY COVERED COMM FUNCTION. WHEN INCLUDING BOTH RADAR
AND COMM FUNCTIONS CRITICALITY IS IN AGREEMENT. RADAR FUNCTION
COVERED UNDER SEPARATE FMEA, 7000 SERIES. IOA ACCEPTS THE MORE
SEVERE NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON THEIR MORE CONSERVATIVE
APPROACH TO ASSIGNING CRITICAILY.





NASA FMEA #: 05-2R-5112-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






KU A PWRSW (REF NAVAIDS RR)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ANALYSIS ONLY COVERED COMM FUNCTION. WHEN INCLUDING BOTH RADAR
AND COMM FUNCTIONS CRITICALITY IS IN AGREEMENT. RADAR FUNCTION
COVERED UNDER SEPARATE FMEA, 7000 SERIES. IOA ACCEPTS THE MORE
SEVERE NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON THEIR MORE CONSERVATIVE
APPROACH TO ASSIGNING CRITICAILY.





NASA FMEA #: 05-2R-5113-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






KU A MODE SW (REF NAVAIDS RR)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ x ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ANALYSIS ONLY COVERED COMM FUNCTION. WHEN INCLUDING BOTH RADAR
AND COMM FUNCTIONS CRITICALITY IS IN AGREEMENT. RADAR FUNCTION
COVERED UNDER SEPARATE FMEA, 7000 SERIES. IOA ACCEPTS THE MORE
SEVERE NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON THEIR MORE CONSERVATIVE
APPROACH TO ASSIGNING CRITICAILY.




















HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ANALYSIS ONLY COVERED COMM FUNCTION. WHEN INCLUDING BOTH RADAR
AND COMM FUNCTIONS CRITICALITY IS IN AGREEMENT. RADAR FUNCTION
COVERED UNDER SEPARATE FMEA, 7000 SERIES. IOA ACCEPTS THE MORE
SEVERE NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON THEIR MORE CONSERVATIVE
APPROACH TO ASSIGNING CRITICAILY.





NASA FMEA #: 05-2R-5107-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






KU BD A ANT STEERING SW
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE TO SWITCH WOULD PREVENT SELECTION OF OPTIMUM ANTENNA
STEERING MODE. NOT CRITICAL FUNCTION. IOA ACCEPTS THE MORE
SEVERE NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON THEIR MORE CONSERVATIVE APPROACH
TO ASSIGNING CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 05-2R-5107-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






KU BD A ANT STEERING SW
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE TO SWITCH WOULD PREVENT SELECTION OF OPTIMUM ANTENNA
STEERING MODE. NOT CRITICAL FUNCTION. NASA FMEA 05-2R-5107-2
WAS COMBINED WITH 5107-1 AND DELEATED DURING THE NASA
REEVALUATION.











KU BD A ANT STEERING SW




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ p ] [ P ] [ P ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[ x ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
OPEN/SHORT FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF KUCOMM. ANALYSIS ONLY
COVERED COMM FUNCTION. WHEN INCLUDING BOTH RADAR AND COMM
FUNCTIONS CRITICALITY IS IN AGREEMENT. RADAR FUNCTION COVERED
UNDER SEPARATE FMEA, 7000 SERIES. IOA ACCEPTS THE MORE SEVERE
NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON THEIR MORE CONSERVATIVE APPROACH TO
ASSIGNING CRITICALITY.














KU BD ANT A PYRO ARM/SAFE SW




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
[ ] [ ] [ ] [x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO COUNTERPART NASA KUCOMM FMEA. SHOULD BE COVERED IN NASA FMEA.
IOA AGREES WITH THE NEWLY GENERATED NASA FMEA/CIL 05-6EI-2001-I
(2/24/88, CRITICALITY i/i), WHICH ADDRESSES THIS IOA CRITICALITY
ASSESSMENT.














KU BD ANT A PYRO ARM/SAFE SW
LEAD ANALYST : W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
[ ] [ ] [ ] [X]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO COUNTERPART NASA KUCOMM FMEA. SHOULD BE COVERED IN NASA FMEA.
IOA ACCEPTS THE NASA GENERATED FMEA 05-6EI-2001-2 (2/24/88,
CRITICALITY 3/IR), WHICH ADDRESSES THIS IOA CRITICALITY
ASSESSMENT.














KU BD ANT A PYRO JETT/SAFE SW




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 1 /i ]
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
[ ] [ ] [ ] [x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO COUNTERPART NASA KUCOMM FMEA. SHOULD BE COVERED IN NASA FMEA.
IOA AGREES WITH THE NEWLY GENERATED NASA FMEA/CIL 05-6EI-2002-I
(2/24/88, CRITICALITY I/I), WHICH ADDRESSES THIS IOA CRITICALITY
ASSESSMENT.














KU BD ANT A PYRO JETT/SAFE SW




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]





COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO COUNTERPART NASA KUCOMM FMEA. SHOULD BE COVERED IN NASA FMEA.
IOA AGREES WITH THE NEWLY GENERATED NASA FMEA/CIL 05-6EI-2002-2
(2/24/88, CRITICALITY i/i), WHICH ADDRESSES THIS IOA CRITICALITY
ASSESSMENT.

















NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO CORRESPONDING FMEA IN FMEA/CIL PACKET.
IOA AGREES WITH THE NEWLY GENERATED NASA FMEA/CIL 05-6EI-2000-I
(2/24/88, CRITICALITY I/IRB), WHICH ADDRESSES THIS IOA
CRITICALITY ASSESSMENT.





NASA FMEA #: 05-2B-22104-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






UHF SIMPLEX POWER SWITCH




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ I [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
CONTACT-TO-CONTACT BRIDGING SHORT HOLDING A FAILED PA IN THE UHF
RF TRANSMIT CIRCUIT COULD PREVENT UHF USE FOR ATC/LANDING OPS.
FAILS SCREEN B BECAUSE FAILURE WOULD NOT BE DETECTABLE. NASA
ASSIGNED CRITICALITY OF 3/3 FOR EVA AND 2/IR FOR OTHER MISSION
PHASES. NASA FMEA 05-2B-22104-I WAS ASSIGNED THE HIGHEST
CRITICALITY OF 2/IR. IOA ACCEPTS THE MORE SEVERE NASA
CRITICALITY BASED ON THEIR MORE CONSERVATIVE APPROACH TO
ASSIGNING CRITICALITY.




















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




BOTH CIRCUIT BREAKERS (CBI3, CBI8) ARE NORMALLY CLOSED. ONE
(CBI8) COULD FAIL OPEN AND CONDITION WOULD NOT BE DETECTED IN
FLIGHT BECAUSE OTHER (CBI3) WOULD BE PROVIDING POWER TO BOTH XCVR
AND TO PA, SO FAILS SCREEN B. IOA 5502 COVERS EVA OPS;
IOA 5503 COVERS FLIGHT OPS VOICE COMM WITH GROUND. IOA ACCEPTS
NASA FMEA SCREEN B PASS CRITERIA ON THE BASIS THAT CIRCUIT
BREAKERS COULD BE ROUTINELY CYCLED ON AND OFF TO CHECK OPERATION
DURING FLIGHT. ALTHOUGH THIS IS NOT A NORMAL PROCEDURE, IT COULD
ACCOMPLISH THE IN-FLIGHT READILY DETECTABLE FAILURE REQUIREMENT.











CIRCUIT BREAKER, UHF, MNC
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




BOTH CIRCUIT BREAKERS (CBI3, CBI8) ARE NORMALLY CLOSED. ONE
(CBI8) COULD FAIL OPEN AND CONDITION WOULD NOT BE DETECTED IN
FLIGHT BECAUSE OTHER (CBI3) WOULD BE PROVIDING POWER TO BOTH XCVR
AND TO PA, SO FAILS SCREEN B. IOA 5502 COVERS EVA OPS;
IOA 5503 COVERS FLIGHT OPS VOICE COMM WITH GROUND. IOA ACCEPTS
NASA FMEA SCREEN B PASS CRITERIA ON THE BASIS THAT CIRCUIT
BREAKERS COULD BE ROUTINELY CYCLED ON AND OFF TO CHECK OPERATION
DURING FLIGHT. ALTHOUGH THIS IS NOT A NORMAL PROCEDURE, IT COULD
ACCOMPLISH THE IN-FLIGHT READILY DETECTABLE FAILURE REQUIREMENT.





NASA FMEA #: 05-2R-5100-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[p] [P] [P]
E ] [ ] E ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ANALYSIS ONLY COVERED KU-BAND RADAR FUNCTION. WHEN BOTH RADAR
AND COMM FUNCTIONS ARE COMBINED, CRITICALITY IS IN AGREEMENT.
KUCOMM FUNCTIONS COVERED UNDER SEPARATE FMEA, 4000 SERIES.
STOWED ANTENNA CAUSES LOSS OF KUB-BAND RR FUNCTION. IOA AGREES
WITH NASA FMEA/CIL CRITICALITY 2/2 FOR RADAR FUNCTION.
OVERLOOKED DURING INITIAL REVIEW SINCE MAIN FMEA PERTAINED TO KU
COMM AND RADAR CRITICALITY SHOWED UP AS A SECONDARY PART OF THE
FMEA AS A 2/2 CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 05-2R-5100-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[p] [P] [P]
[ ] [ ] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




ANALYSIS ONLY COVERED k_-BAND RADAR FUNCTION. WHEN BOTH RADAR
AND COMM FUNCTIONS ARE COMBINED, CRITICALITY IS IN AGREEMENT.
KUCOMM FUNCTIONS COVERED UNDER SEPARATE FMEA, 4000 SERIES.
STOWED ANTENNA CAUSES LOSS OF KU-BAND RR FUNCTION. IOA AGREES
WITH
NASA FMEA/CIL CRITICALITY 2/2 FOR RADAR FUNCTION. OVERLOOKED
DURING INITIAL REVIEW SINCE MAIN FMEA PERTAINED TO KU COMM AND
RADAR CRITICALITY SHOWED UP AS A SECONDARY PART OF THE FMEA AS A
2/2 CRITICALITY.














NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
COMMAND TRACK
7028
RR EA-I (INTERFACE AND CONTROL UNIT)
W.C. LONG
[REF KU
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
H DW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ANALYSIS ONLY COVERED KU-BAND RADAR FUNCTION. WHEN BOTH RADAR
AND COMM FUNCTIONS ARE COMBINED, CRITICALITY IS IN AGREEMENT.
KUCOMM FUNCTIONS COVERED UNDER SEPARATE FMEA, 4000 SERIES.
STOWED ANTENNA CAUSES LOSS OF KU-BAND RR FUNCTION. IOA AGREES
WITH
NASA FMEA/CIL CRITICALITY 2/2 FOR RADAR FUNCTION. OVERLOOKED
DURING INITIAL REVIEW SINCE MAIN FMEA PERTAINED TO KU COMM AND
RADAR CRITICALITY SHOWED UP AS A SECONDARY PART OF THE FMEA AS A
2/2 CRITICALITY.














RR DMA (DEPLOYEDMECHANICAL ASSY) [REF KU COMM]
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
[ ] [ ] [ ] [x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO COUNTERPART NASA KU-BAND RADAR FMEA. FAILURE TO START/STOP
COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF RADAR FUNCTION.
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA/CIL 05-2R-5300-I (CRIT-2/2) FOR RADAR
FUNCTION. OVERLOOKED DURING INITIAL ASSESSMENT DUE TO SEVERAL
CRITICALITIES AND FUNCTION BEING INCLUDED ON ONE FMEA.














KU-BAND POWERSWITCH (REF KU-BAND COMM)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO COUNTERPART NASA KU-BAND RADAR FMEA.
COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF KU-BAND SYSTEM.
RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.
FAILURE TO REMAIN CLOSED
LOSS OF RADAR WOULD
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA/CIL 05-2R-5112-I (CRIT-2/2) FOR RADAR
FUNCTION. FAILURE MODE "OPEN" PRESENTS SAME EFFECT AS FAILS TO
REMAIN CLOSED.





NASA FMEA #: 05-2R-5104-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SLEW AZIMUTH CONTROLSWITCH (REF KU-BAND COMM)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ANALYSIS ONLY COVERED KU-BAND RADAR FUNCTION. WHEN BOTH RADAR
AND COMM FUNCTIONS ARE COMBINED, CRITICALITY IS IN AGREEMENT.
KUCOMM FUNCTIONS COVERED UNDER SEPARATE FMEA, 4000 SERIES.
STOWED ANTENNA CAUSES LOSS OF KUB-BAND RR FUNCTION. IOA ACCEPTS
NASA FMEA CRITICALITY 3/2R FOR RADAR FUNCTION. NORMALLY RADAR
EMPLOYS AUTOMATIC ANTENNA TRACKING/SLEWING SO THAT USE OF MANUAL
SLEWING REQUIRES A PRIOR FAILURE.











NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
COMM AND TRACK
7046
SLEW ELEV CONTROL SWITCH (REF KU-BAND COMM)
W.C. LONG
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ANALYSIS ONLY COVERED KU-BAND RADAR FUNCTION. WHEN BOTH RADAR
AND COMM FUNCTIONS ARE COMBINED, CRITICALITY IS IN AGREEMENT.
KUCOMM FUNCTIONS COVERED UNDER SEPARATE FMEA, 4000 SERIES.
STOWED ANTENNA CAUSES LOSS OF KUB-BAND RR FUNCTION. IOA ACCEPTS
NASA FMEA CRITICALITY 3/2R FOR RADAR FUNCTION. NORMALLY RADAR
EMPLOYS AUTOMAATIC ANTENNA TRACKING/SLEWING SO THAT USE OF MANUAL
SLEWING REQUIRES A PRIOR FAILURE.












LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [p] [p]
IN] IN] IN]
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF VCU COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF
ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW USUAL INSPEGTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS THE NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON THE LATITUDE GIVEN FOR
USE OF VARIOUS GROUND RULE INTERPRETATIONS IN DETERMINING THE
SYSTEM LEVEL OF REDUNDANCY.





NASA FMEA #: 1.2.18
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] [ ] C ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IN] IN] IN]
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF VCU COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF
ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW USUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS THE NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON THE LATITUDE GIVEN FOR
USE OF VARIOUS GROUND RULE INTERPRETATIONS IN DETERMINING THE
SYSTEM LEVEL OF REDUNDANCY.





NASA FMEA #: 1.2.21
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ p ] [ p ]
[ x] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF VCU COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF
ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW USUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS THE NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON THE LATITUDE GIVEN FOR
USE OF VARIOUS GROUND RULE INTERPRETATIONS IN DETERMINING THE
SYSTEM LEVEL OF REDUNDANCY.





NASA FMEA #: 1.2.22
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ p ] [ p ]
[ x ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF VCU COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF
ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW USUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS THE NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON THE LATITUDE GIVEN FOR
USE OF VARIOUS GROUND RULE INTERPRETATIONS IN DETERMINING THE
SYSTEM LEVEL OF REDUNDANCY.
















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ p ] [ p ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF VCU COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF
ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW USUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS THE NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON THE LATITUDE GIVEN FOR
USE OF VARIOUS GROUND RULE INTERPRETATIONS IN DETERMINING THE
SYSTEM LEVEL OF REDUNDANCY.
















HDW/FUNC A S C
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL VSU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE
FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW USUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.
NASA IN AGREEMENT WITH IOA CRITICALITY DESIGNATIONS FOR LRU LEVEL
ANALYSIS. NASA MADE AN INDEPTH ANALYSIS TO THE LRU COMPONENT
LEVEL SO THAT THE IOA LRU LEVEL ANALYSIS RESULTED IN A MORE
SEVERE CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 1.2.3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ p ] [ p ]
C ] *
CX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL VSU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE
FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW USUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.
NASA IN AGREEMENT WITH IOA CRITICALITY DESIGNATIONS FOR LRU LEVEL
ANALYSIS. NASA MADE AN INDEPTH ANALYSIS TO THE LRU COMPONENT
LEVEL SO THAT THE IOA LRU LEVEL ANALYSIS RESULTED IN A MORE
SEVERE CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 1.2.4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ p ] [ p ]
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL VSU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE
FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW USUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.
NASA IN AGREEMENT WITH IOA CRITICALITY DESIGNATIONS FOR LRU LEVEL
ANALYSIS. NASA MADE AN INDEPTH ANALYSIS TO THE LRU COMPONENT
LEVEL SO THAT THE IOA LRU LEVEL ANALYSIS RESULTED IN A MORE
SEVERE CRITICALITY.
















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ p ] [ p ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]





COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL VSU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE
FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW USUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.
NASA IN AGREEMENT WITH IOA CRITICALITY DESIGNATIONS FOR LRU LEVEL
ANALYSIS. NASA MADE AN INDEPTH ANALYSIS TO THE LRU COMPONENT
LEVEL SO THAT THE IOA LRU LEVEL ANALYSIS RESULTED IN A MORE
SEVERE CRITICALITY.
















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ p ] [ p ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]





COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL VSU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE
FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW USUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.
NASA IN AGREEMENT WITH IOA CRITICALITY DESIGNATIONS FOR LRU LEVEL
ANALYSIS. NASA MADE AN INDEPTH ANALYSIS TO THE LRU COMPONENT
LEVEL SO THAT THE IOA LRU LEVEL ANALYSIS RESULTED IN A MORE
SEVERE CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 1.2.7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL VSU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE
FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW USUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.
NASA IN AGREEMENT WITH IOA CRITICALITY DESIGNATIONS FOR LRU LEVEL
ANALYSIS. NASA MADE AN INDEPTH ANALYSIS TO THE LRU COMPONENT
LEVEL SO THAT THE IOA LRU LEVEL ANALYSIS RESULTED IN A MORE
SEVERE CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 1.2.8
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ p ] [ p ]
[ ] *
[X]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )




LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL VSU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE
FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW USUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.
NASA IN AGREEMENT WITH IOA CRITICALITY DESIGNATIONS FOR LRU LEVEL
ANALYSIS. NASA MADE AN INDEPTH ANALYSIS TO THE LRU COMPONENT
LEVEL SO THAT THE IOA LRU LEVEL ANALYSIS RESULTED IN A MORE
SEVERE CRITICALITY.













NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]








CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [p] [p]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL VSU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE
FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW USUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.
NASA IN AGREEMENT WITH IOA CRITICALITY DESIGNATIONS FOR LRU LEVEL
ANALYSIS. NASA MADE AN INDEPTH ANALYSIS TO THE LRU COMPONENT
LEVEL SO THAT THE IOA LRU LEVEL ANALYSIS RESULTED IN A MORE
SEVERE CRITICALITY.
















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL VSU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE
FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW USUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.
NASA IN AGREEMENT WITH IOA CRITICALITY DESIGNATIONS FOR LRU LEVEL
ANALYSIS. NASA MADE AN INDEPTH ANALYSIS TO THE LRU COMPONENT
LEVEL SO THAT THE IOA LRU LEVEL ANALYSIS RESULTED IN A MORE
SEVERE CRITICALITY.














NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL VSU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE
FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW USUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.
NASA IN AGREEMENT WITH IOA CRITICALITY DESIGNATIONS FOR LRU LEVEL
ANALYSIS. NASA MADE AN INDEPTH ANALYSIS TO THE LRU COMPONENT
LEVEL SO THAT THE IOA LRU LEVEL ANALYSIS RESULTED IN A MORE
SEVERE CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 1.2.12
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL VSU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE
FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW USUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.
NASA IN AGREEMENT WITH IOA CRITICALITY DESIGNATIONS FOR LRU LEVEL
ANALYSIS. NASA MADE AN INDEPTH ANALYSIS TO THE LRU COMPONENT
LEVEL SO THAT THE IOA LRU LEVEL ANALYSIS RESULTED IN A MORE
SEVERE CRITICALITY.
















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL VSU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE
FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW USUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.
NASA IN AGREEMENT WITH IOA CRITICALITY DESIGNATIONS FOR LRU LEVEL
ANALYSIS. NASA MADE AN INDEPTH ANALYSIS TO THE LRU COMPONENT
LEVEL SO THAT THE IOA LRU LEVEL ANALYSIS RESULTED IN A MORE
SEVERE CRITICALITY.













NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]







NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL VSU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE
FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW USUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.
NASA IN AGREEMENT WITH IOA CRITICALITY DESIGNATIONS FOR LRU LEVEL
ANALYSIS. NASA MADE AN INDEPTH ANALYSIS TO THE LRU COMPONENT
LEVEL SO THAT THE IOA LRU LEVEL ANALYSIS RESULTED IN A MORE
SEVERE CRITICALITY.














NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL VSU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE
FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW USUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.
NASA IN AGREEMENT WITH IOA CRITICALITY DESIGNATIONS FOR LRU LEVEL
ANALYSIS. NASA MADE AN INDEPTH ANALYSIS TO THE LRU COMPONENT
LEVEL SO THAT THE IOA LRU LEVEL ANALYSIS RESULTED IN A MORE
SEVERE CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 1.2.16
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [p] [p]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL VSU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE
FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW USUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.
NASA IN AGREEMENT WITH IOA CRITICALITY DESIGNATIONS FOR LRU LEVEL
ANALYSIS. NASA MADE AN INDEPTH ANALYSIS TO THE LRU COMPONENT
LEVEL SO T}_T THE IOA LRU LEVEL ANALYSIS RESULTED IN A MORE
SEVERE CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 1.2.17
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ p ] [ p ]
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL VSU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE
FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW USUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.
NASA IN AGREEMENT WITH IOA CRITICALITY DESIGNATIONS FOR LRU LEVEL
ANALYSIS. NASA MADE AN INDEPTH ANALYSIS TO THE LRU COMPONENT
LEVEL SO THAT THE IOA LRU LEVEL ANALYSIS RESULTED IN A MORE
SEVERE CRITICALITY.














NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
























RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL VSU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE
FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW USUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.
NASA IN AGREEMENT WITH IOA CRITICALITY DESIGNATIONS FOR LRU LEVEL
ANALYSIS. NASA MADE AN INDEPTH ANALYSIS TO THE LRU COMPONENT
LEVEL SO THAT THE IOA LRU LEVEL ANALYSIS RESULTED IN A MORE
SEVERE CRITICALITY.
















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ p ] [ p ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]





COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS ALL VSU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE
FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW USUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.
NASA IN AGREEMENT WITH IOA CRITICALITY DESIGNATIONS FOR LRU LEVEL
ANALYSIS. NASA MADE AN INDEPTH ANALYSIS TO THE LRU COMPONENT
LEVEL SO THAT THE IOA LRU LEVEL ANALYSIS RESULTED IN A MORE
SEVERE CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 1.2.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ X ] *
[X]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF VCU COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF
ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW
IOA ACCEPTS THE NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON THE LATITUDE GIVEN FOR
USE OF VARIOUS GROUND RULE INTERPRETATIONS IN DETERMINING THE
SYSTEM LEVEL OF REDUNDANCY.













NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]







NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[p] [p] [p]
IN] IN] IN]
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF VCU COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF
ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW
IOA ACCEPTS THE NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON THE LATITUDE GIVEN FOR
USE OF VARIOUS GROUND RULE INTERPRETATIONS IN DETERMINING THE
SYSTEM LEVEL OF REDUNDANCY.













NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]







NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ x ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF VCU COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF
ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW
IOA ACCEPTS THE NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON THE LATITUDE GIVEN FOR
USE OF VARIOUS GROUND RULE INTERPRETATIONS IN DETERMINING THE
SYSTEM LEVEL OF REDUNDANCY.













NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]







NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF VCU COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF
ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW
IOA ACCEPTS THE NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON THE LATITUDE GIVEN FOR
USE OF VARIOUS GROUND RULE INTERPRETATIONS IN DETERMINING THE
SYSTEM LEVEL OF REDUNDANCY.





NASA FMEA #: 1.2.23
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF VCU COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF
ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW
IOA ACCEPTS THE NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON THE LATITUDE GIVEN FOR
USE OF VARIOUS GROUND RULE INTERPRETATIONS IN DETERMINING THE
SYSTEM LEVEL OF REDUNDANCY.





NASA FMEA #: 1.2.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FAILS TO SWITCH RESULTS IN LOSS OF OUTPUT. LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS
ALL VSU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.
NASA IN AGREEMENT WITH IOA CRITICALITY DESIGNATIONS FOR LRU LEVEL
ANALYSIS. NASA MADE AN INDEPTH ANALYSIS TO THE LRU COMPONENT
LEVEL SO THAT THE IOA LRU LEVEL ANALYSIS RESULTED IN A MORE
SEVERE CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 1.2.3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FAILS TO SWITCH RESULTS IN LOSS OF OUTPUT. LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS
ALL VSU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.
NASA IN AGREEMENT WITH IOA CRITICALITY DESIGNATIONS FOR LRU LEVEL
ANALYSIS. NASA MADE AN INDEPTH ANALYSIS TO THE LRU COMPONENT
LEVEL SO THAT THE IOA LRU LEVEL ANALYSIS RESULTED IN A MORE
SEVERE CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 1.2.4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




FAILS TO SWITCH RESULTS IN LOSS OF OUTPUT. LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS
ALL VSU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.
NASA IN AGREEMENT WITH IOA CRITICALITY DESIGNATIONS FOR LRU LEVEL
ANALYSIS. NASA MADE AN INDEPTH ANALYSIS TO THE LRU COMPONENT
LEVEL SO THAT THE IOA LRU LEVEL ANALYSIS RESULTED IN A MORE
SEVERE CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 1.2.5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FAILS TO SWITCH RESULTS IN LOSS OF OUTPUT. LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS
ALL VSU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.
NASA IN AGREEMENT WITH IOA CRITICALITY DESIGNATIONS FOR LRU LEVEL
ANALYSIS. NASA MADE AN INDEPTH ANALYSIS TO THE LRU COMPONENT
LEVEL SO THAT THE IOA LRU LEVEL ANALYSIS RESULTED IN A MORE
SEVERE CRITICALITY.














NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FAILS TO SWITCH RESULTS IN LOSS OF OUTPUT. LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS
ALL VSU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.
NASA IN AGREEMENT WITH IOA CRITICALITY DESIGNATIONS FOR LRU LEVEL
ANALYSIS. NASA MADE AN INDEPTH ANALYSIS TO THE LRU COMPONENT
LEVEL SO THAT THE IOA LRU LEVEL ANALYSIS RESULTED IN A MORE
SEVERE CRITICALITY.













NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]







NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FAILS TO SWITCH RESULTS IN LOSS OF OUTPUT. LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS
ALL VSU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.
NASA IN AGREEMENT WITH IOA CRITICALITY DESIGNATIONS FOR LRU LEVEL
ANALYSIS. NASA MADE AN INDEPTH ANALYSIS TO THE LRU COMPONENT
LEVEL SO THAT THE IOA LRU LEVEL ANALYSIS RESULTED IN A MORE
SEVERE CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 1.2.8
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST : W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A S C






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FAILS TO SWITCH RESULTS IN LOSS OF OUTPUT. LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS
ALL VSU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.
NASA IN AGREEMENT WITH IOA CRITICALITY DESIGNATIONS FOR LRU LEVEL
ANALYSIS. NASA MADE AN INDEPTH ANALYSIS TO THE LRU COMPONENT
LEVEL SO THAT THE IOA LRU LEVEL ANALYSIS RESULTED IN A MORE
SEVERE CRITICALITY.













NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]







NEW [ X j
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FAILS TO SWITCH RESULTS IN LOSS OF OUTPUT. LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS
ALL VSU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.
NASA IN AGREEMENT WITH IOA CRITICALITY DESIGNATIONS FOR LRU LEVEL
ANALYSIS. NASA MADE AN INDEPTH ANALYSIS TO THE LRU COMPONENT
LEVEL SO THAT THE IOA LRU LEVEL ANALYSIS RESULTED IN A MORE
SEVERE CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 1.2.10
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FAILS TO SWITCH RESULTS IN LOSS OF OUTPUT. LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS
ALL VSU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.
NASA IN AGREEMENT WITH IOA CRITICALITY DESIGNATIONS FOR LRU LEVEL
ANALYSIS. NASA MADE AN INDEPTH ANALYSIS TO THE LRU COMPONENT
LEVEL SO THAT THE IOA LRU LEVEL ANALYSIS RESULTED IN A MORE
SEVERE CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 1.2.11
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FAILS TO SWITCH RESULTS IN LOSS OF OUTPUT. LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS
ALL VSU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.
NASA IN AGREEMENT WITH IOA CRITICALITY DESIGNATIONS FOR LRU LEVEL
ANALYSIS. NASA MADE AN INDEPTH ANALYSIS TO THE LRU COMPONENT
LEVEL SO THAT THE IOA LRU LEVEL ANALYSIS RESULTED IN A MORE
SEVERE CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 1.2.12
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FAILS TO SWITCH RESULTS IN LOSS OF OUTPUT. LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS
ALL VSU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.
NASA IN AGREEMENT WITH IOA CRITICALITY DESIGNATIONS FOR LRU LEVEL
ANALYSIS. NASA MADE AN INDEPTH ANALYSIS TO THE LRU COMPONENT
LEVEL SO THAT THE IOA LRU LEVEL ANALYSIS RESULTED IN A MORE
SEVERE CRITICALITY.












LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FAILS TO SWITCH RESULTS IN LOSS OF OUTPUT. LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS
ALL VSU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.
NASA IN AGREEMENT WITH IOA CRITICALITY DESIGNATIONS FOR LRU LEVEL
ANALYSIS. NASA MADE AN INDEPTH ANALYSIS TO THE LRU COMPONENT
LEVEL SO THAT THE IOA LRU LEVEL ANALYSIS RESULTED IN A MORE
SEVERE CRITICALITY.












LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FAILS TO SWITCH RESULTS IN LOSS OF OUTPUT. LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS
ALL VSU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.
NASA IN AGREEMENT WITH IOA CRITICALITY DESIGNATIONS FOR LRU LEVEL
ANALYSIS. NASA MADE AN INDEPTH ANALYSIS TO THE LRU COMPONENT
LEVEL SO THAT THE IOA LRU LEVEL ANALYSIS RESULTED IN A MORE
SEVERE CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 1.2.15
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FAILS TO SWITCH RESULTS IN LOSS OF OUTPUT. LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS
ALL VSU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.
NASA IN AGREEMENT WITH IOA CRITICALITY DESIGNATIONS FOR LRU LEVEL
ANALYSIS. NASA MADE AN INDEPTH ANALYSIS TO THE LRU COMPONENT
LEVEL SO THAT THE IOA LRU LEVEL ANALYSIS RESULTED IN A MORE
SEVERE CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 1.2.16
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )




FAILS TO SWITCH RESULTS IN LOSS OF OUTPUT. LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS
ALL VSU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.
NASA IN AGREEMENT WITH IOA CRITICALITY DESIGNATIONS FOR LRU LEVEL
ANALYSIS. NASA MADE AN INDEPTH ANALYSIS TO THE LRU COMPONENT
LEVEL SO THAT THE IOA LRU LEVEL ANALYSIS RESULTED IN A MORE
SEVERE CRITICALITY.
















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] .
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FAILS TO SWITCH RESULTS IN LOSS OF OUTPUT. LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS
ALL VSU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.
NASA IN AGREEMENT WITH IOA CRITICALITY DESIGNATIONS FOR LRU LEVEL
ANALYSIS. NASA MADE AN INDEPTH ANALYSIS TO THE LRU COMPONENT
LEVEL SO THAT THE IOA LRU LEVEL ANALYSIS RESULTED IN A MORE
SEVERE CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 1.2.19
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / J [ J [ J [ J [ J
(ADD/DELETE)




FAILS TO SWITCH RESULTS IN LOSS OF OUTPUT. LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS
ALL VSU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.
NASA IN AGREEMENT WITH IOA CRITICALITY DESIGNATIONS FOR LRU LEVEL
ANALYSIS. NASA MADE AN INDEPTH ANALYSIS TO THE LRU COMPONENT
LEVEL SO THAT THE IOA LRU LEVEL ANALYSIS RESULTED IN A MORE
SEVERE CRITICALITY.













NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]







NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




FAILS TO SWITCH RESULTS IN LOSS OF OUTPUT. LOSS OF OUTPUT COVERS
ALL VSU FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE WORST CASE FUNCTION WAS ANALYSED.
NASA IN AGREEMENT WITH IOA CRITICALITY DESIGNATIONS FOR LRU LEVEL
ANALYSIS. NASA MADE AN INDEPTH ANALYSIS TO THE LRU COMPONENT
LEVEL SO THAT THE IOA LRU LEVEL ANALYSIS RESULTED IN A MORE
SEVERE CRITICALITY.
















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF VCU COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF
ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS THE NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON THE LATITUDE GIVEN FOR
USE OF VARIOUS GROUND RULE INTERPRETATION IN DETERMINING THE
SYSTEM LEVEL OF REDUNDANCY.
















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF VCU COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF
ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS THE NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON THE LATITUDE GIVEN FOR
USE OF VA.qIOUS GROUND RULE INTERPRETATION IN DETERMINING THE
SYSTEM LEVEL OF REDUNDANCY.





NASA FMEA #: 1.2.21
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ p ] [ p ]
[ x] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF VCU COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF
ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS THE NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON THE LATITUDE GIVEN FOR
USE OF VARIOUS GROUND RULE INTERPRETATION IN DETERMINING THE
SYSTEM LEVEL OF REDUNDANCY.





NASA FMEA #: 1.2.22
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ p ] [ p ]
[ x ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF VCU COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF
ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS THE NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON THE LATITUDE GIVEN FOR
USE OF VARIOUS GROUND RULE INTERPRETATION IN DETERMINING THE
SYSTEM LEVEL OF REDUNDANCY.





NASA FMEA #: 1.2.23
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] C ] C ]
[P] [p] [p]
[N] IN] [N]
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF VCU COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF
ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS THE NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON THE LATITUDE GIVEN FOR
USE OF VARIOUS GROUND RULE INTERPRETATION IN DETERMINING THE
SYSTEM LEVEL OF REDUNDANCY.





NASA FMEA #: 1.2.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




INTERNAL ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT CIRCUIT COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
OUTPUT.
LOSS OF VCU COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF
ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.
NASA IN AGREEMENT WITH IOA CRITICALITY DESIGNATIONS FOR LRU LEVEL
ANALYSIS. NASA MADE AN INDEPTH ANALYSIS TO THE LRU COMPONENT
LEVEL SO THAT THE IOA LRU LEVEL ANALYSIS RESULTED IN A MORE
SEVERE CRITICALITY.











NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]









NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[P] [p] [P]
[P] [p] [p]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




INTERNAL ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT CIRCUIT COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
OUTPUT.
LOSS OF VCU COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF
ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.
NASA IN AGREEMENT WITH IOA CRITICALITY DESIGNATIONS FOR LRU LEVEL
ANALYSIS. NASA MADE AN INDEPTH ANALYSIS TO THE LRU COMPONENT
LEVEL SO THAT THE IOA LRU LEVEL ANALYSIS RESULTED IN A MORE
SEVERE CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 1.2.4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ p ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




INTERNAL ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT CIRCUIT COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
OUTPUT.
LOSS OF VCU COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF
ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.
NASA IN AGREEMENT WITH IOA CRITICALITY DESIGNATIONS FOR LRU LEVEL
ANALYSIS. NASA MADE AN INDEPTH ANALYSIS TO THE LRU COMPONENT
LEVEL SO THAT THE IOA LRU LEVEL ANALYSIS RESULTED IN A MORE
SEVERE CRITICALITY.














NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




INTERNAL ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT CIRCUIT COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
OUTPUT.
LOSS OF VCU COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF
ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.
NASA IN AGREEMENT WITH IOA CRITICALITY DESIGNATIONS FOR LRU LEVEL
ANALYSIS. NASA MADE AN INDEPTH ANALYSIS TO THE LRU COMPONENT
LEVEL SO THAT THE IOA LRU LEVEL ANALYSIS RESULTED IN A MORE
SEVERE CRITICALITY.
















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




INTERNAL ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT CIRCUIT COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
OUTPUT.
LOSS OF VCU COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF
ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.
NASA IN AGREEMENT WITH IOA CRITICALITY DESIGNATIONS FOR LRU LEVEL
ANALYSIS. NASA MADE AN INDEPTH ANALYSIS TO THE LRU COMPONENT
LEVEL SO THAT THE IOA LRU LEVEL ANALYSIS RESULTED IN A MORE
SEVERE CRITICALITY.














NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




INTERNAL ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT CIRCUIT COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
OUTPUT.
LOSS OF VCU COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF
ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.
NASA IN AGREEMENT WITH IOA CRITICALITY DESIGNATIONS FOR LRU LEVEL
ANALYSIS. NASA MADE AN INDEPTH ANALYSIS TO THE LRU COMPONENT
LEVEL SO THAT THE IOA LRU LEVEL ANALYSIS RESULTED IN A MORE
SEVERE CRITICALITY.














NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]









[ P ] [ P ]
[ P ] [ P ]













RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




INTERNAL ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT CIRCUIT COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
OUTPUT.
LOSS OF VCU COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF
ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.
NASA IN AGREEMENT WITH IOA CRITICALITY DESIGNATIONS FOR LRU LEVEL
ANALYSIS. NASA MADE AN INDEPTH ANALYSIS TO THE LRU COMPONENT
LEVEL SO THAT THE IOA LRU LEVEL ANALYSIS RESULTED IN A MORE
SEVERE CRITICALITY.
















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




INTERNAL ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT CIRCUIT COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
OUTPUT.
LOSS OF VCU COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF
ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.
NASA IN AGREEMENT WITH IOA CRITICALITY DESIGNATIONS FOR LRU LEVEL
ANALYSIS. NASA MADE AN INDEPTH ANALYSIS TO THE LRU COMPONENT
LEVEL SO THAT THE IOA LRU LEVEL ANALYSIS RESULTED IN A MORE
SEVERE CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 1.2.10
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




INTERNAL ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT CIRCUIT COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
OUTPUT.
LOSS OF VCU COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF
ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.
NASA IN AGREEMENT WITH IOA CRITICALITY DESIGNATIONS FOR LRU LEVEL
ANALYSIS. NASA MADE AN INDEPTH ANALYSIS TO THE LRU COMPONENT
LEVEL SO THAT THE IOA LRU LEVEL ANALYSIS RESULTED IN A MORE
SEVERE CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 1.2.11
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




INTERNAL ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT CIRCUIT COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
OUTPUT.
LOSS OF VCU COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF
ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.
NASA IN AGREEMENT WITH IOA CRITICALITY DESIGNATIONS FOR LRU LEVEL
ANALYSIS. NASA MADE AN INDEPTH ANALYSIS TO THE LRU COMPONENT
LEVEL SO THAT THE IOA LRU LEVEL ANALYSIS RESULTED IN A MORE
SEVERE CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 1.2.12
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




INTERNAL ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT CIRCUIT COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
OUTPUT.
LOSS OF VCU COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF
ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.
NASA IN AGREEMENT WITH IOA CRITICALITY DESIGNATIONS FOR LRU LEVEL
ANALYSIS. NASA MADE AN INDEPTH ANALYSIS TO THE LRU COMPONENT
LEVEL SO THAT THE IOA LRU LEVEL ANALYSIS RESULTED IN A MORE
SEVERE CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 1.2.13
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




INTERNAL ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT CIRCUIT COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
OUTPUT.
LOSS OF VCU COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF
ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.
NASA IN AGREEMENT WITH IOA CRITICALITY DESIGNATIONS FOR LRU LEVEL
ANALYSIS. NASA MADE AN INDEPTH ANALYSIS TO THE LRU COMPONENT
LEVEL SO THAT THE IOA LRU LEVEL ANALYSIS RESULTED IN A MORE
SEVERE CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 1.2.14
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




INTERNAL ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT CIRCUIT COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
OUTPUT.
LOSS OF VCU COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF
ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.
NASA IN AGREEMENT WITH IOA CRITICALITY DESIGNATIONS FOR LRU LEVEL
ANALYSIS. NASA MADE AN INDEPTH ANALYSIS TO THE LRU COMPONENT
LEVEL SO THAT THE IOA LRU LEVEL ANALYSIS RESULTED IN A MORE
SEVERE CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 1.2.15
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ p ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




INTERNAL ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT CIRCUIT COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
OUTPUT.
LOSS OF VCU COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF
ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.
NASA IN AGREEMENT WITH IOA CRITICALITY DESIGNATIONS FOR LRU LEVEL
ANALYSIS. NASA MADE AN INDEPTH ANALYSIS TO THE LRU COMPONENT
LEVEL SO THAT THE IOA LRU LEVEL ANALYSIS RESULTED IN A MORE
SEVERE CRITICALITY.



















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] ,
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




INTERNAL ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT CIRCUIT COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
OUTPUT.
LOSS OF VCU COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF
ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.
NASA IN AGREEMENT WITH IOA CRITICALITY DESIGNATIONS FOR LRU LEVEL
ANALYSIS. NASA MADE AN INDEPTH ANALYSIS TO THE LRU COMPONENT
LEVEL SO THAT THE IOA LRU LEVEL ANALYSIS RESULTED IN A MORE
SEVERE CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 1.2.17
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




INTERNAL ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT CIRCUIT COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
OUTPUT.
LOSS OF VCU COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF
ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.
NASA IN AGREEMENT WITH IOA CRITICALITY DESIGNATIONS FOR LRU LEVEL
ANALYSIS. NASA MADE AN INDEPTH ANALYSIS TO THE LRU COMPONENT
LEVEL SO THAT THE IOA LRU LEVEL ANALYSIS RESULTED IN A MORE
SEVERE CRITICALITY.



















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ] ,
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




INTERNAL ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT CIRCUIT COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
OUTPUT.
LOSS OF VCU COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF
ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.
NASA IN AGREEMENT WITH IOA CRITICALITY DESIGNATIONS FOR LRU LEVEL
ANALYSIS. NASA MADE AN INDEPTH ANALYSIS TO THE LRU COMPONENT
LEVEL SO THAT THE IOA LRU LEVEL ANALYSIS RESULTED IN A MORE
SEVERE CRITICALITY.














NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )




INTERNAL ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT CIRCUIT COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
OUTPUT.
LOSS OF VCU COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF
ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.
NASA IN AGREEMENT WITH IOA CRITICALITY DESIGNATIONS FOR LRU LEVEL
ANALYSIS. NASA MADE AN INDEPTH ANALYSIS TO THE LRU COMPONENT
LEVEL SO THAT THE IOA LRU LEVEL ANALYSIS RESULTED IN A MORE
SEVERE CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 2.1.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






TV CAMERA A (FWD P/L BAY)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ X ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 2.1.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






TV CAMERAA (FWD P/L BAY)




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.




















HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
C x ] *
CX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 _ND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 2.1.5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






TV CAMERAA (FWD P/n BAY)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[p] [p] [P]
IN] IN] IN]
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 2.2.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






TV CAMERAA (FWD P/L BAY)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ X ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 2.2.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






TV CAMERA A (FWD P/L BAY)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ x ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ 3 [
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 2.2.3.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






TV CAMERAA (FWD P/L BAY)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ p ]
[ x ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 2.2.5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






TV CAMERAa (FWD P/L BAY)




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 2.3.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






TV CAMERAA (FWD P/L BAY)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ x ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 2.3.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






TV CAMERAA (FWD P/L BAY)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ X ] *
[X]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 2.3.3.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






TV CAMERA A (FWD P/L BAY)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ x ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 2.3.5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






TV CAMERA A (FWD P/L BAY)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ X ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.

















NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECITON _D RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 2.1.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






TV CAMERAC (AFT P/L BAY)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ X ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECITON AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 2.1.3.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






TV CAMERAC (AFT P/L BAY)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMP_E [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECITON AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 2.1.5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






TV CAMERAC (AFT P/L BAY)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ x ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECITON AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.











TV CAMERAC (AFT P/L BAY)




NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECITON AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 2.2.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






TV CAMERAC (AFT P/L BAY)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] [ ] C ]
[P] [P] [P]
IN] IN] IN]
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECITON AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.











TV CAMERAC (AFT P/L BAY)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ x ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECITON AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 2.2.5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






TV CAMERAC (AFT P/L BAY)




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECITON AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 2.3.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






TV CAMERA C (AFT P/L BAY)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
IN] IN] IN]
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECITON AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.











TV CAMERAC (AFT P/L BAY)




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECITON AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 2.3.3.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






TV CAMERAC (AFT P/L BAY)




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECITON AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 2.3.5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






TV CAMERAC (AFT P/L BAY)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ X ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECITON AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.











NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
NASA DATA :
COMTRK-80 i0 BASELINE [ ]
2.1.1 NEW [ X ]
COMM AND TRACK
8010
TV CAMERA D (RMS STBD POSITION FWD)
W.C. LONG
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IN] IN] IN]
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECITON AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 2.1.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






TV CAMERAD (RMS STBD POSITION FWD)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ x ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / J [ 3 [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECITON AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 2.1.3.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






TV CAMERA D (RMS STBD POSITION FWD)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ x ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECITON AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 2.1.5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






TV CAMERA D (RMS STBD POSITION FWD)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
IN] IN] IN]
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECITON AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.













NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
COMM AND TRACK
8010
TV CAMERA D (RMS STBD POSITION FWD)
W.C. LONG
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ X ] *
[x]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ 3 [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECITON AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 2.2.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






TV CAMERAD (RMS STBD POSITION FWD)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
IN] IN] IN]
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECITON AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.













NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
COMM AND TRACK
8010
TV CAMERA D (RMS STBD POSITION FWD)
W.C. LONG
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
H DW/FUN C A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[p] [P] [P]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ x ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECITON AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 2.2.5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






TV CAMERAD (RMS STBD POSITION FWD)




HDW/FUNC A B C
ClL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ x ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
{ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECITON AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 2.3.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






TV CAMERA D (RMS STBD POSITION FWD)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ x ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECITON AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 2.3.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






TV CAMERAD (RMS STBD POSITION FWD)




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECITON AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 2.3.3.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






TV CAMERA D (RMS STBD POSITION FWD)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECITON AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), _D IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 2.3.5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






TV CAMERA D (RMS STBD POSITION FWD)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ X ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / _ [ ] [ J [ J [ J
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECITON AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 2.1.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]





TV CAMERA D (RMS STBD POSITION FWD)




HDW/FUNC A B C
ClL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ x ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSEPCTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 2.1.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]





TV CAMERAD (RMS STBD POSITION FWD)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
IN] IN] IN]
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSEPCTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 2.1.3.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]





TV CAMERA D (RMS STBD POSITION FWD)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ X ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSEPCTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 2.1.5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]





TV CAMERAD (RMS STBD POSITION FWD)




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ]
[ ] IX]*
[P] [x]
COMP_E [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSEPCTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.











NEW [ X ]
8011
TV CAMERA D (RMS STBD POSITION FWD)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSEPCTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 2.2.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]





TV CAMERAD (RMS STBD POSITION FWD)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ X ] *
[X]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSEPCTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 2.2.3.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]





TV CAMERA D (RMS STBD POSITION FWD)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ x ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSEPCTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 2.2.5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]





TV CAMERA D (RMS STBD POSITION FWD)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSEPCTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 2.3.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]





TV CAMERA D (_MS STBD POSITION FWD)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ x ] *
CX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSEPCTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 2.3.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]





TV CAMERA D (RMS STBD POSITION FWD)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A S C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMP_E [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSEPCTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 2.3.3.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]





TV CAMERA D (RMS STBD POSITION FWD)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ X ] *
[X]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDanCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSEPCTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 2.3.5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]





TV CAMERAD (RMS STBD POSITION FWD)




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMP_E [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF TVC COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING OF P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING,
EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSEPCTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW
P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), _D IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 2.1.7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC A POSITION)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ x ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS
OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 2.2.7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC A POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] C ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
IN] IN] IN]
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS
OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 2.3.7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC A POSITION)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ x ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS
OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 2.4.1.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC A POSITION)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ x ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS
OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 2.4.1.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC A POSITION)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ x ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS
OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 2.4.2.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC A POSITION)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ x ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS
OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 2.4.2.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC A POSITION)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ x ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS
OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 2.4.3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC A POSITION)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ X] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS
OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 2.1.7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC A POSITION)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ x ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.











NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]





NEW [ X ]
COMM AND TRACK
8015
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC A POSITION)
W.C. LONG
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
E ] E ] E ]
[p] [P] [P]
IN] IN] IN]
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 2.3.7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC A POSITION)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ x ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 2.4.1.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC A POSITION)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ x] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.











NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]





NEW [ X ]
COMM AND TRACK
8015
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC A POSITION)
W.C. LONG
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
IN] IN] IN]
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 2.4.2.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC A POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
H DW/FUN C A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ X ] *
[x]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 2.4.2.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC A POSITION)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ x ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 2.4.3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC A POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IN] IN] IN]
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 2.4.4.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC A POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] C ]
[P] [P] [P]
IN] IN] IN]
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 2.1.7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC A POSITION)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ x ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ERRATIC/INTERMITTANT OPERATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND
MISSION. LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD
PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXIST
VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION
AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE
CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 2.2.7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC A POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ x ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ERRATIC/INTERMITTANT OPERATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND
MISSION. LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD
PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXIST
VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION
AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE
CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 2.3.7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC A POSITION)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ x ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ERRATIC/INTERMITTANT OPERATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND
MISSION. LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD
PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXIST
VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION
AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE
CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 2.4.1.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC A POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [p] [p]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ x ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ERRATIC/INTERMITTANT OPERATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND
MISSION. LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD
PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXIST
VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION
AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE
CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 2.4.1.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC A POSITION)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ X ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ERRATIC/INTERMITTANT OPERATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND
MISSION. LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD
PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXIST
VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION
AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE
CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 2.4.2.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC A POSITION)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ x ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ERRATIC/INTERMITTANT OPERATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND
MISSION. LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD
PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXIST
VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION
AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE
CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 2.4.2.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC A POSITION)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ x] *
[x]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ERRATIC/INTERMITTANT OPERATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND
MISSION. LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD
PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXIST
VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION
AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE
CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 2.4.3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC A POSITION)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ x ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ERRATIC/INTERMITTANT OPERATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND
MISSION. LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD
PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXIST
VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREN VISUAL INSPECTION
AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE
CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 2.1.7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC B POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
IN] IN] IN]
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS
OF CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXIST
VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION
AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE
CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.













NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
COMM AND TRACK
8017
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC B POSITION)
W.C. LONG
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[p] [p] [p]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS
OF CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXIST
VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION
AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE
CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 2.3.7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC B POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
IN] IN] IN]
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS
OF CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXIST
VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION
AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE
CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 2.4.1.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC B POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ x ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS
OF CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXIST
VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION
AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE
CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 2.4.1.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC B POSITION)




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS
OF CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXIST
VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION
AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE
CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 2.4.2.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC B POSITION)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ x ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS
OF CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXIST
VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION
AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE
CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 2.4.2.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC B POSITION)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ x ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS
OF CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXIST
VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION
AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE
CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 2.4.3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC B POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
IN] IN] IN]
[ X ] *
[X]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS
OF CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXIST
VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION
AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE
CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 2.1.7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC B POSITION)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ X ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXIST
VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION
AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE
CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 2.2.7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC B POSITION)




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXIST
VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION
AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE
CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 2.3.7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC B POSITION)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ x ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXIST
VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION
AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE
CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 2.4.1.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC B POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
H DW/FUN C A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ X ] *
[x]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESUL_ _ IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXIST
VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION
AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE
CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 2.4.1.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC B POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IN] IN] IN]
[ x ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXIST
VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION
AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE
CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 2.4.2.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC B POSITION)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXIST
VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION
AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE
CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/1R), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 2.4.2.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC B POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXIST
VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION
AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE
CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 2.4.3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC B POSITION)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXIST
VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION
AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE
CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/1R), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 2.4.4.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ']






PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC B POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXIST
VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION
AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE
CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 2.1.7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC B POSITION)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
ERRATIC/INTERMITTANT OPERATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD
RESULT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 2.2.7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC B POSITION)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ x ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ERRATIC/INTERMITTANT OPERATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD
RESULT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 2.3.7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC B POSITION)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ERRATIC/INTERMITTANT OPERATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD
RESULT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 2.4.1.i
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC B POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMP_ [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ERRATIC/INTERMITTANT OPERATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD
RESULT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 2.4.1.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC B POSITION)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ x] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ERRATIC/INTERMITTANT OPERATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD
RESULT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 2.4.2.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC B POSITION)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ X ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ERRATIC/INTERMITTANT OPERATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD
RESULT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 2.4.2.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC B POSITION)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ERRATIC/INTERMITTANT OPERATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD
RESULT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 2.4.3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC B POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] [ ] C ]
[p] [P] [P]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ x ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ERRATIC/INTERMITTANT OPERATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TOPERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD
RESULT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 2.1.7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC C POSITION)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS
OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD RESULT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 2.2.7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC C POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS
OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD RESULT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.





NASA FMF2% #: 2.3.7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC C POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT".
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS
OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD RESULT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.











NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]





NEW [ X ]
COMMAND TRACK
8020
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC C POSITION)
W.C. LONG
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] C ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ x ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS
OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD RESULT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 2.4.1.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC C POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ x ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS
OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD RESULT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY, NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 2.4.2.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC C POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS
OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD RESULT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 2.4.2.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC C POSITION)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS
OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD RESULT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 2.4.3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC C POSITION)




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS
OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD RESULT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 2.1.7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC C POSITION)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD RESULT RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
IOAACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 2.2.7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC C POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD RESULT RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 2.3.7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC C POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD RESULT RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/1R), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 2.4.1.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC C POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD RESULT RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 2.4.1.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC C POSITION)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ X] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD RESULT RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 2.4.2.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC C POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD RESULT RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 2.4.2.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC C POSITION)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ X] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD RESULT RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/1R), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 2.4.3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC C POSITION)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD RESULT RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 2.4.4.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC C POSITION)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ X] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD RESULT RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 2.4.4.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC C POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ONLY WORST CASE CONDITION ANALYSED.
NASA IN AGREEMENT WITH IOA CRITICALITY DESIGNATIONS FOR LRU LEVEL
ANALYSIS. NASA MADE AN INDEPTH ANALYSIS TO THE LRU COMPONENT
LEVEL SO THAT THE IOA LRU LEVEL ANALYSIS RESULTED IN A MORE
SEVERE CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 2.1.7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC C POSITION)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ x] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ERRATIC/INTERMITTANT OPERATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD
PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 2.2.7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC C POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ERRATIC/INTERMITTANT OPERATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD
PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 2.3.7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC C POSITION)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ERRATIC/INTERMITTANT OPERATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD
PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 2.4.1.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC C POSITION)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ X ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ERRATIC/INTERMITTANT OPERATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD
PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 2.4.1.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC C POSITION)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ x] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ERRATIC/INTERMITTANT OPERATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD
PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 2.4.2.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC C POSITION)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ERRATIC/INTERMITTANT OPERATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD
PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 2.4.2.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC C POSITION)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ERRATIC/INTERMITTANT OPERATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD
PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 2.4.3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC C POSITION)




H DW/FUN C A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ X ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ERRATIC/INTERMITTANT OPERATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD
PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 2.1.7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC D POSITION)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS
OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 2.2.7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC D POSITION)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ x ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS
OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 2.3.7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC D POSITION)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS
OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 2.4.1.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC D POSITION)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS
OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 2.4.1.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC D POSITION)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS
OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 2.4.2.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC D POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS
OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 2.4.2.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC D POSITION)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMP_E [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
PHYSICAL BINDING COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS
OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 2.4.3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC D POSITION)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ x ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS
OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW
AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.













NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
COMM AND TRACK
8024
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC D POSITION)
W.C. LONG
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] [ ] C ]
[P] [P] [P]
IN] IN] IN]
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 2.2.7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC D POSITION)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[x]*
[x]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 2.3.7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC D POSITION)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/1R), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 2.4.1.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC D POSITION)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ x] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 2.4.1.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC D POSITION)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/1R), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 2.4.2.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC D POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 2.4.2.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC D POSITION)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ X ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 2.4.3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC D POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 2.4.4.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC D POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
FAILURE TO START/STOP COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 2.1.7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC D POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ERRATIC/INTERMITTANT OPERATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD
PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 2.2.7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC D POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ERRATIC/INTERMITTANT OPERATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD
PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 2.3.7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC D POSITION)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ERRATIC/INTERMITTANT OPERATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD
PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 2.4.1.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC D POSITION)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ]
[ X] *
[X]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
ERRATIC/INTERMITTANT OPERATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD
PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/1R) , AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 2.4.1.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC D POSITION)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ]
[ X] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ERRATIC/INTERMITTANT OPERATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD
PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 2.4.2.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC D POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ERRATIC/INTERMITTANT OPERATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTVAND
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD
PREVENT RMS STOWAND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 2.4.2.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC D POSITION)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ]
[ x] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ERRATIC/INTERMITTANT OPERATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD
PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 2.4.3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC D POSITION)
LEAD ANALYST: W. C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
ERRATIC/INTERMITTANT OPERATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD
PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL
INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST
CASE CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 2.1.6.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY (TVC A FWD P/L BAY)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.
ONLY WORST CASE CONDITION WAS ANALYSED.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 2.1.6.4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY (TVC A FWD P/L BAY)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ X ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.
ONLY WORST CASE CONDITION WAS ANALYSED.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 2.1.6.3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY (TVC A FWD P/L BAY)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ONLY WORST CASE CONDITION WAS ANALYSED.
NASA IN AGREEMENT WITH IOA CRITICALITY DESIGNATIONS FOR LRU LEVEL
ANALYSIS. NASA MADE AN INDEPTH ANALYSIS TO THE LRU COMPONENT
LEVEL SO THAT THE IOA LRU LEVEL ANALYSIS RESULTED IN A MORE
SEVERE CRITICALITY.











NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]





NEW [ X ]
COMM AND TRACK
8034
MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY (TVC A FWD P/L BAY)
W.C. LONG
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA
CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND
RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 2.1.6.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY (TVC B KEEL/EVA AFT P/L




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA
CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND
RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION
WAS ANALYSED.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 2.1.6.4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY (TVC B KEEL/EVA AFT P/L




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA
CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND
RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION
WAS ANALYSED.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 2.1.6.3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY (TVC B KEEL/EVA AFT P/L




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ONLY WORST CASE CONDITION WAS ANALYSED.
NASA IN AGREEMENT WITH IOA CRITICALITY DESIGNATIONS FOR LRU LEVEL
ANALYSIS. NASA MADE AN INDEPTH ANALYSIS TO THE LRU COMPONENT
LEVEL SO THAT THE IOA LRU LEVEL ANALYSIS RESULTED IN A MORE
SEVERE CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 2.1.6.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY (TVC B KEEL/EVA AFT P/L




HDW/FUNC A B C
ClL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA
CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAST FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND
RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE
CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 2.1.6.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY (TVC C AFT P/L BAY)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 2.1.6.4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY (TVC C AFT P/L BAY)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
LOSS OF OUTPUT COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW
WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS
JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 2.1.6.3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY (TVC C AFT P/L BAY)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ONLY WORST CASE CONDITION ANALYSED.
NASA IN AGREEMENT WITH IOA CRITICALITY DESIGNATIONS FOR LRU LEVEL
ANALYSIS. NASA MADE AN INDEPTH ANALYSIS TO THE LRU COMPONENT
LEVEL SO THAT THE IOA LRU LEVEL ANALYSIS RESULTED IN A MORE
SEVERE CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 2.1.6.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY (TVC C AFT P/L BAY)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA
CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND
RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE
CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/1R), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 2.1.6.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY (TVC D FWD P/L BAY)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ X ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF OUTPUT COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON
TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. ONLY WORST CASE CONDITION WAS
ANALYSED.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 2.1.6.4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY (TVC D FWD P/L BAY)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
LOSS OF OUTPUT COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS STOW AND
MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW
VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND RMS JETTISON
TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. ONLY WORST CASE CONDITION WAS
ANALYSED.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY .





NASA FMEA #: 2.1.6.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY (TVC D FWD P/L BAY)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTIONCOULD PREVENT RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA
CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND
RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE
CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 2.2.6.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (TVC C)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CCTV AND
MISSION.LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD
PREVENT RMS STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS
VIA
CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND
RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE
CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 2.2.8.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (TVC C)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA
CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND
RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE
CONDITION.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.











COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (TVC D)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CCTV AND MISSION.
LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA
CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND
RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE
CONDITION. ONLY WORST CASE CONDITION WAS ANALYSED.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR) , AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 2.2.8.1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (TVC D)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CCTVAND MISSION.
LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD PREVENT RMS
STOW AND MONITORING P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. UNLIKE CCTV REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA
CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND
RMS JETTISON TO ALLOW P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE. WORST CASE
CONDITION. ONLY WORST CASE CONDITION WAS ANALYSED.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6PK-20402-I
NASA DATA:







TV PWR CNTL UNIT SWITCH




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA ACCEPTS NASA REVISED 3/IR CRITICALITY BASED ON GCIL
REDUNDANCY. GCIL CAN SELECT CCTVMNA OR MNB POWER THROUGH
DEDICATED DRIVERS THUS PROVIDING TWO LEVELS OF REDUNDANCY FOR
THIS ITEM.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6PK-20402-I
NASA DATA:







TV PWRCNTL UNIT SWITCH




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




IOA ACCEPTS NASA REVISED 3/IR CRITICALITY BASED ON GCIL
REDUNDANCY. GCIL CAN SELECT CCTV MNA OR MNB POWER THROUGH
DEDICATED DRIVERS THUS PROVIDING TWO LEVELS OF REDUNDANCY FOR
THIS ITEM.















LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




NO FMEA PRESENTLY AVAILABLE, BUT NASA PLANS TO HAVE A FMEA 3/IR
(NON-CIL) GENERATED FOR THIS ITEM. IOA ACCEPTS NASA PLANNED FMEA
CRITICALITY 3/IR BASED ON CONSIDERATION THAT RMS JETTISON
REPRESENTS A SECOND LEVEL OF REDUNDANCY FOR RMS MOVEMENT
MONITORING AND THAT TWO LATCH SENSE DETECTORS PROVIDE TWO LEVELS
OF REDUNDANCY FOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCH MONITORING.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6PK-20501-I
NASA DATA:







TV CAMERA POWER SWITCH (TVC A)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA ACCEPTS NASA REVISED 3/IR CRITICALITY BASED ON CONSIDERATION
THAT RMS JETTISON REPRESENTS A SECOND LEVEL OF REDUNDANCY FOR RMS
MOVEMENT MONITORING AND THAT TWO LATCH SENSE DETECTORS PROVIDE
TWO LEVELS OF REDUNDANCY FOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCH MONITORING.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6PK-20501-I
NASA DATA:







TV CAMERA POWER SWITCH (TVC A)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA ACCEPTS NASA REVISED 3/IR CRITICALITY BASED ON CONSIDERATION
THAT RMS JETTISON REPRESENTS A SECOND LEVEL OF REDUNDANCY FOR RMS
MOVEMENT MONITORING AND THAT TWO LATCH SENSE DETECTORS PROVIDE
TWO LEVELS OF REDUNDANCY FOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCH MONITORING.














TV CAMERA POWER SWITCH (TVC B)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA ACCEPTS NASA REVISED 3/IR CRITICALITY BASED ON CONSIDERATION
THAT RMS JETTISON REPRESENTS A SECOND LEVEL OF REDUNDANCY FOR RMS
MOVEMENT MONITORING AND THAT TWO LATCH SENSE DETECTORS PROVIDE
TWO LEVELS OF REDUNDANCY FOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCH MONITORING.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6PK-20501-I
NASA DATA:







TV CAMERA POWER SWITCH (TVC B)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] .
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA ACCEPTS NASA REVISED 3/IR CRITICALITY BASED ON CONSIDERATION
THAT RMS JETTISON REPRESENTS A SECOND LEVEL OF REDUNDANCY FOR RMS
MOVEMENT MONITORING AND THAT TWO LATCH SENSE DETECTORS PROVIDE
TWO LEVELS OF REDUNDANCY FOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCH MONITORING.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6PK-20501-I
NASA DATA:







TV CAMERA POWER SWITCH (TVC C)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA ACCEPTS NASA REVISED 3/IR CRITICALITY BASED ON CONSIDERATION
THAT RMS JETTISON REPRESENTS A SECOND LEVEL OF REDUNDANCY FOR RMS
MOVEMENT MONITORING AND THAT TWO LATCH SENSE DETECTORS PROVIDE
TWO LEVELS OF REDUNDANCY FOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCH MONITORING.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6PK-20501-I
NASA DATA:







TV CAMERA POWER SWITCH (TVC C)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] *
[X]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA ACCEPTS NASA REVISED 3/IR CRITICALITY BASED ON CONSIDERATION
THAT RMS JETTISON REPRESENTS A SECOND LEVEL OF REDUNDANCY FOR RMS
MOVEMENT MONITORING AND THAT TWO LATCH SENSE DETECTORS PROVIDE
TWO LEVELS OF REDUNDANCY FOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCH MONITORING.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6PK-20501-I
NASA DATA:







TV CAMERA POWER SWITCH (TVC D)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 J [ J [ J [ J
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA ACCEPTS NASA REVISED 3/IR CRITICALITY BASED ON CONSIDERATION
THAT RMS JETTISON REPRESENTS A SECOND LEVEL OF REDUNDANCY FOR RMS
MOVEMENT MONITORING AND THAT TWO LATCH SENSE DETECTORS PROVIDE
TWO LEVELS OF REDUNDANCY FOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCH MONITORING.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6PK-20501-I
NASA DATA:







TV CAMERA POWER SWITCH (TVC D)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




IOA ACCEPTS NASA REVISED 3/IR CRITICALITY BASED ON CONSIDERATION
THAT RMS JETTISON REPRESENTS A SECOND LEVEL OF REDUNDANCY FOR RMS
MOVEMENT MONITORING AND THAT TWO LATCH SENSE DETECTORS PROVIDE
TWO LEVELS OF REDUNDANCY FOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCH MONITORING.














TV CAMERA CMD FOCUS SWITCH




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO COMPARABLE NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE TO PROVIDE THIS FUNCTION
WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF TVC. UP CMD PROVIDES UNLIKE REDUNDANCY.
SECOND FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV FUNCTION AND LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON NASA REVISED FMEA/CIL 05-
6PK-20250-2. BOTH NASA AND IOA ASSIGNED CIL DESIGNATIONS 2/IR OR
2/2.














TV CAMERA CMD FOCUS SWITCH




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO COMPARABLE NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE TO PROVIDE THIS FUNCTION
WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF TVC. UP CMD PROVIDES UNLIKE REDUNDANCY.
SECOND FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV FUNCTION AND LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON NASA REVISED FMEA/CIL 05-
6PK-20250-2. BOTH NASA AND IOA ASSIGNED CIL DESIGNATIONS 2/IR OR
2/2.














TV CAMERA CMD ZOOM SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO COMPARABLE NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE TO PROVIDE THIS FUNCTION
WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF TVC. UP CMD PROVIDES UNLIKE REDUNDANCY.
SECOND FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV FUNCTION AND LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON NASA REVISED FMEA/CIL 05-
6PK-20251-2. BOTH NASA AND IOA ASSIGNED CIL DESIGNATIONS 2/IR OR
2/2.



















HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




NO COMPARABLE NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE TO PROVIDE THIS FUNCTION
WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF TVC. UP CMD PROVIDES UNLIKE REDUNDANCY.
SECOND FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV FUNCTION AND LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON NASA REVISED FMEA/CIL 05-
6PK-20251-2. BOTH NASA AND IOa ASSIGNED CIL DESIGNATIONS 2/IR OR
212.














TV CAMERA CMD IRIS SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




NO COMPARABLE NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE TO PROVIDE THIS FUNCTION
WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF TVC. UP CMD PROVIDES UNLIKE REDUNDANCY.
SECOND FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV FUNCTION AND LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON NASA REVISED FMEA/CIL 05-
6PK-20252-2. BOTH NASA AND IOA ASSIGNED CIL DESIGNATIONS 2/IR OR
2/2.














TV CAMERA CMD IRIS SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO COMPARABLE NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE TO PROVIDE THIS FUNCTION
WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF TVC. UP CMD PROVIDES UNLIKE REDUNDANCY.
SECOND FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV FUNCTION AND LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON NASA REVISED FMEA/CIL 05-
6PK-20252-2. BOTH NASA AND IOA ASSIGNED CIL DESIGNATIONS 2/IR OR
2/2.














TV CAMERA CMD TILT SWITCH




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO COMPARABLE NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE TO PROVIDE THIS FUNCTION
WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF TVC. UP CMD PROVIDES UNLIKE REDUNDANCY.
SECOND FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV FUNCTION AND LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON NASA REVISED FMEA/CIL 05-
6PK-20214-2. BOTH NASA AND IOA ASSIGNED CIL DESIGNATIONS 2/IR OR
2/2.














TV CAMERA CMD TILT SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO COMPARABLE NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE TO PROVIDE THIS FUNCTION
WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF TVC. UP CMD PROVIDES UNLIKE REDUNDANCY.
SECOND FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV FUNCTION AND LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON NASA REVISED FMEA/CIL 05-
6PK-20214-2. BOTH NASA AND IOA ASSIGNED CIL DESIGNATIONS 2/IR OR
2/2.














TV CAMERA CMD PAN SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO COMPARABLE NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE TO PROVIDE THIS FUNCTION
WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF TVC. UP CMD PROVIDES UNLIKE REDUNDANCY.
SECOND FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV FUNCTION AND LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON NASA REVISED FMEA/CIL 05-
6PK-20215-2. BOTH NASA AND IOa ASSIGNED CIL DESIGNATIONS 2/IR OR
2/2.














TV CAMERA CMD PAN SWITCH




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO COMPARABLE NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE TO PROVIDE THIS FUNCTION
WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF TVC. UP CMD PROVIDES UNLIKE REDUNDANCY.
SECOND FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV FUNCTION AND LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON NASA REVISED FMEA/CIL 05-
6PK-20215-2. BOTH NASA AND IOa ASSIGNED CIL DESIGNATIONS 2/IR OR
2/2.














TV VIDEO INPUT PBI [TVC A FWD BAY SELECT] SW
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO COMPARABLE NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE TO PROVIDE THIS FUNCTION
WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF TVC. UP CMD PROVIDES UNLIKE REDUNDANCY.
SECOND FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV FUNCTION AND LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON NASA REVISED FMEA/CIL 05-
6PK-20227-2. BOTH NASA AND IOA ASSIGNED CIL DESIGNATIONS 2/IR OR
2/2.














TV VIDEO INPUT PBI [TVC A SELECT] SW




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




NO COMPARABLE NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE TO PROVIDE THIS FUNCTION
WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF TVC. UP CMD PROVIDES UNLIKE REDUNDANCY.
SECOND FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV FUNCTION AND LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON NASA REVISED FMEA/CIL 05-
6PK-20227-2. BOTH NASA AND IOA ASSIGNED CIL DESIGNATIONS 2/1R OR
2/2.














TV VIDEO INPUT PBI [TVC B KEEL/EVA SELECT] SW




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO COMPARABLE NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE TO PROVIDE THIS FUNCTION
WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF TVC. UP CMD PROVIDES UNLIKE REDUNDANCY.
SECOND FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV FUNCTION AND LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON NASA REVISED FMEA/CIL 05-
6PK-20228-2. BOTH NASA AND IOA ASSIGNED CIL DESIGNATIONS 2/IR OR
2/2,














TV VIDEO INPUT PBI [TVC B SELECT] SW




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] *
[X]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO COMPARABLE NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE TO PROVIDE THIS FUNCTION
WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF TVC. UP CMD PROVIDES UNLIKE REDUNDANCY.
SECOND FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV FUNCTION AND LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON NASA REVISED FMEA/CIL 05-
6PK-20228-2. BOTH NASA AND IOa ASSIGNED CIL DESIGNATIONS 2/IR OR
2/2.














TV VIDEO INPUT PBI [TVC C AFT BAY SELECT] SW




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO COMPARABLE NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE TO PROVIDE THIS FUNCTION
WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF TVC. UP CMD PROVIDES UNLIKE REDUNDANCY.
SECOND FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV FUNCTION AND LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON NASA REVISED FMEA/CIL 05-
6PK-20260-2. BOTH NASA AND IOA ASSIGNED CIL DESIGNATIONS 2/IR OR
2/2.














TV VIDEO INPUT PBI [TVC C SELECT] SW




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO COMPARABLE NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE TO PROVIDE THIS FUNCTION
WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF TVC. UP CMD PROVIDES UNLIKE REDUNDANCY.
SECOND FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV FUNCTION AND LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON NASA REVISED FMEA/CIL 05-
6PK-20260-2. BOTH NASA AND IOa ASSIGNED CIL DESIGNATIONS 2/IR OR
2/2.














TV VIDEO INPUT PBI [TVC D RMS STBD SELECT] SW
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




NO COMPARABLE NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE TO PROVIDE THIS FUNCTION
WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF TVC. UP CMD PROVIDES UNLIKE REDUNDANCY.
SECOND FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV FUNCTION AND LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON NASA REVISED FMEA/CIL 05-
6PK-20229-2. BOTH NASA AND IOA ASSIGNED CIL DESIGNATIONS 2/IR OR
2/2.














TV VIDEO INPUT PBI [TVC D SELECT] SW




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO COMPARABLE NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE TO PROVIDE THIS FUNCTION
WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF TVC. UP CMD PROVIDES UNLIKE REDUNDANCY.
SECOND FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV FUNCTION AND LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON NASA REVISED FMEA/CIL 05-
6PK-20229-2. BOTH NASA AND IOA ASSIGNED CIL DESIGNATIONS 2/IR OR
2/2.














TVC A MONOCHROME LENS ASSY FOCUS CONTROL SWITCH




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM THIS FUNCTION COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
WITHDRAWN DUE TO UNLIKELY FAILURE MODE. CONTROLS MOUNTED ON
CHASSIS OF PAYLOAD BAY LOCATED CCTV COMPONENTS ARE NOT EXERCISED
DURING FLIGHT, THEREFORE THEY CANNOT EXPERIENCE A "FAILURE TO
SWITCH".














TVC A MONOCHROME LENS ASSY FOCUS CONTROL SWITCH




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] ,
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM THIS FUNCTION COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
WITHDRAWN DUE TO IMPROBABLE FAILURE MODE. CONTROLS MOUNTED ON
CHASSIS OF CCTV COMPONENTS ARE MOMENTARY SWITCHES THAT CAN BE
OVERIDDEN BY GROUND UPLINK AND CREW COMMANDS. "OPEN OR SHORT TO
CASE" WILL NOT PREVENT TV CAMERA AND LENS OPERATION, AND SHORTED
CONTACTS ARE UNLIKELY. SINCE THE CARGO BAY CCTV COMPONENTS
CONTROLS ARE NOT PLANNED FOR USE DURING FLIGHT, NASA DID NOT
GENERATE FMEA'S FOR THEM.














TVC B MONOCHROMELENS ASSY FOCUSCONTROLSWITCH




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM THIS FUNCTION COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
WITHDRAWN DUE TO UNLIKELY FAILURE MODE. CONTROL MOUNTED ON
CHASSIS OF PAYLOAD BAY LOCATED CCTV COMPONENTS ARE NOT EXERCISED
DURING FLIGHT, THEREFORE THEY CANNOT EXPERIENCE A "FAILURE TO
SWITCH".














TVC B MONOCHROME LENS ASSY FOCUS CONTROL SWITCH




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM THIS FUNCTION COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
WITHDRAWN DUE TO IMPROBABLE FAILURE MODE. CONTROLS MOUNTED ON
CHASSIS OF CCTV COMPONENTS ARE MOMENTARY SWITCHES THAT CAN BE
OVERIDDEN BY GROUND UPLINK AND CREW COMMANDS. "OPEN OR SHORT TO
CASE" WILL NOT PREVENT TV CAMERA AND LENS OPERATION, AND SHORTED
CONTACTS ARE UNLIKELY. SINCE THE CARGO BAY CCTV COMPONENTS
CONTROLS ARE NOT PLANNED FOR USE DURING FLIGHT, NASA DID NOT
GENERATE FMEA'S FOR THEM.














TVC C MONOCHROMELENS ASSY FOCUSCONTROLSWITCH




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM THIS FUNCTION COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
WITHDRAWN DUE TO UNLIKELY FAILURE MODE. CONTROLS MOUNTED ON
CHASSIS OF PAYLOAD BAY LOCATED CCTV COMPONENTS ARE NOT EXERCISED
DURING FLIGHT, THEREFORE THEY CANNOT EXPERIENCE A "FAILURE TO
SWITCH".














TVC C MONOCHROME LENS ASSY FOCUS CONTROL SWITCH




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM THIS FUNCTION COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
WITHDRAWN DUE TO IMPROBABLE FAILURE MODE. CONTROLS MOUNTED ON
CHASSIS OF CCTV COMPONENTS ARE MOMENTARY SWITCHES THAT CAN BE
OVERIDDEN BY GROUND UPLINK AND CREW COMMANDS. "OPEN OR SHORT TO
CASE" WILL NOT PREVENT TV CAMERA AND LENS OPERATION, AND SHORTED
CONTACTS ARE UNLIKELY. SINCE THE CARGO BAY CCTV COMPONENTS
CONTROLS ARE NOT PLANNED FOR USE DURING FLIGHT, NASA DID NOT
GENERATE FMEA'S FOR THEM.














TVC D MONOCHROME LENS ASSY FOCUS CONTROL SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM THIS FUNCTION COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
WITHDRAWN DUE TO UNLIKELY FAILURE MODE. CONTROLS MOUNTED ON
CHASSIS OF PAYLOAD BAY LOCATED CCTV COMPONENTS ARE NOT EXERCISED
DURING FLIGHT, THERFORE THEY CANNOT EXPERIENCE A "FAILURE TO
SWITCH".














TVC D MONOCHROME LENS ASSY FOCUS CONTROL SWITCH




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] ,
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM THIS FUNCTION COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
WITHDRAWN DUE TO IMPROBABLE FAILURE MODE. CONTROLS MOUNTED ON
CHASSIS OF CCTV COMPONENTS ARE MOMENTARY SWITCHES THAT CAN BE
OVERIDDEN BY GROUND UPLINK AND CREW COMMANDS. "OPEN OR SHORT TO
CASE" WILL NOT PREVENT TV CAMERA AND LENS OPERATION, AND SHORTED
CONTACTS ARE UNLIKELY. SINCE THE CARGO BAY CCTV COMPONENTS
CONTROLS ARE NOT PLANNED FOR USE DURING FLIGHT, NASA DID NOT
GENERATE FMEA'S FOR THEM.














TVC A MONOCHROME LENS ASSY ZOOM CONTROL SWITCH




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM THIS FUNCTION COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
WITHDRAWN DUE TO UNLIKELY FAILURE MODE. CONTROLS MOUNTED ON
CHASSIS OF PAYLOAD BAY LOCATED CCTV COMPONENTS ARE NOT EXERCISED
DURING FLIGHT, THEREFORE THEY CANNOT EXPERIENCE A "FAILURE TO
SWITCH".














TVC A MONOCHROME LENS ASSY ZOOM CONTROL SWITCH




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )




NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM THIS FUNCTION COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
WITHDRAWN DUE TO IMPROBABLE FAILURE MODE. CONTROLS MOUNTED ON
CHASSIS OF CCTV COMPONENTS ARE MOMENTARY SWITCHES THAT CAN BE
OVERIDDEN BY GROUND UPLINK AND CREW COMMANDS. "OPEN OR SHORT TO
CASE" WILL NOT PREVENT TV CAMERA AND LENS OPERATION, AND SHORTED
CONTACTS ARE UNLIKELY. SINCE THE CARGO BAY CCTV COMPONENTS
CONTROLS ARE NOT PLANNED FOR USE DURING FLIGHT, NASA DID NOT
GENERATE FMEA'S FOR THEM.














TVC B MONOCHROME LENS ASSY ZOOM CONTROL SWITCH




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM THIS FUNCTION COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
WITHDRAWN DUE TO UNLIKELY FAILURE MODE. CONTROLS MOUNTED ON
CHASSIS OF PAYLOAD BAY LOCATED CCTV COMPONENTS ARE NOT EXERCISED
DURING FLIGHT, THEREFORE THAY CANNOT EXPERIENCE A "FAILURE TO
SWITCH".














TVC B MONOCHROME LENS ASSY ZOOM CONTROL SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM THIS FUNCTION COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
WITHDRAWN DUE TO IMPROBABLE FAILURE MODE. CONTROLS MOUNTED ON
CHASSIS OF CCTV COMPONENTS ARE MOMENTARY SWITCHES THAT CAN BE
OVERIDDEN BY GROUND UPLINK AND CREW COMMANDS. "OPEN OR SHORT TO
CASE" WILL NOT PREVENT TV CAMERA AND LENS OPERATION, AND SHORTED
CONTACTS ARE UNLIKELY. SINCE THE CARGO BAY CCTV COMPONENTS
CONTROLS ARE NOT PLANNED FOR USE DURING FLIGHT, NASA DID NOT
GENERATE FMEA'S FOR THEM.














TVC C MONOCHROME LENS ASSY ZOOM CONTROL SWITCH




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM THIS FUNCTION COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
WITHDRAWN DUE TO UNLIKELY FAILURE MODE. CONTROLS MOUNTED ON
CHASSIS OF PAYLOAD BAY LOCATED CCTV COMPONENTS ARE NOT EXERCISED
DURING FLIGHT, THEREFORE THEY CANNOT EXPERIENCE A "FAILURE TO
SWITCH".














TVC C MONOCHROME LENS ASSY ZOOM CONTROL SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM THIS FUNCTION COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
WITHDRAWN DUE TO IMPROBABLE FAILURE MODE. CONTROLS MOUNTED ON
CHASSIS OF CCTV COMPONENTS ARE MOMENTARY SWITCHES THAT CAN BE
OVERIDDEN BY GROUND UPLINK AND CREW COMMANDS. "OPEN OR SHORT TO
CASE" WILL NOT PREVENT TV CAMERA AND LENS OPERATION, AND SHORTED
CONTACTS ARE UNLIKELY. SINCE THE CARGO BAY CCTV COMPONENTS
CONTROLS ARE NOT PLANNED FOR USE DURING FLIGHT, NASA DID NOT
GENERATE FMEA'S FOR THEM.














TVC D MONOCHROME LENS ASSY ZOOM CONTROL SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM THIS FUNCTION COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
WITHDRAWN DUE TO UNLIKELY FAILURE MODE. CONTROLS MOUNTED ON
CHASSIS OF PAYLOAD BAY LOCATED CCTV COMPONENTS ARE NOT EXERCISED
DURING FLIGHT, THEREFORE THEY CANNOT EXPERIENCE A "FAILURE TO
SWITCH".














TVC D MONOCHROME LENS ASSY ZOOM CONTROL SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM THIS FUNCTION COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
WITHDRAWN DUE TO IMPROBABLE FAILURE MODE. CONTROLS MOUNTED ON
CHASSIS OF CCTV COMPONENTS ARE MOMENTARY SWITCHES THAT CAN BE
OVERIDDEN BY GROUND UPLINK AND CREW COMMANDS. "OPEN OR SHORT TO
CASE" WILL NOT PREVENT TV CAMERA AND LENS OPERATION, AND SHORTED
CONTACTS ARE UNLIKELY. SINCE THE CARGO BAY CCTV COMPONENTS
CONTROLS ARE NOT PLANNED FOR USE DURING FLIGHT, NASA DID NOT
GENERATE FMEA'S FOR THEM.














TVC A MONOCHROME LENS ASSY IRIS CONTROL SWITCH




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] *
[X]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILAURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM THIS FUNCTION COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
WITHDRAWN DUE TO UNLIKELY FAILURE MODE. CONTROLS MOUNTED ON
CHASSIS OF PAYLOAD BAY LOCATED CCTV COMPONENTS ARE NOT EXERCISED
DURING FLIGHT, THEREFORE THEY CANNOT EXPERIENCE A "FAILURE TO
SWITCH".














TVC A MONOCHROME LENS ASSY IRIS CONTROL SWITCH




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILAURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM THIS FUNCTION COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
WITHDRAWN DUE TO IMPROBABLE FAILURE MODE. CONTROLS MOUNTED ON
CHASSIS OF CCTV COMPONENTS ARE MOMENTARY SWITCHES THAT CAN BE
OVERIDDEN BY GROUND UPLINK AND CREW COMMANDS. "OPEN OR SHORT TO
CASE" WILL NOT PREVENT TV CAMERA AND LENS OPERATION, AND SHORTED
CONTACTS ARE UNLIKELY. SINCE THE CARGO BAY CCTV COMPONENTS
CONTROLS ARE NOT PLANNED FOR USE DURING FLIGHT, NASA DID NOT
GENERATE FMEA'S FOR THEM.














TVC B MONOCHROME LENS ASSY IRIS CONTROL SWITCH




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILAURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM THIS FUNCTION COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
WITHDRAWN DUE TO UNLIKELY FAILURE MODE. CONTROLS MOUNTED ON
CHASSIS OF PAYLOAD BAY LOCATED CCTV COMPONENTS ARE NOT EXERCISED
DURING FLIGHT, THEREFORE THEY CANNOT EXPERIENCE A "FAILURE TO
SWITCH".














TVC B MONOCHROME LENS ASSY IRIS CONTROL SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILAURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM THIS FUNCTION COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
WITHDRAWN DUE TO IMPROBABLE FAILURE MODE. CONTROLS MOUNTED ON
CHASSIS OF CCTV COMPONENTS ARE MOMENTARY SWITCHES THAT CAN BE
OVERIDDEN BY GROUND UPLINK AND CREW COMMANDS. "OPEN OR SHORT TO
CASE" WILL NOT PREVENT TV CAMERA AND LENS OPERATION, AND SHORTED
CONTACTS ARE UNLIKELY. SINCE THE CARGO BAY CCTV COMPONENTS
CONTROLS ARE NOT PLANNED FOR USE DURING FLIGHT, NASA DID NOT
GENERATE FMEA'S FOR THEM.














TVC C MONOCHROME LENS ASSY IRIS CONTROL SWITCH




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILAURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM THIS FUNCTION COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
WITHDRAWN DUE TO UNLIKELY FAILURE MODE. CONTROLS MOUNTED ON
CHASSIS OF PAYLOAD BAY LOCATED CCTV COMPONENTS ARE EXERCISED
DURING FLIGHT, THEREFORE THEY CANNOT EXPERIENCE A "FAILURE TO
SWITCH".














TVC C MONOCHROME LENS ASSY IRIS CONTROL SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]*
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILAURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM THIS FUNCTION COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
WITHDRAWN DUE TO IMPROBABLE FAILURE MODE. CONTROLS MOUNTED ON
CHASSIS OF CCTV COMPONENTS ARE MOMENTARY SWITCHES THAT CAN BE
OVERIDDEN BY GROUND UPLINK AND CREW COMMANDS. "OPEN OR SHORT TO
CASE" WILL NOT PREVENT TV CAMERA AND LENS OPERATION, AND SHORTED
CONTACTS ARE UNLIKELY. SINCE THE CARGO BAY CCTV COMPONENTS
CONTROLS ARE NOT PLANNED FOR USE DURING FLIGHT, NASA DID NOT
GENERATE FMEA'S FOR THEM.














TVC D MONOCHROME LENS ASSY IRIS CONTROL SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILAURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM THIS FUNCTION COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
WITHDRAWN DUE TO UNLIKELY FAILURE MODE. CONTROLS MOUNTED ON
CHASSIS OF PAYLOAD BAY LOCATED CCTV COMPONENTS ARE NOT EXERCISED
DURING FLIGHT, THEREFORE THEY CANNOT EXPERIENCE A "FAILURE TO
SWITCH".














TVC D MONOCHROME LENS ASSY IRIS CONTROL SWITCH




HDW/FUNC A B C
ClL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO COUNTERPART NASA cCTV FMEA. FAILAURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM THIS FUNCTION COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
WITHDRAWN DUE TO IMPROBABLE FAILURE MODE. CONTROLS MOUNTED ON
CHASSIS OF CCTV COMPONENTS ARE MOMENTARY SWITCHES THAT CAN BE
OVERIDDEN BY GROUND UPLINK AND CREW COMMANDS. "OPEN OR SHORT TO
CASE" WILL NOT PREVENT TV CAMERA AND LENS OPERATION, AND SHORTED
CONTACTS ARE UNLIKELY. SINCE THE CARGO BAY CCTV COMPONENTS
CONTROLS ARE NOT PLANNED FOR USE DURING FLIGHT, NASA DID NOT
GENERATE FMEA'S FOR THEM.














TVC A COLOR LENS ASSY FOCUS CONTROL SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W. C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM THIS FUNCTION COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
WITHDRAWN DUE TO UNLIKELY FAILURE MODE. CONTROLS MOUNTED ON
CHASSIS OF PAYLOAD BAY LOCATED CCTV COMPONENTS ARE NOT EXERCISED
DURING FLIGHT, THEREFORE THEY CANNOT EXPERIENCE A "FAILURE TO
SWITCH".














TVC A COLOR LENS ASSY FOCUS CONTROL SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST : W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )




NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM THIS FUNCTION COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
WITHDRAWN DUE TO IMPROBABLE FAILURE MODE. CONTROLS MOUNTED ON
CHASSIS OF CCTV COMPONENTS ARE MOMENTARY SWITCHES THAT CAN BE
OVERIDDEN BY GROUND UPLINK AND CREW COMMANDS. "OPEN OR SHORT TO
CASE" WILL NOT PREVENT TV CAMERA AND LENS OPERATION, AND SHORTED
CONTACTS ARE UNLIKELY. SINCE THE CARGO BAY CCTV COMPONENTS
CONTROLS ARE NOT PLANNED FOR USE DURING FLIGHT, NASA DID NOT
GENERATE FMEA'S FOR THEM.














TVC A COLOR LENS ASSY ZOOM CONTROL SWITCH




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM THIS FUNCTION COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
WITHDRAWN DUE TO UNLIKELY FAILURE MODE. CONTROLS MOUNTED ON
CHASSIS OF PAYLOAD BAY LOCATED CCTV COMPONENTS ARE NOT EXERCISED
DURING FLIGHT, THEREFORE THEY CANNOT EXPERIENCE A "FAILURE TO
SWITCH".














NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
COMM AND TRACK
8306
TVC A COLOR LENS ASSY ZOOM CONTROL SWITCH
W.C. LONG
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM THIS FUNCTION COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
WITHDRAWN DUE TO IMPROBABLE FAILURE MODE. CONTROLS MOUNTED ON
CHASSIS OF CCTV COMPONENTS ARE MOMENTARY SWITCHES THAT CAN BE
OVERIDDEN BY GROUND UPLINK AND CREW COMMANDS. "OPEN OR SHORT TO
CASE" WILL NOT PREVENT TV CAMERA AND LENS OPERATION, AND SHORTED
CONTACTS ARE UNLIKELY. SINCE THE CARGO BAY CCTV COMPONENTS
CONTROLS ARE NOT PLANNED FOR USE DURING FLIGHT, NASA DID NOT
GENERATE FMEA'S FOR THEM.














TVC A COLOR LENS ASSY IRIS CONTROL SWITCH




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]*
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM THIS FUNCTION COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
WITHDRAWN DUE TO UNLIKELY FAILURE MODE. CONTROLS MOUNTED ON
CHASSIS OF PAYLOAD BAY LOCATED CCTV COMPONENTS ARE NOT EXERCISED
DURING FLIGHT, THEREFORE THEY CANNOT EXPERIENCE A "FAILURE TO
SWITCH".














TVC A COLOR LENS ASSY IRIS CONTROL SWITCH




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] ,
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM THIS FUNCTION COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
WITHDRAWN DUE TO IMPROBABLE FAILURE MODE. CONTROLS MOUNTED ON
CHASSIS OF CCTV COMPONENTS ARE MOMENTARY SWITCHES THAT CAN BE
OVERIDDEN BY GROUND UPLINKAND CREW COMMANDS. "OPEN OR SHORT TO
CASE" WILL NOT PREVENT TV CAMERA AND LENS OPERATION, AND SHORTED
CONTACTS ARE UNLIKELY. SINCE THE CARGO BAY CCTV COMPONENTS
CONTROLS ARE NOT PLANNED FOR USE DURING FLIGHT, NASA DID NOT
GENERATE FMEA'S FOR THEM.














TVC B COLOR LENS ASSY FOCUS CONTROL SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM THIS FUNCTION COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
WITHDRAWN DUE TO UNLIKELY FAILURE MODE. CONTROLS MOUNTED ON
CHASSIS OF PAYLOAD BAY LOCATED CCTV COMPONENTS ARE NOT EXERCISED
DURING FLIGHT, THEREFORE THEY CANNOT EXPERIENCE A "FAILURE TO
SWITCH".
















TVC B COLOR LENS ASSY FOCUS CONTROL SWITCH




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM THIS FUNCTION COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
WITHDRAWN DUE TO IMPROBABLE FAILURE MODE. CONTROLS MOUNTED ON
CHASSIS OF CCTV COMPONENTS ARE MOMENTARY SWITCHES THAT CAN BE
OVERIDDEN BY GROUND UPLINK AND CREW COMMANDS. "OPEN OR SHORT TO
CASE" WILL NOT PREVENT TV CAMERA AND LENS OPERATION, AND SHORTED
CONTACTS ARE UNLIKELY. SINCE THE CARGO BAY CCTV COMPONENTS
CONTROLS ARE NOT PLANNED FOR USE DURING FLIGHT, NASA DID NOT
GENERATE FMEA'S FOR THEM.














TVC B COLOR LENS ASSY ZOOM CONTROL SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM THIS FUNCTION COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
WITHDRAWN DUE TO UNLIKELY FAILURE MODE. CONTROLS MOUNTED ON
CHASSIS OF PAYLOAD BAY LOCATED CCTV COMPONENTS ARE NOT EXERCISED
DURING FLIGHT, THEREFORE THEY CANNOT EXPERIENCE A "FAILURE TO
SWITCH".














TVC B COLOR LENS ASSY ZOOM CONTROL SWITCH




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] .
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM THIS FUNCTION COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
WITHDRAWN DUE TO IMPROBABLE FAILURE MODE. CONTROLS MOUNTED ON
CHASSIS OF CCTV COMPONENTS ARE MOMENTARY SWITCHES THAT CAN BE
OVERIDDEN BY GROUND UPLINK AND CREW COMMANDS. "OPEN OR SHORT TO
CASE" WILL NOT PREVENT TV CAMERA AND LENS OPERATION, AND SHORTED
CONTACTS ARE UNLIKELY. SINCE THE CARGO BAY CCTV COMPONENTS
CONTROLS ARE NOT PLANNED FOR USE DURING FLIGHT, NASA DID NOT
GENERATE FMEA'S FOR THEM.














TVC B COLOR LENS ASSY IRIS CONTROL SWITCH




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM THIS FUNCTION COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
WITHDRAWN DUE TO UNLIKELY FAILURE MODE. CONTROLS MOUNTED ON
CHASSIS OF PAYLOAD BAY LOCATED CCTV COMPONENTS ARE NOT EXERCISED
DURING FLIGHT, THEREFORE THEY CANNOT EXPERIENCE A "FAILURE TO
SWITCH".














TVC B COLOR LENS ASSY IRIS CONTROL SWITCH




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM THIS FUNCTION COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
WITHDRAWN DUE TO IMPROBABLE FAILURE MODE. CONTROLS MOUNTED ON
CHASSIS OF CCTV COMPONENTS ARE MOMENTARY SWITCHES THAT CAN BE
OVERIDDEN BY GROUND UPLINK AND CREW COMMANDS. "OPEN OR SHORT TO
CASE" WILL NOT PREVENT TV CAMERA AND LENS OPERATION, AND SHORTED
CONTACTS ARE UNLIKELY. SINCE THE CARGO BAY CCTV COMPONENTS
CONTROLS ARE NOT PLANNED FOR USE DURING FLIGHT, NASA DID NOT
GENERATE FMEA'S FOR THEM.














TVC C COLOR LENS ASSY FOCUS CONTROL SWITCH




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM THIS FUNCTION COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
WITHDRAWN DUE TO UNLIKELY FAILURE MODE. CONTROLS MOUNTED ON
CHASSIS OF PAYLOAD BAY LOCATED CCTV COMPONENTS ARE NOT EXERCISED
DURING FLIGHT, THEREFORE THEY CANNOT EXPERIENCE A "FAILURE TO
SWITCH".














TVC C COLOR LENS ASSY FOCUS CONTROL SWITCH




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM THIS FUNCTION COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
WITHDRAWN DUE TO IMPROBABLE FAILURE MODE. CONTROLS MOUNTED ON
CHASSIS OF CCTV COMPONENTS ARE MOMENTARY SWITCHES THAT CAN BE
OVERIDDEN BY GROUND UPLINK AND CREW COMMANDS. "OPEN OR SHORT TO
CASE" WILL NOT PREVENT TV CAMERA AND LENS OPERATION, AND SHORTED
CONTACTS ARE UNLIKELY. SINCE THE CARGO BAY CCTV COMPONENTS
CONTROLS ARE NOT PLANNED FOR USE DURING FLIGHT, NASA DID NOT
GENERATE FMEA'S FOR THEM.














TVC C COLOR LENS ASSY ZOOM CONTROL SWITCH




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM THIS FUNCTION COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
WITHDRAWN DUE TO UNLIKELY FAILURE MODE. CONTROLS MOUNTED ON
CHASSIS OF PAYLOAD BAY LOCATED CCTV COMPONENTS ARE NOT EXERCISED
DURING FLIGHT, THEREFORE THEY CANNOT EXPERIENCE A "FAILURE TO
SWITCH".














TVC C COLOR LENS ASSY ZOOM CONTROL SWITCH




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] ,
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM THIS FUNCTION COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
WITHDRAWN DUE TO IMPROBABLE FAILURE MODE. CONTROLS MOUNTED ON
CHASSIS OF CCTV COMPONENTS ARE MOMENTARY SWITCHES THAT CAN BE
OVERIDDEN BY GROUND UPLINK AND CREW COMMANDS. "OPEN OR SHORT TO
CASE" WILL NOT PREVENT TV CAMERA AND LENS OPERATION, AND SHORTED
CONTACTS ARE UNLIKELY. SINCE THE CARGO BAY CCTV COMPONENTS
CONTROLS ARE NOT PLANNED FOR USE DURING FLIGHT, NASA DID NOT
GENERATE FMEA'S FOR THEM.














TVC C COLOR LENS ASSY IRIS CONTROL SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM THIS FUNCTION COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
WITHDRAWN DUE TO UNLIKELY FAILURE MODE. CONTROLS MOUNTED ON
CHASSIS OF PAYLOAD BAY LOCATED CCTV COMPONENTS ARE NOT EXERCISED
DURING FLIGHT, THEREFORE THEY CANNOT EXPERIENCE A "FAILURE TO
SWITCH".














TVC C COLOR LENS ASSY IRIS CONTROL SWITCH




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM THIS FUNCTION COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
WITHDRAWN DUE TO IMPROBABLE FAILURE MODE. CONTROLS MOUNTED ON
CHASSIS OF CCTV COMPONENTS ARE MOMENTARY SWITCHES THAT CAN BE
OVERIDDEN BY GROUND UPLINK AND CREW COMMANDS. "OPEN OR SHORT TO
CASE" WILL NOT PREVENT TV CAMERA AND LENS OPERATION, AND SHORTED
CONTACTS ARE UNLIKELY. SINCE THE CARGO BAY CCTV COMPONENTS
CONTROLS ARE NOT PLANNED FOR USE DURING FLIGHT, NASA DID NOT
GENERATE FMEA'S FOR THEM.














TVC D COLORLENS ASSY FOCUSCONTROLSWITCH




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM THIS FUNCTION COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
WITHDRAWN DUE TO UNLIKELY FAILURE MODE. CONTROLS MOUNTED ON
CHASSIS OF PAYLOAD BAY LOCATED CCTV COMPONENTS ARE NOT EXERCISED
DURING FLIGHT, THEREFORE THEY CANNOT EXPERIENCE A "FAILURE TO
SWITCH".


















CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM THIS FUNCTION COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
WITHDRAWN DUE TO IMPROBABLE FAILURE MODE. CONTROLS MOUNTED ON
CHASSIS OF CCTV COMPONENTS ARE MOMENTARY SWITCHES THAT CAN BE
OVERIDDEN BY GROUND UPLINK AND CREW COMMANDS. "OPEN OR SHORT TO
CASE" WILL NOT PREVENT TV CAMERA AND LENS OPERATION, AND SHORTED
CONTACTS ARE UNLIKELY. SINCE THE CARGO BAY CCTV COMPONENTS
CONTROLS ARE NOT PLANNED FOR USE DURING FLIGHT, NASA DID NOT
GENERATE FMEA'S FOR THEM.














TVC D COLOR LENS ASSY ZOOM CONTROL SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM THIS FUNCTION COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
WITHDRAWN DUE TO UNLIKELY FAILURE MODE. CONTROLS MOUNTED ON
CHASSIS OF PAYLOAD BAY LOCATED CCTV COMPONENTS ARE NOT EXERCISED
DURING FLIGHT, THEREFORE THEY CANNOT EXPERIENCE A "FAILURE TO
SWITCH".














NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
COMM AND TRACK
8324
TVC D COLOR LENS ASSY ZOOM CONTROL SWITCH
W.C. LONG
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM THIS FUNCTION COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
WITHDRAWN DUE TO IMPROBABLE FAILURE MODE. CONTROLS MOUNTED ON
CHASSIS OF CCTV COMPONENTS ARE MOMENTARY SWITCHES THAT CAN BE
OVERIDDEN BY GROUND UPLINKAND CREW COMMANDS. "OPEN OR SHORT TO
CASE" WILL NOT PREVENT TV CAMERA AND LENS OPERATION, AND SHORTED
CONTACTS ARE UNLIKELY. SINCE THE CARGO BAY CCTV COMPONENTS
CONTROLS ARE NOT PLANNED FOR USE DURING FLIGHT, NASA DID NOT
GENERATE FMEA'S FOR THEM.














TVC D COLOR LENS ASSY IRIS CONTROL SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM THIS FUNCTION COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
WITHDRAWN DUE TO UNLIKELY FAILURE MODE. CONTROLS MOUNTED ON
CHASSIS OF PAYLOAD BAY LOCATED CCTV COMPONENTS ARE NOT EXERCISED
DURING FLIGHT, THEREFORE THEY CANNOT EXPERIENCE A "FAILURE TO
SWITCH".














TVC D COLOR LENS ASSY IRIS CONTROL SWITCH




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM THIS FUNCTION COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV AND SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
WITHDRAWN DUE TO IMPROBABLE FAILURE MODE. CONTROLS MOUNTED ON
CHASSIS OF CCTV COMPONENTS ARE MOMENTARY SWITCHES THAT CAN BE
OVERIDDEN BY GROUND UPLINK AND CREW COMMANDS. "OPEN OR SHORT TO
CASE" WILL NOT PREVENT TV CAMERA AND LENS OPERATION, AND SHORTED
CONTACTS ARE UNLIKELY. SINCE THE CARGO BAY CCTV COMPONENTS
CONTROLS ARE NOT PLANNED FOR USE DURING FLIGHT, NASA DID NOT
GENERATE FMEA'S FOR THEM.















RMS WRIST TVC COLOR LENS ASSY FOCUS CONTROL




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO COUNTERPART NASA CCTV FMEA. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM
THIS FUNCTION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.
THIS MDAC FMEA ID-8328 WAS PREVIOUSLY INCLUDED IN THE CIL LIST BY
AN ERRONEOUS "X" PLACED IN THE "IOA/CIL ITEM" SLOT ON THE
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET.














CONSOLE MONITOR PWR SW




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]





COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO FMEA PRESENTLY AVAILABLE, BUT NASA PLANS TO HAVE A FMEA 3/IR
(NON-CIL) GENERATED FOR THIS ITEM. IOA ACCEPTS NASA PLANNED FMEA
CRITICALITY 3/IR BASED ON CONSIDERATION THAT RMS JETTISON
REPRESENTS A SECOND LEVEL OF REDUNDANCY FOR RMS MOVEMENT
MONITORING AND THAT TWO LATCH SENSE DETECTORS PROVIDE TWO LEVELS
OF REDUNDANCY FOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCH MONITORING.














CONSOLE MONITOR PWR SW
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO FMEA PRESENTLY AVAILABLE, BUT NASA PLANS TO HAVE A FMEA 3/IR
(NON-CIL) GENERATED FOR THIS ITEM. IOA ACCEPTS NASA PLANNED FMEA
CRITICALITY 3/IR BASED ON CONSIDERATION THAT RMS JETTISON
REPRESENTS A SECOND LEVEL OF REDUNDANCY FOR RMS MOVEMENT
MONITORING AND THAT TWO LATCH SENSE DETECTORS PROVIDE TWO LEVELS
OF REDUNDANCY FOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCH MONITORING.














CONSOLE MONITOR SYNC SW
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO FMEA PRESENTLY AVAILABLE, BUT NASA PLANS TO HAVE A FMEA 3/IR
(NON-CIL) GENERATED FOR THIS ITEM. IOA ACCEPTS NASA PLANNED FMEA
CRITICALITY 3/IR BASED ON CONSIDERATION THAT RMS JETTISON
REPRESENTS A SECOND LEVEL OF REDUNDANCY FOR RMS MOVEMENT
MONITORING AND THAT TWO LATCH SENSE DETECTORS PROVIDE TWO LEVELS
OF REDUNDANCY FOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCH MONITORING.














CONSOLE MONITOR SOURCE SW
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ _ [ ] [ _ [ _*
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMP_E [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO FMEA PRESENTLY AVAILABLE, BUT NASA PLANS TO HAVE A FMEA 3/IR
(NON-CIL) GENERATED FOR THIS ITEM. IOA ACCEPTS NASA PLANNED FMEA
CRITICALITY 3/IR BASED ON CONSIDERATION THAT RMS JETTISON
REPRESENTS A SECOND LEVEL OF REDUNDANCY FOR RMS MOVEMENT
MONITORING AND THAT TWO LATCH SENSE DETECTORS PROVIDE TWO LEVELS
OF REDUNDANCY FOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCH MONITORING.















CONSOLE MONITOR BRIGHTNESS AND CONTRAST CONTROL




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO FMEA PRESENTLY AVAILABLE, BUT NASA PLANS TO HAVE A FMEA 3/IR
(NON-CIL) GENERATED FOR THIS ITEM. IOA ACCEPTS NASA PLANNED FMEA
CRITICALITY 3/IR BASED ON CONSIDERATION THAT RMS JETTISON
REPRESENTS A SECOND LEVEL OF REDUNDANCY FOR RMS MOVEMENT
MONITORING AND THAT TWO LATCH SENSE DETECTORS PROVIDE TWO LEVELS
OF REDUNDANCY FOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCH MONITORING.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6PK-20201-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






CB 39 FWD BAY TVC & P/T (3A)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]*
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMP_ [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




OPEN FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON NASA REVISED FMEA/CIL 05-
6PK-20115-i. BOTH NASA AND IOa ASSIGNED CIL DESIGNATIONS 2/IR OR
2/2.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6PK-20202-I
NASA DATA:







CB 40 FWD BAY TVC HTR (3A)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




ONE FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON NASA REVISED FMEA/CIL 05-
6PK-20116-i. BOTH NASA AND IOa ASSIGNED CIL DESIGNATIONS 2/IR OR
2/2.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6PK-20202-I
NASA DATA:







CB 41 FWDBAY P/T HTR (3A)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




OPEN FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON NASA REVISED FMEA/CIL 05-
6PK-20117-I. BOTH NASA AND IOA ASSIGNED CIL DESIGNATIONS 2/IR OR
2/2.














CB 34 AFT BAY TVC & P/T (3A)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




OPEN FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON NASA REVISED FMEA/CIL 05-
6PK-20112-I. BOTH NASA AND IOA ASSIGNED CIL DESIGNATIONS 2/IR OR
2/2.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6PK-20202-I
NASA DATA:







CB 35 AFT BAY TVC HTR (3A)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[p] [P] [P]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




OPEN FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON NASA REVISED FMEA/CIL 05-
6PK-20113-i. BOTH NASA AND IOA ASSIGNED CIL DESIGNATIONS 2/IR OR
2/2.











CB 36 AFT BAY P/T HTR (3A)




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
NASA DATA:






COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




OPEN FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON NASA REVISED FMEA/CIL 05-
6PK-20114-i. BOTH NASA AND IOA ASSIGNED CIL DESIGNATIONS 2/IR OR
2/2.














CB 45 KEEL/EVA TVC & P/T (3A)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]*
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMP_E [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




OPEN FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON NASA REVISED FMEA/CIL 05-
6PK-20118-i. BOTH NASA AND IOA ASSIGNED CIL DESIGNATIONS 2/IR OR
2/2.











CB 46 KEEL/EVA TVC HTR (3A)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /!R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




OPEN FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON NASA REVISED FMEA/CIL 05-
6PK-20119-I. BOTH NASA AND IOA ASSIGNED CIL DESIGNATIONS 2/IR OR
2/2.











CB 47 KEEL/EVA P/T HTR (3A)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




OPEN FAILURE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON NASA REVISED FMEA/CIL 05-
6PK-20120-i. BOTH NASA AND IOA ASSIGNED CIL DESIGNATIONS 2/IR OR
212.














CB 51 STBD RMS TVC & P/T (3A)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )




NO COMPARABLE NASA CCTV FMEA. STBD NOT USED ON PRESENT MISSION.
NO FMEA REQUIRED FOR STBD RMS.














CB 52 STBD RMS TVC HTR (3A)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




NO COMPARABLE NASA CCTV FMEA. STBD RMS NOT USED ON PRESENT
MISSIONS.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON NASA REVISED FMEA/CIL 05-
6PK-20201-I. BOTH NASA AND IOA ASSIGNED CIL DESIGNATIONS 2/IR OR
2/2.














CB 53 STBD RMS P/T HTR (3A)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO COMPARABLE NASA CCTV FMEA. STBD RMS NOT USED ON PRESENT
MISSIONS.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON NASA REVISED FMEA/CIL 05-
6PK-20211-i. BOTH NASA AND IOa ASSIGNED CIL DESIGNATIONS 2/IR OR
2/2.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6PK-20101-I
NASA DATA:







CB 55 PORT RMS TVC & P/T (3A)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
OTHER TVCs AND CREW VIEWING COULD BE CONSIDERED AS UNLIKE
REDUNDANCY AND LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTIONS
COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
IOA ACCEPTS THE NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON THE LATITUDE GIVEN FOR
USE OF VARIOUS GROUND RULE INTERPRETATION IN DETERMING THE SYSTEM
LEVEL OF REDUNDANCY.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6PK-20102-I
NASA DATA:







CB 56 PORT RMS TVC HTR (3A)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
OTHER TVCs AND CREW VIEWING COULD BE CONSIDERED AS UNLIKE
REDUNDANCY AND LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTIONS
COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
IOA ACCEPTS THE NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON THE LATITUDE GIVEN FOR
USE OF VARIOUS GROUND RULE INTERPRETATION IN DETERMING THE SYSTEM
LEVEL OF REDUNDANCY.





NASA FMEA #: 06-6PK-20102-I
NASA DATA:







CB 57 PORT RMS P/T HTR (3A)
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
{ADD/DELET_ )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
OTHER TVCs AND CREW VIEWING COULD BE CONSIDERED AS UNLIKE
REDUNDANCY AND LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CCTV FUNCTIONS
COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
IOA ACCEPTS THE NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON THE LATITUDE GIVEN FOR
USE OF VARIOUS GROUND RULE INTERPRETATION IN DETERMING THE SYSTEM
LEVEL OF REDUNDANCY.



















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 1 /I ] [ ] [ ] [
CIL
ITEM
] [ ] ,
] [x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




NO NASA COMM & TRACK COUNTERPART. CREDIBLE FAILURE MODE THAT
SHOULD BE COVERED BY NASA POWER DIVISION. NASA INITIALLY HAD A
COMPARABLE FMEA/CIL, BUT NASA CONSOLIDATED BATTERY RELATED CILS
AND RESOLUTION ACTION ASSIGNED TO NASA EPS/BATERY SECTION,
LITHIUM CELL EVALUATION.





NASA FMEA #: 05-6PH-24800-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






GCIL DRIVER, NETWORK SIGNAL PROCESSOR




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




IOA 11007 REFERS TO NSP ONLY, NASA FMEA COVERS ENTIRE S-BAND
SYSTEM, AND RELATES THE 3/IR CRITICALITY TO LOSS OF THE TWO S-
BAND PM STRINGS, LEAVING ONLY UHF VOICE FOR STATE VECTOR UPDATES.
A SINGLE FMEA CANNOT COVER ALL THE POTENTIAL DEGREES
OF CRITICALITY FOR THE S-BAND PM SYSTEM. LOSS OF FIRST NSP
DOWNLINK CALLS FOR MINIMUM DURATION FLIGHT, AND THUS QUALIFIES AS
2/IR.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON THE INTERPRETATION THAT A
MINIMUM DURATION FLIGHT DOES NOT REPRESENT A LOSS OF MISSION.





NASA FMEA #: 05-2R-5300-7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







KU BD DMA (DEPLOYEDELECTRONICASSY) TEMPERATURE




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ x ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF MEASUREMENT DOES NOT HINDER HEATER OPERATON. A SECOND
FAILURE, THE THERMOSTAT, COULD ALLOW FOR OVERHEATING OR FREEZING
RESULTING IN DAMAGE TO GIMBAL THUS JEOPARDIZING THE SECURING OF
DA. FLIGHT DIRECTOR MAY CURTAIL MISSION TO PRECLUDE THIS.
IOA ACCEPTS THE MORE SEVERE NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON THEIR MORE
CONSERVATIVE APPROACH TO ASSIGNING CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 05-2C-22200-4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 1 /i ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
DURING NEAR IN OPERATION S-BAND OR UHF VOICE LINK SHOULD PROVIDE
STATE VECTOR UPDATE CAPABILITY, BUT UNDER WORST CASE CONDITIONS
IMMEDIATELY AFTER BLACKOUT STATE VECTOR UPDATE CAPABILITY MAY BE
LOSS. NASA FMEA 05-2C-22200-4 DELETED. NO LONGER A
CREDIBLE FAILURE MODE. HARDWARE WAS REDESIGNED.





NASA FMEA #: 2.4.4.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PAN AND TILT UNIT LIMIT SWITCH




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ x ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS
FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION, RMS JETTISON, AND KUBAND RADAR FOR
RENDEZ AND STATION KEEPING.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 4.4.4.2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PAN AND TILT UNIT LIMIT SWITCH




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RMS TVC DOES NOT PROVIDE HIGH CRITICALITY FUNCTION LIKE
MONITORING RMS MOVEMENT AND P/L BAY DOOR LATCH CLOSURE. UNLIKE
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR
CREW VISUAL INSPECTION, RMS JETTISON. OTHER RMS TVC AND KUBAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STATION KEEPING. IOA ACCEPTS THE MORE
SEVERE NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON THEIR MORE CONSERVATIVE APPROACH
TO ASSIGNING CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 2.1.6.4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY IRIS LIMIT SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
H DW/FUN C A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
[N] IN] [N]
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS
FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION, RMS JETTISON, AND KUBAND RADAR FOR
RENDEZ AND STATION KEEPING.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 5.1.6.4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY IRIS LIMIT SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RMS TVC DOES NOT PROVIDE HIGH CRITICALITY FUNCTION LIKE
MONITORING RMS MOVEMENT AND P/L BAY DOOR LATCH CLOSURE. UNLIKE
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR
CREW VISUAL INSPECTION, RMS JETTISON. OTHER RMS TVC AND KUBAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STATION KEEPING. IOA ACCEPTS THE MORE
SEVERE NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON THEIR MORE CONSERVATIVE APPROACH
TO ASSIGNING CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 4.1.6.4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






MONOCHROMELENS ASSEMBLYIRIS LIMIT SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RMS TVC DOES NOT PROVIDE HIGH CRITICALITY FUNCTION LIKE
MONITORING RMS MOVEMENT AND P/L BAY DOOR LATCH CLOSURE. UNLIKE
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR
CREW VISUAL INSPECTION, RMS JETTISON. OTHER RMS TVC AND KUBAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STATION KEEPING. IOA ACCEPTS THE MORE
SEVERE NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON THEIR MORE CONSERVATIVE APPROACH
TO ASSIGNING CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 2.3.6.4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY IRIS, FOCUS, ZOOM LIMIT




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ x ] *
[X]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS
FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION, RMS JETTISON, AND KUBAND RADAR FOR
RENDEZ AND STATION KEEPING.
IOA ACCEPTS THE NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.














NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
COMM AND TRACK
28394
WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY IRIS, FOCUS, ZOOM LIMIT
W.C. LONG
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
CN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RMS TVC DOES NOT PROVIDE HIGH CRITICALITY FUNCTION LIKE
MONITORING RMS MOVEMENT AND P/L BAY DOOR LATCH CLOSURE. UNLIKE
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR
CREW VISUAL INSPECTION, RMS JETTISON. OTHER RMS TVC AND KUBAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STATION KEEPING. IOA ACCEPTS THE MORE
SEVERE NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON THEIR MORE CONSERVATIVE APPROACH
TO ASSIGNING CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 5.3.6.4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY IRIS, FOCUS, ZOOM LIMIT




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RMS TVC DOES NOT PROVIDE HIGH CRITICALITY FUNCTION LIKE
MONITORING RMS MOVEMENT AND P/L BAY DOOR LATCH CLOSURE. UNLIKE
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR
CREW VISUAL INSPECTION, RMS JETTISON. OTHER RMS TVC AND KUBAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STATION KEEPING. IOA ACCEPTS THE MORE
SEVERE NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON THEIR MORE CONSERVATIVE APPROACH
TO ASSIGNING CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 2.2.6.4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY IRIS LIMIT SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS
FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION, RMS JETTISON, AND KUBAND RADAR FOR
RENDEZ AND STATION KEEPING.
IOA ACCEPTS NASA WORST CASE CRITICALITY. NASA ASSIGNED DUAL
CRITICALITIES (2/2 AND 3/IR), AND IOA COMBINED TO OBTAIN ONE
CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 4.2.6.4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY IRIS LIMIT SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RMS TVC DOES NOT PROVIDE HIGH CRITICALITY FUNCTION LIKE
MONITORING RMS MOVEMENT AND P/L BAY DOOR LATCH CLOSURE. UNLIKE
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR
CREW VISUAL INSPECTION, RMS JETTISON. OTHER RMS TVC AND KUBAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STATION KEEPING. IOA ACCEPTS THE MORE
SEVERE NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON THEIR MORE CONSERVATIVE APPROACH
TO ASSIGNING CRITICALITY.











NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]





NEW [ X ]
COMM AND TRACK
28404
COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY IRIS LIMIT SWITCH
W.C. LONG
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
RMS TVC DOES NOT PROVIDE HIGH CRITICALITY FUNCTION LIKE
MONITORING RMS MOVEMENT AND P/L BAY DOOR LATCH CLOSURE. UNLIKE
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED VIA CREW WINDOW VIEWING, EVA AND COAS FOR
CREW VISUAL INSPECTION, RMS JETTISON. OTHER RMS TVC AND KUBAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STATION KEEPING. IOA ACCEPTS THE MORE
SEVERE NASA CRITICALITY BASED ON THEIR MORE CONSERVATIVE APPROACH
TO ASSIGNING CRITICALITY.




MCDONNELL DOUGLAS ASTRONAUTICS COMPANY-
ENGINEERING SERVICES
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